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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Anthropogenic climate change and developing
countries
The influence of human activity on the climate is increasingly considered as secured knowl-
edge in the academic community. Driven by economic and population growth, anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) have increased since the pre-industrial era and “led to
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are unprece-
dented in at least the last 800,000 years” (IPCC, 2013). Anthropogenic drivers are, according
to a large majority in the scientific community, extremely likely to have been the dominant
cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. If mankind continues to emit
GHG emissions at current magnitudes, major changes in the climate system can be expected
to occur. Despite a considerable uncertainty, contemporary model predictions show high
chances for severe consequences in all regions of the world (IPCC, 2013).
Developing countries are particularly threatened by negative consequences of global
warming and they are increasingly contributing to man-made climate change through their
growing share in global GHG emissions (Olivier et al., 2015).1 They are thus confronted with
a two-fold challenge: on the one hand, effects of climate change can potentially threaten the
existence of some countries via higher temperatures, changed precipitation patterns, higher
sea levels, and more-likely extreme weather events (IPCC, 2014). For the majority of humans
living in developing countries, this will likely be a major challenge for improving livelihoods.
On the other hand, effective climate change mitigation options are in conflict with developing
countries’ legitimate development goals. With economic growth being a major explanatory
1The term “developing countries” is used as a broad categorization for “low- and middle countries” as
defined by the World Bank. Both terms are used interchangeably in the text.
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variable for both GHG emissions and poverty alleviation, developing countries face a difficult
but critical trade-off with consequences for their inhabitants’ livelihoods and global climate
change trajectories. With this thesis I seek to contribute to the understanding of this dual
challenge by analyzing the relationship of poverty, inequality and greenhouse gas emissions
on the household level in three countries, India, Mexico and Indonesia. By adopting a
micro perspective, my work tries to add a much needed viewpoint for the question of how
households in developing countries will be affected by climate mitigation policies, and how
they are able to contribute to global GHG emission reduction efforts.
Strong mitigation commitments by developing countries are indispensable despite the
historical debt of developed countries. Although rather political than scientific, the consensus
emerged that negative consequences from climate change could be manageable if the global
mean surface temperature rise remained below 2 degrees Celsius (Knutti et al., 2016). Despite
the scientific uncertainty, reaching the 2-degree target or similar goals requires significant
reductions of global GHG emissions. How much each country should reduce its emission
level has always been and continues to be a major dispute at the international policy level. A
major conflict line lies between developed and developing countries and culminates in the
question of accounting principles for determining each country’s reduction responsibilities.
Depending on the point of view, which often relates to the perspective of developed or devel-
oping countries, emissions should either be calculated at the production or consumption level,
with further refinements in per capita and historical time dimensions. Current production
emission levels in the world are dominated by low- and particularly middle-income countries.
Together, they account for two thirds of annual global emissions with a rising trend (Olivier
et al., 2015). Although today’s developed countries have a declining share in total global
GHG emissions, their historical responsibility is still large. Considering cumulated emissions
since 1850, the developed countries’ share is at 50 percent, although with a declining trend
and predicted to fall to 45 percent by 2020 (Elzen et al., 2013; WRI, 2014). However, the
use of production emissions is problematic. A large share of goods produced in developing
countries is exported to developed countries. In fact, a non-marginal share of emission
stabilization in high income countries can be explained by production and thus emission
outsourcing to developing countries (Peters et al., 2011).2
Due to these antagonistic approaches to accounting for national GHG emissions and
consequently differing understandings of responsibility (Cole, 2015; Ostrom, 2010), interna-
tional climate negotiations have been in a deadlock for years. On the one hand, historical
emission paths suggest a clear policy implication that developed countries have to reduce
2The production perspective provides already enough evidence against an Environmental Kuznets Curve
for GHG emissions (Sanchez and Stern, 2016; Stern, 2004). A demand side accounting approach adds more
evidence against it.
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GHG emissions drastically and immediately if extreme climate effects are to be avoided
(Althor et al., 2016). On the other hand, reducing global GHG emissions to a level, which
allows staying within the 2 degrees Celsius target, is simply not achievable anymore without
developing countries’ mitigation commitments (IEA, 2011). The situation is exacerbated
since there is growing evidence that the world is already locked-in on a 1.5 degree increase
until the middle of the century (World Bank, 2014). The current speed of emission growth
from simulation studies suggest that the world is likely on a path towards a 4 degree warming
scenario and that recent increases in developing countries emissions puts considerably more
pressure on emission reduction efforts.
The Paris agreement represents a major advancement compared to prior efforts at the
international policy level, but developing countries’ legitimate development aspirations are
still capable of threatening effective emissions reductions. Whether or not current scientific
predictions have any direct impact on national policy making remains to be seen. However,
major movement occurred recently on the international climate policy stage. 191 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) member countries signed
the first-ever universal and legally binding global climate treaty at the Paris climate confer-
ence (COP21) in December 2015. Unlike the Kyoto protocol of 1997, almost all countries
are expected to set mitigation goals including the large low- and middle-income countries.
The Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) are unilaterally determined and
supposed to reflect each country’s ability to contribute to mitigation efforts.
A look into published INDCs of developing countries reveals three major issues, which
make the assessment of emission reductions and its economic implications difficult. First,
emission reduction goals are usually stated relative to a baseline scenario, which are easily
manipulated to claim larger projected emission reductions. Second, mitigation goals are
typically formulated along two different scenarios. Unilateral goals are less ambitious than
goals that can be achieved by drawing on bilateral or multilateral assistance. Since the size
of multilateral transfers is uncertain today, there is also considerable uncertainty regarding
future emission savings. Third, INDCs hardly contain specific policy details and further
steps for achieving emission reductions. A general trend observable in developing countries’
INDCs is the strong emphasis on development goals. Behind this reasonable interest is an
inconvenient truth that will be decisive for successful climate stabilization. The ratified Paris
agreement will only be implemented starting 2020, at a time when a large fraction of energy
infrastructure will already be locked into fossil fuels (IEA, 2014). Investments in replacing
this infrastructure are costly, and unlikely to be made when they threaten the development
agenda of a poor country. Therefore, a closer look at and thorough analysis of trade-offs is
an important issue for understanding the political feasibility of ambitious mitigation policies.
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1.2 Mitigation and development: discussions of trade-offs
and synergies
Economic growth has shown to be a necessary condition for reaching development goals
and the improvement of living conditions of the poor. The worldwide poverty headcount
ratio at the $ 1.9/day poverty line decreased from 44 percent in 1981 to 12.7 percent in 2012
(World Bank, 2016). A large share of the population, which has escaped extreme poverty,
can be found in India and particularly China, but plenty of other countries all over the world,
such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Mexico, Pakistan, Uganda, or Ghana among them, have
experienced substantial reductions in extreme poverty as well. The assertion of economic
growth being the single most important driver behind this reduction in income poverty is
well supported. On a cross-country level Dollar and Kraay (2002) show a proportionate
relationship between average income growth and the income of the poorest 20 percent of
the population. Revisiting the question Dollar et al. (2016) find that about 75 percent of
income growth for the poorest 40 percent of the population is explained by average income
growth. At the country level there is also overwhelming evidence of the strong effect of
growth on poverty reduction. Ravallion and Datt (1996) report a strongly negative elasticity
of poverty incidence with respect to mean household consumption for India. Certainly, there
are also examples demonstrating that growth is not the only important factor for poverty
reduction, as recently described for India by Dreze and Sen (2013). Finally, a consensus in
the literature appears to be that economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for an improvement in living conditions of the poor. In any case, without sustained economic
growth in low- and middle-income countries, a complete eradication of poverty will be
doomed to failure.
The economic growth needed for the achievement of development goals is tightly associ-
ated with increased energy use and respective GHG emissions, creating a dilemma which
amounts to one of the biggest challenges in the history of humankind. No country has
ever managed to reach a high level of economic development without crossing an energy
threshold of about 40 GJ per capita (Steckel et al., 2013; Steinberger and Roberts, 2010).
Without a widely-available modern energy infrastructure supply and large energy inputs in
production, development goals are impossible to achieve. Current price differentials of fossil
fuels versus renewable energy clearly favor the former, although renewables have recently
become more competitive (IRENA, 2015). To avoid risking long-term lock-ins into the fossil
energy supply, the discussion is ongoing how low- and middle-income countries can achieve
economic growth with a low carbon intensity at an earlier stage of development compared
to high income countries which started this process only recently. One frequently debated
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strategy trying to overcome this dilemma is “greening the economy,” which is broadly de-
fined as structural rearrangement of economic and especially energy conversion processes
by large-scale applications of low carbon technology while maintaining productivity and
competitiveness at the same time.
Conceptual reports on greening the economy by international institutions such as the
World Bank, OECD or UNEP draw an overall optimistic picture while theoretical and em-
pirical backing of the concept’s capability to solve the dilemma is still lacking. UNEP
(2011) takes the strongest stance on the synergies of economic growth and environmental
policies, stating that “greening the economy can generate consistent and positive outcomes
for increased wealth, growth in economic output, decent employment and reduced poverty”.
The arguments for strong green growth synergies are debatable for two reasons, as they imply
that non-converters to a green economy might miss out on potential extra achievements
in their development agendas. First, there is neither a theoretical argument nor empirical
evidence available in support of seeing natural capital stock reduction as a major slow down
factor for conventionally measured GDP in the short to medium run (Schmalensee, 2012).
In the case of climate change and fossil fuels, there is no indication for fossil fuel usage
slowing down economic growth and poverty reduction in the near future. According to the
latest information on the fossil fuel resource availability (Shafiee and Topal, 2009), in the
next decades there is neither an expected resource shortage inducing growth decline, nor an
expected self-regulation of energy prices, which could make renewables more competitive.
Second, simulation studies of mitigation policies usually conclude that strong emission
reduction goals, contrary to synergistic arguments, reduce GDP compared to the business as
usual scenario (Carraro et al., 2012; Edmonds et al., 2012). When the cost of transforming
energy from fossil fuels is cheaper compared to renewable energy sources, production costs
rise. It can also be ruled out that the general growth effects from these studies cannot be
applied to developing countries as well. The extra costs generated by the more expensive
fossil fuel substitutions will consequently be at some party’s expense, which in turn is the
simple reason for most countries’ cemented reliance on fossil fuels.
However, strategies for internalizing externalities, e.g. by taxation of carbon emissions,
possibly help leverage synergy potentials of development goals and GHG emission reduc-
tions. Adding to the environmental benefits of reduced GHG emissions in the atmosphere,
taxation of GHG emissions might provide a so called second dividend. A reduction of other
distortionary taxes may result in an efficiency gain and improved total welfare. The literature
on the so called “double dividend” often focuses on employment gains through a reduction
in labor taxes (Bovenberg, 1999; Goulder, 1995) but also capital tax reductions are shown to
lead to aggregate welfare gains (Jorgenson et al., 2013). There are also arguments in favor
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of “triple dividends”, although the definitions here differ widely: Garbaccio et al. (2000)
find additional health benefits through a reduction of air pollution, which was termed the
“third dividend” by Dale Jorgenson (Shaw, 2014). Heerden et al. (2006) define their “third
dividend” as a reduction in poverty, which appears not to be fundamentally different from
the second dividend after all. Again another definition is used by Pereira et al. (2016) who
speak of lowering public indebtedness as the third dividend. All these potential efficiency
gains are important factors to consider for a concluding judgement about the overall growth
effect of mitigation policies. Due to the small number of implemented mitigation policies in
real world contexts, and the complexity of modelling these effects ex-ante, the literature has
little to offer on these points for developing countries.
Despite some well-founded arguments in favor of possible synergies between climate
mitigation policies and economic development, there are still major obstacles to be overcome
in the short-run. The OECD, although advocating green and low carbon growth, is cautious
by considering potential problems such as distributional impacts in the transformation process
(OECD, 2011). In a recent stock-taking of the green growth agenda, it is emphasized that
a better understanding of opportunities and trade-offs of green growth policies is crucial
for any realistic change in their implementation (OECD, 2015). The World Bank has also
become very active recently in the green growth debate. Hallegatte et al. (2011) provides a
very general discussion of possible green growth scenarios. Adding the term “inclusive” in a
subsequent report, green growth is described as “necessary, efficient and affordable” (World
Bank, 2012, p. 3). Although sharing an optimistic tone, most advocates of low carbon growth
can certainly not be blamed for a careless handling of possible trade-offs with development
goals. Striking however is the relatively large abstraction of the discussion and a major lack of
specific policy guidance, particularly for low carbon development in low- and middle-income
countries. A skeptical and more focused perspective on low carbon development is shared
by Jakob et al. (2014), who recommend a modest approach in identifying mitigation actions
with clear benefits for developing countries. They identify feasible policy options, such
as the reduction of fossil energy subsidies and decentralized renewable energy for rural
areas. However, these policies’ suggestions partly miss to answer the urgent question of
how large emission reductions can be realized in the short-run. Other economists are also
generally skeptical of synergistic green economy programs and point to the short-run costs
in developing countries as a major obstacle in implementing low carbon policies (Bowen and
Hepburn, 2014; Dercon, 2014).
Exploiting mitigation cost differentials on the global level as another possible way to
overcome the mitigation-development dilemma is seemingly also not living up to its promise.
In line with the size of GHG emissions, the largest mitigation potential lies in non-OECD
1.3 Distributional effects: decisive for the feasibility of climate policy 7
countries (Akimoto et al., 2010; van Vuuren et al., 2009). Developed countries thus could
contribute to mitigation and development by financing the installation of renewable energy
capacity in developing countries. Large cost differentials can often be found in studies based
on Marginal Abatement Costs (MAC) Curves. This approach is widely and often advocated
by the private consulting firm McKinsey (Nauclér and Enkvist, 2009). Academic economists
have criticized these cost assessments on various grounds (Kesicki and Ekins, 2012): among
many methodological issues, the allurement of negative abatement costs, which are hailed as
cost-free low hanging fruits, are an elusive promise and proof of their existence still needs to
be delivered. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), part of the Kyoto protocol and
most prominent example for this approach, has not lived up to its expectation either and a
succeeding mechanism is not in sight. Large capital transfers to developing countries for
boosting renewable energies are also potentially problematic. Based on historical experience
with development aid, large capital transfers may come with a “climate finance curse” (Jakob
et al., 2015) analog to the effects described in the resource curse literature (van der Ploeg,
2011). In total, the mitigation-development dilemma does not seem to be easily resolved into
a synergistic win-win situation, leaving developing countries with an unclear perspective
regarding potential outcomes of climate policies.
1.3 Distributional effects: decisive for the feasibility of
climate policy
The unclear impacts of climate policies on household incomes and especially the distribution
of these impacts are particularly problematic. They depend on a variety of often under-
researched factors. However, the elucidation of these factors is important regardless of
their existence and implementation problems in international carbon finance projects. For
low carbon development strategies, developing countries will likely be dependent upon
international assistance to some extent. However, multilateral assistance will not be able to
fundamentally change the incentive structure and determine how much renewable energy is
used over the next decades. National policies are needed to supplement climate finance in
setting the incentives towards low carbon energy sources. However, as a critical review of the
catchy green or low carbon growth slogans show, many problems await for those countries,
which are planning to go down the road of climate policies. Much of the political discussion
on low carbon development focuses on abstract discussions with limited substantial analytical
value and policy guidance. This is surprising, considering that the economic literature can
deliver analytical tools to access complicated topics, such as the incidence of market-based
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environmental policies. These instruments, putting a price on GHG emissions either in
the form of taxes or emission permits, will have to play a major role in any ambitious
decarbonization process. Like any other policy, putting a price on carbon will produce
winners and losers. The identification of these groups and quantifying the impacts are a
highly needed deliverable by the scientific community that this work tries to contribute to.
Fullerton (2008, 2011) discusses six distributional effects, which are worth looking at in
more detail and guide the way for the subsequent chapters in this work. Market based climate
mitigation policies try to correct for the environmental externalities created by the polluting
fossil fuels. The public economics literature has much to say on the general distributional
effects of taxes, but environmental policies are in fact more complicated and interesting as
Fullerton (2011) points out. The reasons behind this are that environmental policies are not
exclusively taxes but also include quantity regulations, such as emission trading schemes
or command and control policies. Specifically, the different effects are (1) higher prices of
carbon intensive products, (2) changes in relative returns to factors like labor, capital, and
resources, (3) allocation of scarcity rents from a restricted number of permits, (4) distribution
of the benefits from improvements in environmental quality, (5) temporary effects during
the transition, and (6) capitalization of all those effects into the prices of land, corporate
stock, or house values. With the exception of effect (3), which only holds for an emission
trading scheme, all of these effects are also present in the cases of carbon or energy taxes.
Under particular circumstances, all these single effects can be regressive (a higher burden as
a fraction of income for the poor compared to the rich) or progressive and the overall effect is
a priori unknown. A discussion of these effects and the available evidence in detail is helpful
in understanding their importance and the current state of research.
First, prices of fossil fuel-intensive products are likely to rise, which will affect the
consumption costs of households, the so called “uses” side. In developed countries, the uses
side is found to be dominantly regressive since poor households spend relatively more on high
carbon intensive goods, such as electricity and fuels (Grainger and Kolstad, 2010; Mathur
and Morris, 2014). How regressive the impact is depends on whether welfare effects are
calculated relative to household income or expenditures, the latter usually claimed to better
represent lifetime income measures. Expenditure based assessments are found to be less
regressive than effects relative to income (Bull et al., 1994; Dinan and Rogers, 2002; Metcalf,
1999). Shah and Larsen (1992) have warned early of applying the standard regressivity
result unquestioned to developing countries, as direct use of modern energy can be lower for
poor households. In urban areas the electricity grid connectivity is higher, which correlates
positively with income. Private motorized transport expenditures are closely tied to the
ownership of motorized transport vehicles, again positively correlated with income. Also
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modern fuels for cooking, such as gas, are unlikely to be used more by the poor who often
depend on traditional biomass fuels such as wood and dung for cooking. The uses side
incidence of energy and carbon taxes may therefore be progressive in developing countries.
Finally, the extent to which higher prices are passed through to consumers will depend on the
shape of their demand curve. Since energy markets are usually dominated by international
market forces and national regulation, it is very likely that energy price increases are entirely
passed through to consumers. The substitution between fuels is then ultimately deciding on
the monetary burden from taxation.
Second, depending on how factor demand changes through the price increase, the income
of workers or capital owners will be affected through the “sources” side. If energy or fossil
fuel intensive goods can best be replaced by new capital intensive technologies, relative
wages will fall, returns to capital rise and the policy will be regressive. On the other hand, a
carbon tax may be more burdensome to capital-intensive industries and disproportionately
reduce the return to capital. If so, and if capital provides a higher share of income for richer
households, then the sources side incidence may be progressive. In particular, the effect
on the sources side depends on the elasticities of substitution in production for polluting
industries, elasticities in labor supply and demand, and capital market conditions. There is
very little empirical literature on this question, which forces modelers of simulation studies to
use “plausible values”. The results in this branch of literature are naturally mixed. Fullerton
and Heutel (2007) describe the effects of carbon taxation on the different factor prices and
conclude they depend critically on the substitutability of capital, labor, and emissions. In
a follow-up paper, Fullerton and Heutel (2011) show that the incidence of a carbon tax
on the uses side is regressive, the incidence on the sources side can be progressive, U-
shaped, or regressive, depending on the parameters. Rausch et al. (2010) find that under
certain circumstances, the progressive impacts of a carbon tax on the sources side exceed
the regressive impacts on the uses side, which in sum leads to a mildly progressive effect
even without recycling of the revenues. Fullerton and Monti (2013) show that even when
accounting for potential progressivity on the uses side, the burden a carbon tax places on the
lowest income cohort can never be offset completely. Concluding, results on the sources side
are sensitive to parameter values in numerical simulation models and remain an unresolved
subject of empirical research. For labor abundant developing countries, the chances of
progressive effects through capital intensive renewable energy installments are relatively low
as put forward for Africa by Collier and Venables (2012).
If the climate policy is a quantity based instrument, there will be a third effect consisting
of scarcity rents following the hand out of pollution permits which will benefit the individuals
who own those firms. In the first phase of the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS),
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almost all emission permits have been grandfathered to companies. Since emission permits
are afterwards traded and therefore worth the resulting market price, consumers face rising
energy prices while financing the permits with their taxes (Dinan and Rogers, 2002; Parry,
2003). The only immediate beneficiaries are the stockholders of the polluting companies,
which are unlikely to sit at the bottom of the income distribution. Plain and simple, giving
permits away for free is a way of combining environmental policy with redistribution from
the bottom to the top.
Fourth, climate policies have the ultimate goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
and the associated environmental improvements may lead to a heterogeneous effect in the
population. Air quality improvements through less fossil fuel intensive electricity generation,
road transport, and industry production is likely to affect the urban more than the rural
population. In this case, the distributional impact depends on the spatial distribution of
income in polluted and less polluted areas. Although this intra-country distribution hasn’t
been analyzed in the literature thus far, in a cross country comparison Markandya et al. (2009)
report large health benefits of low carbon electricity generation in poor countries like India.
Agricultural productivity, which is already lower in less temperate regions of the world,
would further decrease in poor countries with climate change. Developing countries with
large agricultural shares in their gross domestic product would benefit more from climate
mitigation efforts than developed countries in temperate world regions. Dell et al. (2009)
come to the conclusion that higher temperatures reduced income growth in poor but not in
developed countries. Beyond an increase in temperatures, the possible increase in extreme
events and natural disasters may also hurt the poor more than the rich. In this case, the
difference may not be entirely explained by agricultural activities, also non-agricultural
growth is affected (Fomby et al., 2013; Raddatz, 2009). The benefits of climate mitigation
would therefore likely be progressive, also within these countries.
Fifth, the transition towards a low carbon economy may have very different effects on
poor and rich households. With imperfect mobility of production factors, returns to capital
or wages are not the only effects on the sources side. Additionally, large disruptive changes
in employment and capital degradation might occur. Deschenes (2010) analyzes the effects
of electricity prices on labor demand for the US and finds a low, but negative cross-price
elasticity. As with other effects, the time horizon used for the analysis is critical. Short-term
effects as calculated by Deschenes (2010) ignore a firm’s innovation responses to higher
energy prices (Popp, 2002; Popp et al., 2009), which may change the story dynamically over
time; but literature for developing countries is neither available for static nor for dynamic
effects. The other side of the coin, the creation of “green jobs” is often hailed as the ultimate
win-win case of climate policy and green growth. There is little empirical evidence of this
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phenomenon, but existing studies shed serious doubt on the existence of a green job miracle,
in particular for developing countries. In the case of climate policies, green jobs are mostly
defined as jobs in the renewable energy industry. For developing countries, Dercon (2014)
argues that the low-skilled-labor intensity of these industries will finally decide if the poor
benefit from this development. Wei et al. (2010) argue that the renewable energy sector
is more labor intensive and therefore creates more jobs than the fossil fuel using energy
sector. This, however, appears to be a rather optimistic assessment since energy prices
are also higher for renewables, use more inputs per energy unit, and it is not clear what
the net employment effect finally is (Fankhauser et al., 2008). For industrialized countries
with large scale support of renewable energies such as Germany, there are contradicting
findings that the net job creation is either positive (Lehr et al., 2012) or negative (Frondel
et al., 2010). In any case, it appears that the export of technologies is essential to achieve a
potentially positive net employment effect. Currently, the large majority of renewable energy
technologies are developed in rich countries and this is unlikely to change in the short- to
medium-run. Therefore, a low carbon job miracle is unlikely to be a plausible scenario for
poverty reduction and progressive distributional effects.
Sixth, all those effects are capitalized into the prices of assets. If climate policy affects
the expected future returns from houses, land, or corporate stock, the owners or renters of
these assets will be differently affected. For developing countries, important factors are e.g.
the ownership of agricultural land or the geographical vulnerability of asset ownership to sea
level rises. Apart from cross-country evidence reporting a high vulnerability of developing
countries (Dasgupta et al., 2008; Mendelsohn et al., 2006), intra-country evidence is missing.
Eventually, in the case of raised revenue through taxes or permits, the reallocation of
these revenues to households may change the net effect of all impact channels described
above. Many studies find that redistribution can make any carbon tax reform progressive,
although as Rausch et al. (2011) note, this may come at the cost of efficiency.
1.4 Contribution to the literature
Considering the various distributional effects that potentially result from climate policies, data
limitations and methodological challenges do not allow me to investigate them empirically
in one piece of analysis. This holds particularly for developing countries, where necessary
data is even harder to come by. Despite the apparent difficulties to deliver analytical studies
incorporating the variety of potential welfare effects, the immediate need for knowledge in
this field demands urgent action in research. For developing countries there is some literature
available for impacts on the uses side and some Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)
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studies including effects on the sources side.
The uses side literature is predominantly based on descriptive patterns of household
energy expenditures as in Sterner (2011), with critical and untested assumptions of com-
pletely inelastic energy demand. This simplified approach has two important drawbacks:
First, welfare effects are mismeasured when households deviate from the assumption of
inelastic demand. Second, inelastic demand implies zero impact on the emission of GHGs.
CGE studies on the other hand, dealing also with sources side effects, include demand
elasticities. These models come with different problems however. Demand curves are often
of a simplified linear form and of dubious empirical credibility as are other used functional
forms and parameters. Additionally, energy expenditures are difficult to disaggregate on a
single fuel level which misses much of the substitution between different fuels. Usually, the
emission accounting is also production based, which ignores the actual effect from emissions
contained in consumption goods. Last but not least, welfare assessments based on average
households always miss out on heterogeneity between households, which can be critical in
distributional assessments.
In this thesis I try to address all of these problems in a unified, theoretically consistent
and empirically tested model structure. Thereby I focus on household expenditures and the
uses-side effects in order to deliver short-run but reliable analyses of household welfare
impacts resulting from energy and climate policies. The consumption perspective is also
strictly maintained in assessing the GHG emission implications. As a novelty in the literature
of energy and climate policies in developing countries, I introduce an emission accounting
framework for households based on actual emitted GHG in consumption.
In all chapters I employ partial equilibrium models with a maximum of detail in terms of
household heterogeneity and energy demand. Additional to purely descriptive components of
household consumption patterns, these models incorporate estimated household demand re-
sponses to policy interventions. These detailed partial equilibrium models are not substitutes
for more general CGE models but complements, which help to go beyond average effects and
offer as much heterogeneity as possible. The disadvantages are naturally the lack of indirect
effects through factor markets, the missing total, general equilibrium effects, and the strong
short-term focus of the analysis. At least for policy guidance, the latter does not appear to be
extremely harmful. The estimated and simulated effects are all effective immediately after
the policy implementation, which facilitates the practical understanding of results. In general,
the used household demand model, the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS),
is of neoclassical nature and can also be used as a demand module in a CGE model, which
would reconcile this line of work with studies incorporating different impact channels such
as sources-side effects at the same time.
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To lay the ground for the emission accounting from the demand side, the second chapter
describes the calculation and analysis of household carbon footprints for Indian households.
Estimates of household CO2 emissions caused by the direct use of energy or indirectly
through the consumption of other goods are rare for developing countries. Addressing this
research gap I apply an environmentally extended input-output analysis matched with Indian
household expenditure data to estimate the carbon footprint for Indian households in the
years 2004/05 and 2011/12. I analyze the consumption dynamics behind the growing carbon
footprints in a structural demand model framework. Between the two surveys, CO2 emis-
sions contained in household consumption grew slightly faster than consumption itself. The
scale effect of higher consumption is therefore ruled out to be the only factor for emission
growth from Indian consumers. By estimating the income elasticities of major groups of
consumption items, I am able to investigate the effect of changes in household consumption
patterns to identify the composition effect. Although the scale effect dominates, high income
elasticities for carbon intensive consumption items are likely to accelerate future growth in
household carbon footprints. Electricity and private transport are mainly responsible for this
slightly nonlinear emission growth effect.
In the remaining chapters, I put the focus on distributional effects of climate mitigation
policies. The third chapter starts out with a closer look at welfare effects of carbon taxes in
Mexico. Mexico recently declared ambitious goals in reducing domestic CO2 emissions and
introduced a carbon tax in 2014. Although negative effects on household welfare and related
poverty measures are widely discussed as possible consequences, empirical evidence is miss-
ing. I try to fill this gap by simulating an input-output model coupled with household survey
data to examine the welfare effects of different carbon tax rates over the income distribution.
The currently effective tax rate is small and has negligible effects on household welfare.
Higher simulated tax rates, maintaining the current tax base, show a slight progressivity but
welfare losses remain moderate. Welfare losses, regressivity and poverty rise more with
widening the tax base towards natural gas and other greenhouse gases (CH4, N2O) through
food price increases. For a complete analysis of the policy, I simulate a redistribution of
calculated tax revenues and find that the resulting effects become highly progressive, also
for high rates, wider tax bases and even in the absence of perfect targeting of social welfare
programs.
Chapter 4 builds on chapter 3 but deals with the weaknesses of the modelling frame-
work, which is incapable of estimating household responses to policy induced price changes.
Therefore, I analyze not only the effects of environmental taxes on household welfare but
also on carbon emissions at the household level for the case of Mexico. The integrated
welfare-environmental analysis that is based on a censored energy consumer demand system
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extends previous work in two ways. First, the estimation of a full matrix of substitution
elasticities allows testing the necessity of incorporating second-order effects into the welfare
analysis. Second, the derived substitution elasticities from the demand system are used
to estimate the short-run CO2 emission reduction potential. For the Mexican case, I find
first-order approximations of welfare effects to provide reasonable estimates, in particular,
for carbon taxes. Analog to evidence in other low- and middle-income countries, the taxation
of all energy items is found to be regressive with the exception of motor fuels. The inclusion
of CH4 and N2O in a carbon tax regime comes along with particularly regressive impacts
because of its strong effects on food prices. The analysis of the emission implications of
different tax scenarios indicates that the short-run emission reductions at the household level
can be substantial – albeit the effects depend on how revenue is recycled. This effectiveness
combined with moderate and manageable adverse distributional impacts renders the carbon
tax a preferred mitigation instrument. Considering the large effect of food price increases on
poverty and the limited additional emission saving potential, the inclusion of CH4 and N2O
in a carbon tax regime is not advisable.
In the final chapter, using extended methodology from the other chapters in one piece
of analysis, I put the spotlight on energy subsidies in Indonesia. Consumer energy prices
in Indonesia have been regulated by the government for a long time with a recent change
in subsidy policies, facilitated by dramatically falling oil prices. I study welfare, energy
poverty, and CO2 emissions implications of energy price change scenarios. The analysis
extends previous work of energy price and subsidy removal impacts at the household-level in
several ways. First, by employing a household energy demand system (QUAIDS) the analysis
shows considerable heterogeneity of welfare impacts. For gasoline and electricity, first-order
calculations are overestimating welfare effects by 10-20 percent with price changes between
20 and 50 percent. This holds particularly for gasoline and for richer households, which have
higher usage rates. Second, the results point at another source of impact heterogeneity due to
the ownership of energy-processing durables. Poor households that own these goods may
be hit particularly strong by energy price rises. Third, I extend the welfare analysis beyond
the money metric utility effects and look at energy poverty understood as a condition of
missing or imperfect access to reliable and clean modern energy services. By drawing on the
estimated demand function and resulting price elasticities, I find substantial effects of price
increases on energy poverty. Fourth, the analysis explicitly considers the emission effects of
the energy price scenarios. Albeit these effects are estimated with some uncertainty it turns
out that reduced household energy demand implies a substantial reduction in emissions. The
analysis thus indicates that energy taxes may serve as an effective mitigation instrument, but
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The carbon footprint of Indian
households
2.1 Introduction
Household income in India has increased considerably in line with economic growth over the
last decades with a clear acceleration since the early 1990s. Although aggregate economic
growth rates of India may have not transformed into a magnitude of poverty reductions
that was hoped for (Dreze and Sen, 2013), substantial reductions in the poverty rate of 35
percentage points have been achieved since the end of the 1950s until 2012 (Datt et al.,
2016).1 With sustained economic growth and an increasing share of the population leaving
extreme poverty, consumption and associated energy use are expected to grow rapidly as well.
As positive as this development process is, energy used in the production of goods and energy
used directly by households comes to a large extent from fossil sources (IEA, 2015). Current
CO2 emission levels per capita are low in international comparison but the large population
size of India makes the country the 3rd biggest total CO2 emitter in 2014 behind China and the
USA (Olivier et al., 2015). India’s growth rates in energy use and CO2 emissions – driven by
increasing direct and indirect energy requirements of households – will thus have substantial
effects on global climate mitigation efforts. Direct energy use for cooking is expected to
increase due to a switch from traditional to modern fuels. Electricity for lighting is becoming
more and more prevalent also in rural India. Occupational imperatives on the labor market
and private preferences require and lead to increased mobility that causes significant growth
in private motorized transport. Further, indirect energy and emissions embodied in the
1This result holds approximately for two poverty lines. The first is a domestic, nutritional food poverty
line following Datt and Ravallion (2011) based on Planning Commission (1993), the second represents the
international $ 1.25 PPP poverty line.
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production of consumed goods have a growing importance as well. The relationship between
aggregate income and CO2 emissions on the country level has been extensively analyzed
within the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature (Dinda, 2004; Heil and Selden,
2001; Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 1995; Stern, 2004). For CO2 and more general for greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions, there is no turning point observed with higher gross domestic products.
On the household level, the effect of rising income on CO2 emissions from consumption
has been less frequently analyzed, particularly for developing countries. We contribute
to this literature by deriving marginal propensities to emit (MPE) on the household level
based on income elasticities of demand and emissions related to the products and energy
consumed. We apply an environmentally extended input-output (IO) analysis in combination
with household expenditure survey data from India for the years 2004/05 and 2011/12. For the
analysis we calculate the carbon footprint of households and identify the respective emission
drivers. By definition, household consumption induced carbon emissions can be explained by
the expenditure levels, the spending shares and the consumption items’ carbon intensity of
production. By estimating household preferences through a consumer demand system we can
assess whether consumption item choices tend to become more carbon-intensive with rising
income levels and how important these dynamics of consumptions patterns are compared
to the scale effect of higher total household expenditure. The remainder of the paper is as
follows. After the literature review we present the IO analysis and the calculation of carbon
footprints. In the results section we present a descriptive analysis of the carbon footprints
and determine the income dynamics behind the carbon footprints and carbon intensity of
consumption. Eventually we discuss the implications of our findings in the conclusion.
2.2 Literature review
Although our particular focus is on India and developing countries, most studies on carbon
footprints focus on developed countries. For surveys of the literature concerning input-output
analysis and the carbon footprint, see also Minx et al. (2009) and Kok et al. (2006). Generally,
carbon emissions, which are closely related to direct and indirect energy requirements of
households, have been the subject of research since the 1970s. Herendeen and Tanaka (1976)
use input-output and household expenditure data to calculate energy requirements of U.S.
households. Additional to energy intensities, GHG intensities have been calculated by Lenzen
(1998b) for Australian final consumption. Based on IO-analysis and including other GHGs
than CO2 such as CH4, N2O, CF4 and C2F6 it is found that most of the GHG emissions are
ultimately caused by household purchases. One of the first studies calculating carbon foot-
prints on a disaggregated household level, household expenditure data and IO derived carbon
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intensities have been used to calculate household carbon footprints for Australia (Lenzen,
1998a). Among the finding that per capita income is the main determinant of household
energy and carbon requirements, it is found that rural households spend their income on
more energy intensive commodities than households from metropolitan areas on average.
Wier et al. (2001) analyze the carbon footprint of Danish households, identifying household
characteristics with a significant influence on CO2 emissions. Kerkhof et al. (2009) quantify
CO2 emissions of households in the Netherlands, UK, Sweden and Norway by combining
a hybrid approach of process and input-output analysis with household expenditure data.
Similar approaches are used by Bin and Dowlatabadi (2005) and Weber and Matthews (2008),
both focusing on US households.
Drawing on a similar methodology for energy as Lenzen (1998b), Lenzen et al. (2006)
focus on the role of income growth in a cross-country analysis. Their motivation is to
characterise household consumption patterns with respect to their environmental implications
and hereby search for evidence on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Their findings
support previous research in the EKC energy literature, as energy requirements increase
monotonically with household expenditure but no turning point is observed. In general,
the EKC literature describes the relationship of income and emissions with the marginal
propensity to emit (MPE), which is usually found to be diminishing with income at slow rates
(Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 1995; Ravallion et al., 2000). However, these cross-country studies
have little to say about the relationship between emissions and income within countries, let
alone dealing with demand side emissions. The argumentation behind the EKC is method-
ologically on a more aggregate level and the discussed mechanisms cannot be transferred to
the household level. Although Ravallion et al. (2000) already emphasized the importance of
consumer demand for non-linear effects of income of emissions, studies that deal explicitly
with this question on the household level are rare. For transport related emissions Kahn
(1998) and Cox et al. (2012) discuss the existence of an EKC on the household level but
studies covering all direct and indirect household emissions are almost non-existent. As an
exception, Golley and Meng (2012) calculate carbon footprints for urban Chinese households
and find a slightly increasing MPE.
Carbon footprints for Indian households and earlier years have been calculated by Parikh
et al. (1997) combining IO-data from 1989-90 and household data for the years 1987-88.
Their paper presents differences in consumption patterns across income groups and their
carbon dioxide implications. A main finding is that the rich have a more carbon intensive
lifestyle with the urban emission levels being 15 times as high as those of the rural poor.
Apart from carbon footprints, closely related energy requirements of Indian households have
been calculated by Pachauri and Spreng (2011) for the years 1983-84, 1989-90 and 1993-94.
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Based on IO-analysis, they find that household energy requirements have significantly in-
creased over time identifying growing income, population and increasing energy intensity in
the food and agricultural sectors as the main drivers. Based on this analysis, Pachauri (2004)
presents cross-sectional variations in total household energy requirements. Using household
consumption expenditure data for 1993-1994 matched with energy intensities calculated by
Pachauri and Spreng (2011), an econometric estimation reveals income levels as the main
factor determining variation in energy requirements across households.
Hertwich and Peters (2009) analyze the carbon footprint of nations by applying IO
analysis with data from the Global Trade Analysis Project. Therewith they construct a multi-
regional input-output model to estimate the carbon footprint based on four major GHGs
measured in CO2 equivalents. The focus is on eight expenditure categories, such as food,
clothing and mobility, and their contribution to the national carbon footprint. They find a per
capita carbon footprint of about 1.8t CO2 equivalents for India in 2001.They also find that
95% of Indian emissions are from final consumption of households. Since we only focus on
CO2 emissions and different years, these results are hardly comparable to our results. The
following analysis provides an update on carbon footprints in India and a detailed analysis of
the relationship with consumption on the household level.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Deriving the carbon footprint
We combine energy IO analysis with emission factors and household expenditures for goods
and services to estimate the carbon footprint for Indian households. Therewith, we can trace
the carbon content of each final consumption item back to its intermediates and account for
the direct as well as indirect emissions from consumption. We focus on carbon emissions
from fossil fuels since CO2 emissions represent the largest share of GHG emissions and other
GHG emissions are not available on the used detailed sectoral level. The method which has
been applied is based on Leontief (1970) and we follow the approach of Proops et al. (1993)
and Lenzen (1998b) summarized in Munksgaard et al. (2009). In a first step we estimate
the CO2 intensities (in local currency unit) of each sector of the Indian economy. We apply
a single region IO model based on data from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP).
By using a single region IO model we account for direct and indirect emissions from goods
produced and consumed in India as well as for emissions from imported goods.
IO tables for the year 2004 are from the Indian Central Statistical Organisation (CSO)
which provide us with an [ j × 1] vector of domestic output x by 130 sectors j, a [ j × 1]
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vector of final demand y by 130 sectors j (which includes imports).2 The A[ j× j] matrix of
the technical coefficients A reflect the input requirements of the jth sector of intermediates
from other sectors measured in monetary units.3 The domestic technology assumption is
applied with the assumption that imported goods are produced with the same technology
as local goods. We also assume that technology has not changed drastically between 2004
and 2011 since we use the same IO table to estimate the emission intensities of sectors for
2011.4 Depending on the fuel type the CO2 emissions per unit of fuel use are represented
in the emission coefficient vector c[m×1]. The [m× j] energy use matrix Eind represents
the quantitative energy demand of the 58 sectors per monetary unit of intermediate output
from other sectors. The energy use matrix E f d represents the household’s fuel quantitative
use per monetary unit of final demand from 58 sectors.5 Total emissions from consumption
CO2 would consist of direct CO2 f d from final demand and indirect CO2ind emissions from
energy use by each sector. In the first step we match the 130 sectors of our IO tables with
the energy use data, which is aggregated to 58 sectors in order to get the energy intensity
matrix E. Secondly, we match the 58 sector emission intensities with the corresponding
expenditure categories from the household survey data. The data on household expenditure
is rather disaggregated and we match all the approximately 340 expenditure categories with
the corresponding emission intensities. Even though the IO tables contain information on
monetary fossil fuel and electricity demand we still need to refer to the quantitative energy
intensity data from GTAP to gain a more precise estimate on emissions per sector.
We analyze the sum of direct and indirect emissions from industrial sectors. Direct
emissions from final demand can be characterized as follows:
CO2 f d = c′E f dy (2.1)
where c′ represents the inverse emissions coefficient vector, E f d is the energy use matrix and
y is the final demand vector. Indirect emissions CO2ind , which are divided into emissions
from domestic production for domestic final demand, emissions from imported intermediates
and emissions from imported final demand.6 The emissions by sector can be estimated by
multiplying the demand of each sector represented as vector y with the transposed emissions
coefficients vector c and the industrial energy use matrix Eind as well as the with the domestic
2The 130 sectors include administration and defence.
3All values are in local currency units at 2004 producer prices.
4This assumption is confirmed by the emission intensities per sector from the World Input Output Database
(WIOD), which did not change drastically in India for available years between 2004 and 2009
5The data by the GTAP energy volume data is disaggregated into 58 sectors, which were matched with the
130 sectors from the Indian IO tables.
6Exports are excluded.
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Leontief inverse (I −A)−1:
CO2ind = c′Eind
[
(I −A)−1y̸=exp +((I −Atot)−1 − (I −A)−1)y̸=exp
+(I −Atot)−1yimp̸=exp
] (2.2)
where Atot = A+Aimp, ytot = y+ yimp and y̸=exp is domestic final demand, I represents an
identity matrix and A is the technical coefficients matrix, which mirrors the contribution of
the intermediates to one final output unit. Additional to these direct and indirect production
emissions, households directly use fuels which are unaccounted for in the IO analysis. With
observed quantities in the survey data, we calculate direct carbon intensities for kerosene,
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), petrol and diesel.7 Another correction is necessary for
electricity emission intensities, due to the block-tariff nature of electricity expenditures.
Since prices per kilowatt hour rise with the usage of electricity, we find no constant but
household specific carbon intensities. Lower income households with small electricity
demand have higher carbon intensities per currency unit than higher income households with
large demand. The calculation is based on observed quantities of electricity demand.8
Direct emissions from fuel use CO2 f d and direct and indirect production emissions
CO2ind embedded in consumption (with the exception of electricity)can be estimated by:
CO2 = c′
[
E f dyhh +Eind
(
(I −Atot)−1y̸=exp +((I −Atot)−1 − (I −A)−1)y̸=exp
+(I −Atot)−1yimp̸=exp
)] (2.3)
In order to estimate the household carbon footprint we multiply the carbon intensity
σ = c′[E f d +Eind(I −A)−1] per local currency unit of each industrial sector with the house-
hold expenditure for the respective category and sum up over all consumption categories
for each household. Therewith we gain the household carbon footprint CO2hh for each





(σ j ∗ exp j) (2.4)
where i represents the household and j the different expenditure category. The household
expenditure data for the carbon footprint calculation is from the National Sample Survey
Organisation (NSSO) India, with a sample size of approximately 125000 and 100000 house-
7Direct carbon contents are 0.00255 t/l (kerosene), 0.00159 t/kg(LPG), 0.00231 t/l (petrol) and 0.00273 t/l
(diesel).
8Electricity production carbon intensity is taken as 0.001003 t/kwh (IPCC, 2005)
2.3 Methodology 23
holds in 2004/05 (61st round) and 2011/12 (68th round) respectively. Household expenditures
are disaggregated into around 346 consumption items which we aggregate to 19 expenditure
groups (for a description of expenditure groups see table 2.1 and the matching scheme with
CSO IO tables for 2011/12, see table A.1).9
2.3.2 Income dynamics of the carbon footprint
The relationship between economic development and the environment has been divided into
three components by the economic literature (Copeland and Taylor, 2005; Grossman and
Krueger, 1994). First, the scale effect is simply the increase in pollution with economic
activity. Second, the technique effect describes the pollution intensity of production activities.
Third, the composition effect deals with the mixture of economic operations. Originally
invented to describe the aggregate relationship between economic growth and environmental
pollution, this classification can also be used for economic activity on the household level. By
definition (equation 2.4), the household carbon footprint depends entirely on the consumption
of goods and the carbon intensity of consumption goods. The total consumption size reflects
the scale effect and the carbon intensity the technique and composition effect. With just one
estimate of the production carbon intensities and assumed constant values over time between
our used surveys, we focus exclusively on the scale and composition effect. Alternatively,
the relationship of carbon footprints and income and household specific characteristics
could be analyzed in a cross-section regression framework as demonstrated by Wier et al.
(2001) and Pachauri (2004) for household energy requirements. Levinson and O’Brien
(2015) estimate a parametric function of household local pollutant footprints depending on
income and several household characteristics. They name this approach the estimation of
environmental Engel curves and find generally concave curves for local pollutants for US
households but do not include CO2 emissions. However, this reduced form approach may
has considerable drawbacks. The first originates from a theoretical standpoint. Households
target their consumption at goods which fulfil their needs under the income constraint, while
pollution represents an externality that is neither explicitly taken into account nor is it an aim
to maximize or minimize the environmental footprint. Such an analysis is therefore more
limited to an interpretation of correlations. Secondly, endogeneity can never be ruled out
in this approach since the carbon footprint is explicitly defined as the sum of the product
of group expenditures and carbon intensities. Total expenditures as a proxy for income are
highly correlated with any other explanatory factor for carbon footprints including potential
unobserved factors. The third drawback of this approach is the missing information about the
9The classification is very similar for 2004/05 and available upon request.
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consumption categories driving the change in household carbon footprint at different points
of the income distribution. While the coefficient for income explains the carbon intensity
of consumption when all other variables are held constant, we have no information which
consumption items are responsible for this change. We expect some categories to drive
the carbon footprint more than others, revealing valuable information for further energy
and climate mitigation policies. To deal with these issues we employ a structural model by
estimating a household demand system for various consumption items. Since we do not have
price data available for the household expenditure items, we assume constant prices and
estimate Engel curves only dependent on income and socioeconomic characteristics of the
households. The model to be estimated is a simple extended version of Working (1943) and
Leser (1963) with a squared income term and has the following form:
wi j = α j +βi jlog(y j)+λi j(log(y j))2 + εi j (2.5)
The necessity of including squared logarithmic terms for some expenditure items has been
demonstrated in a series of empirical studies (Banks et al., 1997; Blundell et al., 1993; Haus-
man et al., 1995; Lewbel, 1991). They account for a higher degree nonlinear relationship
between budget shares and income than is allowed for in some popular specifications of
demand models such as the Translog (Christensen et al., 1975) and the Almost Ideal Demand
System (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). In equation 2.5, wi j represents the share of total
expenditures allocated to the ith consumption category by the jth household, logy j the income
of household j in logs and the error term εi j. With no income information available in the sur-
vey, we use total expenditures per household as a proxy for income. Aggregating household
expenditures into 19 categories (see section 2.4), we estimate this system of equations with a
feasible generalized nonlinear least squares two-step estimator. The demographic demand
shifters household size, age and education are included in the αi j term.
As the budget shares are defined as wi =
expi
yi






Deaton (1997) points to potential simultaneity bias, which is caused by richer households
buying high quality products, which are more expensive. As households get richer they do
not consume more of a certain good and cause more carbon emissions but they consume
higher quality goods, which may not have to be related with higher carbon emissions than the
lower quality items of the same consumption category. To partly account for this quality bias
we split the sample for the analysis into rural and urban. Another problem is the occurrence
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of zero expenditures, which are less of an issue for daily requirement goods such as food but
more so for education, medical and personal goods which are either infrequently purchased
or never due to income constraints. We apply the correction procedure of Shonkwiler and
Yen (1999), which is based on Heckman (1976, 1979). First, a household specific probit
model is estimated with the outcome of 1 if the household consumes good i and 0 otherwise.
For each household, the standard normal probability density function (pdf) Φ(zih,wi) and
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) φ(zih,wi) are calculated by regressing wi on a set
of independent variables zih. Secondly, the pdf and the cdf are integrated into the system of
equations as follows:
w∗i = Φwi +ϕiφ (2.7)
Based on (2.7), the new expenditure levels are calculated for each household in the






The difference between the simulated and the baseline footprint following a 1 percent
increase in income can be directly interpreted as the income elasticity of CO2 for the
respective subsample. This elasticity can also be interpreted as a version of the marginal
propensity to emit (MPE) on the household level. In order to understand the role of changing
consumption patterns for the emission of CO2, we decompose the changes of the carbon
footprint into the share each consumption category has in explaining the rise of the footprint.
The MPE is therefore directly decomposable into consumption items.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Household CO2 requirements
The average CO2 emission intensities for 2011/12 and for 19 aggregate consumption groups
and items are displayed in Figure 2.1. Emission intensities vary strongly between the
consumption categories with the highest emission intensity per currency unit for electricity,
followed by kerosene and LPG. Further, toiletry, medical and clothing as well as transport
items exhibit relatively high carbon intensities due to the manufacturing process of those
goods or direct energy use in the case of transport. Animal protein, which accounts for dairy
as well as any kind of meat products or fish, exhibits a low carbon intensity since we only
account for emissions from fossil fuels and not for other greenhouse gases such as methane
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or nitrous oxide. The carbon intensity of the category vegetables & fruits, which includes all
non-animal agricultural produce, is higher than of animal protein since there is more input
from other emission intensive sectors. We observe low emission intensities for education and
vegetables, which contains all the agricultural goods apart from meat, dairy or fish. Since
2004/05, electricity is the only average carbon intensity which changed with a clear upward
trend (Appendix Figure A.1). With a rising electrification rate, this is driven by relatively low
electricity demand from lower income households and associated higher carbon intensities























































































































Fig. 2.1 Carbon intensities of expenditure Sub-Groups (2011/12)
Table 2.1 gives an overview on what households spent their income on in 2004/05 and
2011/12. The structure of the expenditure shares varies largely between rural and urban
households. Rural households spent a larger fraction of their income on agricultural goods
and a smaller share on housing (including rent) and transport than urban households. Table
2.1 also reveals that expenditure shares for vegetables and fruits were declining between the
two time periods for both rural and urban households. Despite the increase in animal protein
expenditures, total food budget shares decline with rising income as predicted by Engels law.
The resulting average per capita footprint is at 0.7t CO2 in 2011/12, less than half the
size of per capita CO2 production emissions which are at 1.7t in 2012. This difference is
due to smaller reported survey expenditures and smaller indicated total population in the
survey, measured as the sum of individual weights. Regarding the difference between survey
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and national accounts data, there are a variety of reasons discussed in the literature from
selection issues to item nonresponse (Deaton, 2005) other conceptual issues. There is also the
possibility that the national accounts data has serious quality issues since the consumption
aggregate is determined residually and definitions of consumption is different from the survey
data (Datt et al., 2016; Deaton, 2005; Sen, 2000). As we have no reliable information on the
exact nature of the bias in the used national accounts and survey data, we refrain from scaling
the survey data with a constant factor to make it comparable with the national accounts.
Such a procedure would have little influence on the further analysis which mainly focuses on
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Fig. 2.2 Household carbon footprint per capita
We find large differences for carbon footprints over the income distribution as displayed
in Figure 2.2. The 2011/12 average per capita carbon footprint of the 10 percent richest
household is with 1.6 t CO2 about 11 times higher than the carbon footprint of the poorest
10 percent with 0.15t CO2. An almost linear relationship between per capita footprints and
average per capita income per percentile can be observed for the bottom 80 percent of the
population (Figure 2.2a). Behind this threshold, a clear nonlinear increase of footprints over
income percentiles can be observed. Opposed to the optical impression, it does not imply
a general nonlinear relationship between carbon footprints and income. The top income
percentiles are much more compressed since they have a much larger income variation than
low and middle income percentiles. Income and carbon footprints are in fact almost linearly
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related, with a slight concave curvature, displayed in Figure 2.2b. Between 2004/05 and
2011/12 growth in per capita carbon footprints grow along the same almost linear curve
(Figure 2.2b) at the same real income level (in 2011 prices). Although it can be inferred that
richer households are responsible for larger increases in carbon footprints, these absolute
figures hide an important fact about the dynamics of emission growth over the population and
over time. Despite the fact that annual average expenditure per capita growth rates have been
larger for middle and high income households (Figure 2.3a), the carbon footprint per capita
growth rates have been larger for lower income households. In fact, the growth rate in mean
for carbon footprints is larger than for expenditures, indicating an average CO2-expenditure
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Fig. 2.3 Expenditure and carbon footprint per capita growth incidence curves (2004/05-
2011/12)
The carbon footprints have therefore risen more than proportional with expenditure
growth, a fact that can be explained by consumption patterns and the associated carbon inten-
sity of consumption. Over the expenditure distribution, the carbon intensity of consumption
is increasing (Figure 2.4a) but has been growing stronger for the bottom 60 percent of the
expenditure distribution over the last years (Figure 2.4b).
Responsible for this increase in the carbon intensity is a shift towards more carbon
intensive consumption goods. Due to the high carbon intensity, particularly for low demand,
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Fig. 2.4 Carbon intensity of consumption (2004/05 – 2011/12)
appears to have a certain income threshold when household shift their consumption towards
less carbon intensive goods. Urban households appear to reduce the carbon intensity of
consumption earlier than their rural counterparts. For a majority of the population however,
it implies a more than proportional rise in carbon footprints when income increases. Beyond
the size and composition of consumption varying with preferences at different income levels,
other household characteristic may also be responsible for different carbon requirements.
Urban households have on average a higher per capita footprint than rural households which
also holds over the entire income distribution (Figure 2.5).10 Beyond the location of the
household in urban or rural areas, other sociodemographic factors have been frequently used
in trying to explain within country cross-sectional variation in regression analyzes of energy
use and CO2 emissions (Pachauri, 2004; Wier et al., 2001). We opt for a nonparametric
procedure and use kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing to plot the carbon footprint
per capita over income percentiles for different household characteristics (Figure 2.5). We
observe a slightly higher pr capita footprint for households with older household heads above
the 80th percentile. This might be due to higher direct energy needs of older households but
the difference is small. Slightly higher footprints can also be observed for households with
higher educated household heads, but differences are again negligible. Small but negligible
10Nonparametric distributional curves are calculated with kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing using
an epanechnikov kernel function with degree 0 and bandwith 1.15
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economies of scale in consumption and energy use are present when comparing different
household sizes over the income distribution. These findings confirm earlier studies that
sociodemographic (and sociocultural) information is of little importance for the determination
of household energy and CO2 requirements (Pedersen, 2000; Stokes et al., 1994; Wier et al.,
2001). Although available studies are from developed countries, there is little reason why
demographic variables should play a larger role in developing countries as confirmed here.
Despite the clear observed patterns, past trends of emissions embedded in consumption may
not necessarily hold in the future. Particularly the electrification rate is projected to be close
to 100 percent in the coming years, and initially large relative emission increases for lower
income households may diminish. To provide an analytical tool how to evaluate the role of
the different consumption items driving the carbon footprints, an Engel curve analysis is
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2.4.2 Income and carbon elasticities of consumption
Income elasticities for income quintiles and urban and rural populations separately are
calculated based on coefficients from equation 2.5. We calculate elasticities individually for
households and calculate average values for quintiles, divided into urban/rural and weighted
by the household expenditure share of total sample expenditures in the respective category.
Table 2.2 displays urban income elasticities, which widely differ depending on the income
level. As expected, elasticities for agricultural products and animal protein decline with
rising income. The income responses for the high carbon intensive consumption items
differ significantly between the items and over the expenditure distribution. Electricity is
almost a luxury good for the bottom quintile and the elasticity stays close to one with rising
income. Other domestically used direct energy items are necessities, opposed to transport
expenditures which are clearly luxury goods at all expenditure levels.
For rural households, estimated consumption responses for income changes reflect
differing preferences (Table 2.3). Public transport is estimated to be an inferior good at all
income levels whereas private transport is quite a popular luxury good. Electricity income
elasticities are also close to one for most households but describe electricity to be more of a
luxury good for the top quintile. Lower income rural households also buy relatively more
LPG than their urban counterparts when income rises. Considering less carbon intensive
products, expenditures for housing are a luxury for rural households but less so than for
urban households despite the on average smaller housing spending shares. Besides the size
of income effects, also sample sizes differ considerably between rural and urban income
groups. Due to a large urban-rural income disparity, the bottom three urban quintile samples
are small, the same holds for the top rural income quintile sample. Transport is found to
be a luxury good for all households, which is particularly important due to its high carbon
intensity. Households in India are expected to increase spending on transport across all
income levels. For domestically used energy, rural households are still catching up in demand
and exhibit income elasticities close to one.
To understand the implications for carbon emissions, we calculate carbon footprint
changes resulting from a 1 percent income increase which results in income elasticities of
carbon footprints or the marginal propensity to emit (MPE). For the different population
groups, the resulting total elasticities are all close to 1 but differ to some extent depending on
the income level and living in urban or rural areas (Tables 2.4 and 2.4). An income elasticity
of the carbon footprint of 1 would rule out any change in the carbon intensity of consumption
and income would be the only driver. The pattern we observe from the estimation of demand
is that on average all urban households increase their carbon footprint elastically, exhibiting
an MPE slightly above 1.
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Table 2.2 Income elasticities (urban)
quintiles
item group 1 2 3 4 5
1 vegetables & fruits 0.78 0.71 0.63 0.53 0.11
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007)
2 animal protein 1.15 1.06 1.00 0.94 0.70
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
3 processed food 0.20 0.40 0.58 0.78 1.25
(0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
4 tobacco, pan, tox 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.73
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
5 electricity 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.90
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
6 biomass 0.67 0.63 0.58 0.56 0.59
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018)
7 LPG 0.74 0.61 0.51 0.38 0.11
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
8 Kerosene 0.55 0.61 0.65 0.70 0.77
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
9 Other fuel and light 0.58 0.35 0.19 -0.01 -0.31
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.028)
10 clothing & footwear 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.81
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
11 education 2.35 2.00 1.75 1.57 1.35
(0.043) (0.034) (0.023) (0.015) (0.010)
12 entertainment & recreation 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.83
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
13 medical 1.62 1.58 1.56 1.52 1.43
(0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
14 toiletary 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.73
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
15 services 1.45 1.41 1.39 1.35 1.27
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
16 housing 1.62 1.51 1.42 1.32 1.21
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
17 Public transport 2.58 2.24 2.08 1.93 1.75
(0.026) (0.019) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010)
18 Private transport 3.92 2.66 2.11 1.92 1.63
(0.120) (0.084) (0.051) (0.033) (0.019)
19 personal goods 2.31 2.21 2.09 1.91 1.51
(0.091) (0.093) (0.084) (0.070) (0.049)
standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2.3 Income elasticities (Rural)
quintiles
item group 1 2 3 4 5
1 vegetables & fruits 0.71 0.63 0.56 0.43 0.03
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011)
2 animal protein 1.31 1.19 1.13 1.08 0.92
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
3 processed food 0.87 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.99
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
4 tobacco, pan, tox 0.77 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.88
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
5 electricity 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.92 1.01
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
6 biomass 0.39 0.28 0.17 0.02 -0.24
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.023)
7 LPG 0.92 0.83 0.73 0.60 0.55
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
8 Kerosene 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.68
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012)
9 Other fuel and light 0.47 0.39 0.28 0.18 0.15
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.024)
10 clothing & footwear 0.94 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.68
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
11 education 2.44 1.96 1.67 1.44 1.24
(0.028) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
12 entertainment & recreation 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.89 1.11
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013)
13 medical 2.24 2.09 1.92 1.75 1.47
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
14 toiletary 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.75 0.64
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
15 services 1.36 1.28 1.24 1.20 1.12
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
16 housing 1.26 1.29 1.29 1.28 1.29
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
17 Public transport -2.17 -1.60 -1.26 -1.03 -1.00
(0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.042)
18 Private transport 2.67 2.03 1.76 1.61 1.44
(0.038) (0.032) (0.025) (0.022) (0.029)
19 personal goods 0.42 0.85 1.09 1.26 1.30
(0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.029) (0.075)
standard errors in parentheses
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Rural households have on average a MPE below 1, which is surprising considering the
stronger growth in carbon footprints and carbon intensities due to higher electrification
rates and direct energy use. While we expect a MPE above 1 particularly for low income
households, the model has some limitations in correctly representing the discrete-continuous
decision space for electricity and private transport demand. The MPE represents only continu-
ous demand choices and the initial strong MPE rise through electrification is not incorporated.
Despite this finding, the estimates for urban households, where electrification rates are fairly
high, demonstrate how household carbon footprints and income is related. Once households
have access to electricity, the MPE will unlikely to fall below 1 in the short- to medium-run
in India.
Lower income household’s carbon emissions stem to a large part from the agricultural
sector. The MPE for vegetables and fruits is the second highest for these households, partic-
ularly in rural areas, but it is quickly declining with rising income. Urban households are
increasingly buying processed food and do even more so with rising income at all income
levels. Processed food contributes up to 6 percent of the rise in carbon footprints for urban
households, an effect driven by very large income elasticities in this relatively low carbon
intensive consumption category. The additional emissions from total food expenditures
are continuously declining for all households in urban and rural areas down to 9 percent
of the total increase. The largest item specific MPE can be found for electricity across all
income levels and urban and rural areas. Up to 35 percent of the increase in footprints can be
explained by higher direct energy use for electricity. As discussed above, urban households
have higher MPEs than their urban counterparts, which directly results from higher electricity
access rates. For all other domestically used energy, the item specific MPEs fall with rising
income as LPG and kerosene demand does not rise infinitely. While emissions from food
and domestic energy (except electricity) become less important with income growth, high
elasticities drive emission growth from housing and particularly transport expenditures. The
housing share of the total emission increase resulting from income growth increases from 10
to 15 percent for urban households from the first to the fifth quintile. Exceptionally strong is
the MPE for private transport, driven by the luxury good character for all households. Rural
households show relatively stronger footprint increases resulting from income growth. Up to
18 percent of the total emission rise can be explained by private transport demand. Urban
households exhibit smaller MPEs for private transport but still major demand increases,
reflecting their already higher consumption level. Emissions from direct energy use are sure
to grow further for all income groups due to elastic income elasticities for electricity and
transport with associated high carbon intensities. However, the growing share of direct energy
use in carbon footprints growth does not imply that all other goods are becoming unimportant
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for emissions. Even for the top urban quintile, indirect emissions through the production of
goods account for 50 percent of the emission increase. Although non-energy consumption
items are less carbon intensive, they constitute the major share in total consumption and will
continue to contribute significantly to rising carbon footprints. They are likely to contribute
more when energy needs reach a saturation level where households do not need more energy
for lighting, cooking, the operation of durables or transport. For domestically used energy
such as LPG and Kerosene, this diminishing role can already be observed. Our derived
estimates show that this saturation level might be in a very distant future for electricity and
private transport, since both the urban and rural top quintiles show high income elasticities
for these items.
Based on the estimation of consumer demand, the composition effect from the consump-
tion side is not the most important factor, but is expected to play a role for current and future
emission growth. On top of the scale effect, household demand for electricity and private
transport is likely to let CO2 emissions rise more than proportional with income growth.
Table 2.4 MPE Engel curve estimates (urban)
quintiles
item group 1 2 3 4 5
1 vegetables & fruits 0.105 0.075 0.057 0.040 0.014
2 animal protein 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.012
3 processed food 0.012 0.018 0.027 0.036 0.065
4 tobacco, pan, tox 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007
5 electricity 0.326 0.349 0.337 0.329 0.289
6 biomass 0.017 0.010 0.005 0.002 0.001
7 LPG 0.042 0.053 0.051 0.039 0.011
8 Kerosene 0.055 0.038 0.029 0.020 0.009
9 Other fuel and light 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
10 clothing & footwear 0.076 0.066 0.061 0.057 0.048
11 education 0.043 0.048 0.055 0.062 0.075
12 entertainment & recreation 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008
13 medical 0.050 0.051 0.054 0.056 0.065
14 toiletary 0.028 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.018
15 services 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.026
16 housing 0.110 0.107 0.113 0.127 0.150
17 Public transport 0.052 0.059 0.061 0.061 0.062
18 Private transport 0.032 0.045 0.069 0.092 0.146
19 personal goods 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.018
Total 1.004 1.003 1.003 1.004 1.025
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Table 2.5 MPE Engel curve estimates (rural)
quintiles
item group 1 2 3 4 5
1 vegetables & fruits 0.119 0.084 0.062 0.040 0.013
2 animal protein 0.024 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.020
3 processed food 0.047 0.046 0.042 0.041 0.046
4 tobacco, pan, tox 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
5 electricity 0.200 0.250 0.266 0.264 0.256
6 biomass 0.017 0.009 0.005 0.002 -0.001
7 LPG 0.008 0.022 0.032 0.037 0.027
8 Kerosene 0.055 0.031 0.023 0.014 0.010
9 Other fuel and light 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001
10 clothing & footwear 0.095 0.082 0.073 0.065 0.047
11 education 0.037 0.041 0.044 0.053 0.057
12 entertainment & recreation 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.011
13 medical 0.098 0.097 0.097 0.100 0.114
14 toiletary 0.030 0.028 0.025 0.023 0.017
15 services 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021
16 housing 0.080 0.081 0.084 0.090 0.108
17 Public transport -0.060 -0.057 -0.049 -0.042 -0.036
18 Private transport 0.034 0.053 0.076 0.115 0.183
19 personal goods 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.026
Total 0.825 0.838 0.855 0.879 0.930
2.5 Conclusion
Based on input output analysis matched with expenditure data as well as consumer de-
mand analysis, we have investigated the consumption dynamics behind the growing carbon
footprints of Indian households between 2004/05 and 2011/12. By estimating the income
elasticity of major groups of consumption items, we are able to analyze the effect of changes
in the composition of household consumption. We find that the scale effect of total household
income is the major driver of household emissions and dominates the composition effect
of consumption shifts. Particularly urban households exhibit MPEs larger than 1 reflect-
ing shifts in consumption patterns towards a higher carbon intensity of consumption. An
important driver behind this shift is higher demand for electricity with income elasticities
close to 1 for all urban income groups. Private transport is estimated to be a luxury good
for both rural and urban households and adds to the rising carbon intensity of consumption.
Indirect energy use remains an important factor in determining the size and growth of the
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carbon footprints in India. The fact that staple and processed foods contribute significantly
to footprint increases for low income households is a reminder how many households in
India are still poor despite all the improvements over the last decades. Additionally to the
observed consumption dynamics, we find only minor differences in carbon footprints caused
by sociodemographic characteristics of households. Households thus share very similar pref-
erences and increase their consumption for all items with accelerated growth for direct energy
use for cooking, lighting and transport. Considering that currently low income households
use far less energy than high income households we expect convergence over time to occur.
This, in turn, is likely to imply that the speed of CO2 emission growth and energy use may
very well be accelerated in the near future. Calculating emission increases by assuming a
unitary relationship between income and CO2 emissions is set to underestimate the emission
growth that will come from the energy thirsty population. The relationship between income
growth and carbon emissions is likely to be described by an elasticity around or even above 1
in the short- to medium-run, as electricity and private transport demands have not reached
observable saturation levels. The demand for these energy intensive goods quickly increases
with income as millions of Indians are striving to drive cars and use convenient household
appliances for their homes. Our analysis thus clearly points to priority areas for serious
mitigation efforts in India: The electricity and transport sectors.
Chapter 3
Poverty and Distributional Effects of a
Carbon Tax in Mexico
3.1 Introduction
Developing countries contribute a rising share to the worldwide emission of greenhouse
gases. Mainly responsible for this growth in emissions are middle income countries with
sustained economic growth rates while low income countries still exhibit relative small
emissions per capita (Olivier et al., 2015). Among the group of middle income countries,
Mexico, as an upper middle income and fairly advanced country, has become one of the most
significant emitters of CO2 in absolute and per capita terms recently. In 2014, it was ranked
the 15th biggest economy (World Bank, 2016) and the 12th biggest carbon emitter in the
world with more economic growth and fossil fuel intensive energy use to be expected in the
future. Mexico started to voluntarily commit itself to greenhouse gas emission reduction
targets in 2010 at the Cancun Climate Change Conference. In 2013, the government launched
additional and further reaching reforms to the Mexican energy markets and thus prepared the
ground for a green fiscal reform (Metcalf, 2015). In October 2013, the Mexican Congress
approved the Government’s proposal of a tax on the sale and import of fossil fuels which came
into effect on January 1, 2014, making Mexico the first non-developed country to adopt such
a policy. The price of the proposed carbon tax was calculated by weighting the carbon price
of various international markets and the carbon content of each fossil fuel sold in Mexico
using emission factors of the combustion process. The Mexican Congress approved different
tax rates for distinct fossil fuel types with prices ranging between 5.80 - 46.42 Mexican Pesos
(MXN) per tCO2 (0.45 - 3.63 USD) (Belausteguigoitia, 2014). This implies a weighted
average of MXN 43.10 per tCO2 (USD 3.37). However, the tax is not levied on all emissions
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but only on those generated by fossil fuels other than natural gas and jet fuel. The risks of
introducing a carbon tax for Mexico are identified as rising poverty through higher consumer
prices, competitiveness losses of the Mexican industry and associated negative effects on
the economy, wages and unemployment. Although Mexico is a middle income country, the
introduced carbon price is relatively low in international comparison. As a result, effects on
the CO2 emission level and household welfare can generally be expected to be small. This
however will not hold for expected higher future tax rates. In 2015, Mexico submitted its
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to the UNFCCC in 2015 as the first
developing country. Although the instruments to realize the planned emission savings are not
explicitly mentioned, an increase in the carbon price appears as one highly suitable candidate.
For Mexico, we do not find empirical evidence on the effects of a carbon tax in the literature.
Gonzalez (2012) uses an analytical general equilibrium model to simulate a stylized carbon
tax scenario for Mexico and finds that the direction of the effect is determined by the way
the tax revenue is recycled. Redistribution towards food subsidies would lead to an overall
progressive effect. We try to fill the gap in the literature by using an input-output model to
calculate carbon intensities of various product categories and match the production side with
consumption expenditure on the household level in order to determine the impact of carbon
tax scenarios on household welfare. Besides calculating welfare effects for the current tax
regime in place, we add scenarios including more CO2 emissions from natural gas, jet fuel
and other greenhouse gas emissions from methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). We also
include redistribution scenarios and check for welfare effects of border tax adjustments. The
rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 3.2 we describe the methodology of the
input-output model and the integration with the household consumption side used in the
analysis. In section 3.3, general trends in emissions, energy use, consumption and poverty
are supplied as background material for the analysis in section 3.4. We briefly discuss results
and conclude in section 3.5.
3.2 Methodology
Our analysis consists of two steps, which have been applied in the previous literature on
welfare effects of energy and climate policies (Labandeira and Labeaga, 1999, 2002). First,
we calculate sector specific price changes following a taxation of CO2 emissions by drawing
on an environmentally extended input-output model. In the second step the price changes are
translated into welfare effects on the household level.
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3.2.1 Input-output analysis and price changes per sector
We obtain carbon intensities of 34 production sectors (table 3.1) by combining input-output
tables with energy and emission data taken from the World Input Output Database (Timmer
et al., 2015).
The resulting carbon intensities per production sector contain direct as well as indirect
emissions from other sectors.1 By assumption, production is described by a Leontief pro-
duction function which implies no substitution between sectors so that price increases are
fully shifted towards consumers. The model is theoretically valid for small tax changes in the
short-run but increases in uncertainty with time and the size of the tax. For calculating the
carbon intensities we follow Proops et al. (1993) and distinguish between different fuel types
as these naturally contain different amounts of CO2 per physical unit.2 Total fossil fuel use
per energy carrier is represented by Ff , whereby f indicates the type of fuel and represents
an element of the vector f showing the fuel quantities used in production per sector. The
carbon content per physical unit of the respective fuel is e f and multiplying this vector by f
yields total production CO2 emissions Cind:
e′ f =Cind (3.1)
The intensity of fuel use in production ci f is defined as the ratio of the quantity of fuel





The product of the transposed fuel intensity matrix C and the total demand x gives the
vector of production fossil fuel use f , i.e. C′x = f . Multiplying both sides by the carbon
content per fuel unit e′ and recalling equation 3.1 then describes the components of production
CO2 emissions:
e′C′x = e′ f =Cind (3.3)
The elements of e′C can be termed "direct carbon intensities" as they reveal how much
CO2 is emitted per unit of total output by each sector. The inclusion of CH4 and N2O in
the analysis provides us with intensities of carbon equivalents, reflecting the gases global
1The WIOD data contains 35 sectors, but we eliminate the 35th sector (“Private Households with Employed
Persons”) due to insignificant contribution to total production and energy use.
2Fossil fuels included are hard coal, brown coal, coke, diesel, gasoline, light fuel oil, fuel oil, naphtha, other
petroleum and other gases excluding natural gas.
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Table 3.1 WIOD sector description
sector sector description
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
2 Mining and Quarrying
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco
4 Textiles and Textile Products
5 Leather and Footwear
6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
7 Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products
10 Rubber and Plastics
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
13 Machinery, Nec
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment
15 Transport Equipment
16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling
17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
18 Construction
19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel
20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods




26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies
27 Post and Telecommunications
28 Financial Intermediation
29 Real Estate Activities
30 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities
31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security
32 Education
33 Health and Social Work
34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services
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warming potential.3 Since CH4 and N2O emissions are transformed to CO2 equivalent
emissions, we continue to use the term carbon also when other gases are included. Finally,
economic policy is more concerned with final demand and not exclusively with production x.
Equation 3.3 has thus to be transformed in terms of final demand using the Leontief inverse
(I −A)1. Recalling total production x = (I −A)1y and substituting for x into equation 3.3
gives:
e′C′(I −A)−1y =Cind (3.4)
The multiplication of the direct carbon intensities e′C by the Leontief inverse (I −A)1
then generates the indirect carbon intensities:
CIind = e′C′(I −A)−1 (3.5)
Equation 3.5 provides us with a new vector of CO2 intensities which contains the direct
carbon emissions, resulting from direct production emissions in the respective sector, plus
the indirect carbon emissions, caused by the release of carbon emissions in the production of
intermediate inputs in the production process of goods, per unit of final demand y. In order to
determine the carbon content of each fuel, the WIOD data takes CO2 emission factors from
the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories and from the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) emissions reporting, as
especially the latter also report country specific emission factors. Additionally to production
emissions, households have direct demand for fuels and associated direct emissions Cdir
which are not captured in the input-output framework. Total emissions from household
consumption is the sum of direct and indirect emissions from consumption and energy use:
C =Cdir +Cind (3.6)
The carbon intensity of energy items with direct emissions such as fuels, could be
calculated on the basis of observed quantities and physical emission factors. In the absence
of observed quantities, we calculate these by using price per fuel unit data from the Instituto
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), calculate direct emissions Cdir and obtain
direct carbon intensities CIdir(tCO2/MXN). Total demand carbon intensities per sector are
then:
CI =CIdir +CIind (3.7)
3Global warming potential factors under the assumption of climate-carbon feedbacks and 100 year time
horizons are 28 for CH4 and 265 for N2O (IPCC, 2013).
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For non-fuels, equation 3.7 simply reduces to CIind . Depending on the scenario, final
demand can either exclude imports or include them in a border tax adjustment scenario. In
the latter case, we assume imports exhibit the same carbon intensity in production and are
taxed like domestic goods. In a next step, we receive a vector of sector specific carbon taxes
by multiplying the general carbon tax rate µ with the sector specific CO2 intensity:
t = µ ∗CI (3.8)
Each sector specific ad valorem tax rate ti can be directly interpreted as the sector specific
price change relative to the base price pi0:




We convert basic prices to consumer prices using data on the net tax rates per sector
provided in WIOD’s national supply and use tables. The most recently available tables are
from 2011 for the IO and 2009 for the energy and emission data.
3.2.2 Effects on household welfare
The total effect on household welfare in our specification depends on the impact of sectoral
price changes on expenditures. Household expenditures are taken from the 2014 Encuesta
Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares (ENIGH) available from INEGI. To link the
production with the consumption side, we assign all expenditure items to the 34 production
sectors (table B.2 in Spanish language, Appendix). Matching is done on the basis of
expenditures item names and assigned description from the questionnaire. In order to
assess distributional implications we calculate first-order welfare effects relative to total
expenditures per household.4 This is done by multiplying the consumption category specific
carbon taxes with household expenditure shares:
∆whi = whi ∗ ti (3.10)
to obtain the change in budget shares per consumption category. We use the sum of changes
∑whi as the welfare loss, defined as the percentage share of total household expenditures.
For the effects on poverty, we calculate absolute welfare effects and subtract them from
household income, since domestic poverty lines are constructed with current income measures
4Second-order effects, including substitution away from and between goods, are naturally a superior measure
of welfare effects but are hard to quantify here. Since our analysis is mostly concerned with the energy and
carbon content of goods, estimating demand elasticities for a system of 34 sectors based on the IO classification
would require extremely detailed price information which was unavailable to the authors.
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(CONEVAL, 2014). All absolute effect are calculated on a per capita basis to facilitate the
analysis across different household sizes.
3.2.3 Scenarios
Apart from the expenditure shares on certain goods and the size of the tax, welfare effects
finally depend on the tax base, which is the share of emissions covered by the tax regime.
The current legislation taxes CO2 emissions from energy sources and excludes natural gas,
jet fuel and non-energy emissions. The first scenario (A) reflects this current legislation
scheme. Since natural gas is a major energy source in the electricity sector, we simulate the
inclusion in the second scenario (B). Thirdly, reflecting the fact that climate change is a result
of rising greenhouse gas emissions and not exclusively of energy CO2 emissions alone, we
add methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) plus jet-fuel and non-energy CO2 emissions to
the calculation. Besides the share of greenhouse gas emissions by a tax, the actual tax size is
crucial in each scenario. Setting the tax rate to an amount that captures marginal damages
resulting from climate change has created major dispute in the literature (Pindyck, 2013).
Considering the problematic calculation of the social cost of carbon we offer lower and upper
bound tax rates of 20 and 50 USD per ton CO2/CO2e.5 6 In the first scenario, we additionally
simulate a simplified version of the actual “carbon tax” that was introduced in 2014. Instead
of working with a number of single fuel taxes, we set a uniform carbon tax of 3.5 USD/tCO2
which is close to the implicit tax in place and facilitates comparisons with larger tax rates and
other carbon tax regimes in the international context.7 The 20 USD tax can be seen as a short
term interpretation of the carbon tax as a major policy tool to achieve Mexico’s INDC. The
upper bound of 50 USD adds to the understanding of how larger tax rates affect household
welfare. We calculate total tax revenues on the basis of the carbon intensity vector and the
scaled 2014 consumer expenditures. Our derived tax estimates are therefore a projection
for 2014 and exclude the taxation of exports, which is in line with our model assumptions.8
Two redistribution scenarios are simulated, which includes a stylized lump-sum transfer per
household over the entire population and a transfer of a share of the tax revenue to recipients
of the social welfare program PROSPERA (formerly known as Oportunidades and rebranded
as PROSPERA in late 2014).
5In the absence of clear scientific guidance on the exact social cost of carbon, these values will always be
somewhat arbitrary.
6Annual average exchange rate 13.29 MXN/USD (International Monetary Fund, 2016).
7We also simulated the “real” carbon tax by calculating sector specific price changes based on the multiple
of fuel taxes. As results do not differ significantly, we did not report them but they are available from the
authors upon request.
8Official Mexican government estimates are slightly different due to differences in the calculation method,
e.g. exports are taxed.
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3.3 Emissions, consumption and poverty
Total carbon emissions of the Mexican economy have been rising steadily over the last years
(Figure 3.1). Since the beginning of the 1970s, emissions have increased by over 350 percent,
reflecting both per capita economic and large population growth. On average, income per
capita has increased by over 80 and carbon emissions per capita by over 100 percent. This
unequal growth rates can be linked to the rising carbon intensity (CO2/GDP) of the economy
until the 1990s; since then we observe a decline accompanied by more efficient energy
use. Although the economy became less carbon intensive, energy efficiency improvements
since 2000 have been small. If Mexico wants to change its growth path towards a low
carbon pathway as discussed in its national climate strategy and its INDC pledges, a massive














































Fig. 3.1 CO2 emissions, GDP and CO2 intensities Mexico
Carbon emissions and intensities per production sector reveal more detailed dynamics
in light of the overall slight decline (table 3.2). The utilities sector including electricity, gas
and water supply has the highest emission total as well as emission intensity in 2009. Other
sectors with high carbon intensities like water transport are less important in terms of direct
emissions and even less so for household consumption. Inland and air transport play a bigger
role but the latter is excluded from the current carbon tax legislation which implies zero price
changes for households.
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Table 3.2 Sectoral CO2 production emissions and CO2 intensities (Scenario B)
CO2 (kt) CO2 intensity (kt/MXN)
sector 2009 change
1995-2009
% change 2009 change
1995-2009
% change
1 20829.2 3310.59 18.9 36.52 0.48 1.32
2 28501.36 12996.07 83.82 26.17 1.65 6.74
3 4742.34 -986.9 -17.23 17.48 -5.39 -23.58
4 2654.53 70.84 2.74 24.26 -0.15 -0.62
5 411.09 -115.36 -21.91 15.64 -1.92 -10.92
6 442.26 -275.22 -38.36 23.52 -6.81 -22.45
7 3102.72 636.81 25.82 24.03 1.57 6.97
8 31112.55 5502.69 21.49 52.5 -21.26 -28.82
9 9650.42 -3377.63 -25.93 27.93 -8.52 -23.37
10 1481.2 -83.21 -5.32 23.39 -4.6 -16.44
11 24279.19 7282.68 42.85 107.12 8.23 8.32
12 14053.75 -794.34 -5.35 38.5 -12.59 -24.63
13 816.03 101.63 14.23 15.35 -3.44 -18.3
14 3068.47 729.92 31.21 11.23 -1.56 -12.19
15 1721.49 395.03 29.78 10.1 -1.55 -13.33
16 2955.43 850.44 40.4 23.87 -2.15 -8.25
17 107813.29 32436.2 43.03 290.91 -151.67 -34.27
18 11732 6325.56 117 20.33 -3.34 -14.12
19 2118.31 737.27 53.39 17.25 -0.46 -2.58
20 2800.13 960.17 52.18 7.63 -1.14 -12.99
21 8708.97 3109.77 55.54 12.1 -1.12 -8.47
22 6039.58 1313.3 27.79 24.78 -2.83 -10.24
23 23689.76 8221.65 53.15 29.36 -2.1 -6.66
24 2237.76 266.55 13.52 147.31 -5.01 -3.29
25 8254.4 2006.94 32.12 86.15 -45.9 -34.76
26 1965.47 523.14 36.27 18.45 -4.58 -19.87
27 2074.73 569.84 37.87 8.23 -2.38 -22.44
28 907.06 417.77 85.38 4.16 0.65 18.65
29 826.02 344.42 71.52 3.59 -0.62 -14.69
30 5427.32 3451.16 174.64 9.13 -1.14 -11.08
31 5222.88 1301.03 33.17 15.48 -5.24 -25.27
32 6886.26 1976.5 40.26 11.69 -4.36 -27.16
33 2509.07 798.18 46.65 10.89 -2.24 -17.07
34 2244.8 402.36 21.84 14.99 -2.73 -15.4
















0 20 40 60 80 100
100 quantiles of tot_exp_pc 








0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Cumulative population proportion
Lorenz curve Line of perfect equality
(b) Lorenz Curve














0 20 40 60 80 100
percentiles (exp. per capita)
95% CI A
B C










0 20 40 60 80 100
percentiles (exp. per capita)
95% CI a
B C
(b) Carbon Footprint (kg CO2)
Fig. 3.3 CO2 intensity of expenditures and CO2 footprints Mexico (2014)
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The observed overall decline in the carbon intensity can mainly be ascribed to the utilities
sector, which exhibits a large decrease in absolute terms and of 34 percent relatively from
1995 to 2009. This decline can be largely ascribed to a shift from oil to gas in the power
sector. Based on the analysis of overall carbon intensities, we would not expect the carbon
intensity to change by great amounts from 2009 to 2014 and use the 2009 carbon intensities,
deflated to the 2014 price level, for further analysis. Finally, a decline in the carbon intensity
is no guarantee for decreasing emissions as can be observed from table 3.2. However, total
emissions would have been higher without reductions in the carbon intensity, which has
mainly happened in the energy and manufacturing sectors. Although we observe changes in
the carbon intensity per sector until 2009, and the used household survey data is from 2014,
we refrain from extrapolating an observed trend per sector to receive a vector of projected
carbon intensities for 2014. Declines over time depend on the transformation towards more
low carbon energy sources, information which is unavailable to the authors for recent years.
For the calculation of welfare effects relevant consumption expenditures are quite un-
equally distributed over the population. In 2014, total consumption expenditures of the top
10 percent of households are about 20 times higher than the bottom 10 percent expenditures
(figure 3.2 a). We find that 50 percent of the population have less than a 20 percent share of
total expenditures (figure 3.2 b), over 60 percent of all expenditures can be accounted to just
10 percent of the population at the top of the expenditure distribution.
High expenditure inequality already provides an indication for distributional impacts of
consumption taxes in absolute terms. In relative terms, tax payments grow in proportion to
the carbon intensity of consumption. We check the latter by calculating household specific
carbon footprints for our three scenarios and relate these to household expenditures. The
carbon intensity of consumption increases until the 50th percentile when only CO2 emissions
from energy use are taxed (Scenario A and B).9 It decreases again at the 90th percentile,
reflecting a shift to more service and less energy intensive consumption items (figure 3.3 a).
This decline is quite moderate and can’t make up for the quantity increase in consumption,
reflected in high carbon footprints for high expenditure households (figure 3.3 b). Remark-
ably, the carbon intensity declines over the expenditure distribution when CH4 and N2O are
taxed additionally to CO2 emission from energy. The importance of CH4 and N2O intensive
goods such as food in the consumption basket declines with income.
Although the welfare effects in our model depend on expenditure patterns, poverty effects
finally depend on the definition of poverty lines as well. We calculate Foster-Greer-Thorbecke
(FGT) poverty indices on the basis of poverty lines provided by the Consejo Nacional de
9Nonparametric distributional curves are calculated with kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing using
an epanechnikov kernel function with degree 0 and bandwith 1.15
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Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL, 2014). Two distinct poverty
lines are used. The first describes a minimum well-being standard of an individual which
corresponds to the value of the food basket per person per month (Bienestar minimo - Canasta
alimentaria). The population below this poverty line cannot afford enough food to ensure
adequate nutrition. The second poverty line is equivalent to the total value of the food plus
non-food basket per person per month and hence refers to a general well-being standard
(Bienestar - Canasta alimentaria y no alimentaria). Both poverty lines are useful to calculate
since each captures a different magnitude of poverty. Each poverty line is calculated for rural
and urban individuals in monthly income per capita values in current prices which allows for
a distinction between rural and urban poverty in the calculations. In the analysis, the average
of the indicated monthly values over the year 2014 was used. The calculated poverty indices
differ quite strongly over rural and urban areas, while the total value is dominated by the
large urban population. The poverty headcount using the wellbeing poverty line is 45 percent
overall while 54 and 42 percent in rural and urban areas respectively (table 3.3).10 The Gini
coefficient is at a relatively high level of 0.52 in international comparison and lower within
urban and rural areas.
Reliability of household survey data, as well as national accounts data, is heavily debated
in the literature (Datt and Ravallion, 2011; Deaton, 2005). The usual problem is that house-
hold survey data aggregates are considerably smaller than calculated in national account data.
With the data used in our analysis, we can confirm the huge spread between consumption in
the micro household and in the input-output data. However, information on input-output data
specific problems or survey issues such as item underreporting, sample selection issues etc.
for Mexico are unavailable to the authors. We assume the IO data to be more reliable and
correct the survey data with a general scaling factor representing the relationship between the
IO and survey consumption aggregate. For relative welfare measures, this scaling procedure
has no effect on results but absolute changes and redistribution effects are different. The
consumption aggregate in the IO data for the most recent available year 2011 is 2.7 times
greater than in the survey data for the year 2014, although economic growth rates have been
around 2.5 percent on average from 2011 to 2014 (World Bank, 2016). If consumption by
households grew with the same rate, the survey data covers only 35.5 percent of the IO
consumption aggregate resulting in a scaling factor of 2.81.
10Differences to poverty statistics published by CONEVAL are due to equivalence scales, which we do not
use since our focus is on poverty changes trough different tax rates and not through family composition.
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Table 3.3 FGT poverty indices and Gini index (2014)
Poverty line Index National Rural Urban
Minimum Wellbeing FGT 0 0.14 0.23 0.11
FGT 1 0.04 0.08 0.03
FGT 2 0.02 0.04 0.01
Wellbeing FGT 0 0.45 0.54 0.42
FGT 1 0.17 0.23 0.15
FGT 2 0.08 0.13 0.07
Gini 0.52 0.45 0.5
3.4 Results
The different carbon tax rates and tax bases generate a wide variety of price changes for
households. Reflecting the carbon intensity of the respective production sector, price increases
can be expected to rise from Scenario A to C, although with differences in sectors. The
carbon intensity for electricity and utilities, calculated by excluding natural gas, jet fuel and
non-energy emissions in scenario A (table 3.4), is considerably smaller than in Scenario B
(table 3.5). Resulting price changes are small for the current tax rate and moderate for higher
tax rates. With a tax of 3.5 USD per ton CO2, the price change in the electricity sector is well
below one percent and rises up to 10 percent with 50 USD per ton. The largest price change
in the current tax regime can be expected from refined petroleum products such as gasoline.
Including natural gas in the taxation of CO2 emissions (Scenario B) naturally increases the
price for electricity and since the emissions covered increase by almost 100 percent, the
carbon intensity and associated price changes with a similar magnitude relative to Scenario A.
Electricity price changes now dominate fuel price increases. For other sectors, the inclusion
of natural gas slightly increases price changes. As expected, including CH4 and N2O in
taxation (Scenario C, table 3.6) lead to strong price increases for agricultural products and
to a lesser extent for processed food reflected in larger carbon intensities for these sectors.
Other sectors are less affected in Scenario C and show carbon intensities and price increases
similar to Scenario B. Resulting welfare effects also increase with the coverage of emissions
from Scenario A to C and with the tax rate. For the currently implemented tax rate close to
3.5 USD/ t CO2 the welfare effects are generally slightly progressive and small below 0.2
percent of total expenditures for most households. Welfare effects increase to a maximum of
4.2 percent of total expenditures for the poorest households in Scenario C for a tax rate of 50
USD/t CO2.
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Table 3.4 CO2 Intensities for final demand and price changes (Scenario A)
price changes in % for carbon tax rates (in USD)
Sector
No
CI (t/Mio MXN) 3.5 20 50
1 29.07 0.13% 0.72% 1.80%
2 3.57 0.02% 0.09% 0.22%
3 12.50 0.05% 0.31% 0.77%
4 12.75 0.06% 0.32% 0.79%
5 9.06 0.04% 0.22% 0.56%
6 14.06 0.06% 0.35% 0.87%
7 10.45 0.05% 0.26% 0.65%
8 202.26 0.88% 5.01% 12.52%
9 5.24 0.02% 0.13% 0.32%
10 7.20 0.03% 0.18% 0.45%
11 40.40 0.18% 1.00% 2.50%
12 8.79 0.04% 0.22% 0.54%
13 3.40 0.01% 0.08% 0.21%
14 4.67 0.02% 0.12% 0.29%
15 5.21 0.02% 0.13% 0.32%
16 12.85 0.06% 0.32% 0.80%
17 158.43 0.69% 3.92% 9.81%
18 13.04 0.06% 0.32% 0.81%
19 14.19 0.06% 0.35% 0.88%
20 5.54 0.02% 0.14% 0.34%
21 10.15 0.04% 0.25% 0.63%
22 19.43 0.08% 0.48% 1.20%
23 21.24 0.09% 0.53% 1.31%
24 143.45 0.62% 3.55% 8.88%
25 8.69 0.04% 0.22% 0.54%
26 15.97 0.07% 0.40% 0.99%
27 6.41 0.03% 0.16% 0.40%
28 3.01 0.01% 0.07% 0.19%
29 2.29 0.01% 0.06% 0.14%
30 7.08 0.03% 0.18% 0.44%
31 11.06 0.05% 0.27% 0.68%
32 10.37 0.04% 0.26% 0.64%
33 8.07 0.03% 0.20% 0.50%
34 10.18 0.04% 0.25% 0.63%
3.4 Results 53
Table 3.5 CO2 Intensities for final demand and price changes (Scenario B)




CI (t/Mio MXN) 20 50
1 32.52 0.80% 2.00%
2 3.47 0.63% 1.57%
3 12.80 0.41% 1.02%
4 17.49 0.43% 1.07%
5 10.74 0.32% 0.80%
6 17.84 0.45% 1.12%
7 13.17 0.46% 1.15%
8 209.01 5.37% 13.42%
9 7.96 0.34% 0.86%
10 12.35 0.32% 0.79%
11 44.01 1.38% 3.45%
12 12.53 0.51% 1.27%
13 9.07 0.13% 0.33%
14 6.03 0.19% 0.48%
15 6.14 0.20% 0.49%
16 13.03 0.55% 1.38%
17 158.31 7.18% 17.95%
18 12.45 0.44% 1.10%
19 13.87 0.43% 1.07%
20 5.31 0.19% 0.48%
21 9.94 0.30% 0.76%
22 19.40 0.61% 1.52%
23 20.94 0.73% 1.82%
24 143.30 3.63% 9.08%
25 9.83 0.32% 0.79%
26 16.07 0.45% 1.12%
27 6.31 0.20% 0.51%
28 3.03 0.10% 0.24%
29 2.25 0.09% 0.22%
30 7.11 0.22% 0.55%
31 11.43 0.36% 0.91%
32 10.34 0.29% 0.72%
33 7.75 0.27% 0.68%
34 10.32 0.33% 0.83%
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Table 3.6 CO2 Intensities for final demand and price changes (Scenario C)




CI (t/Mio MXN) 20 50
1 172.93 4.28% 10.70%
2 31.80 0.79% 1.97%
3 43.72 1.08% 2.71%
4 23.63 0.58% 1.46%
5 19.44 0.48% 1.20%
6 47.12 1.17% 2.92%
7 20.03 0.50% 1.24%
8 222.20 5.50% 13.75%
9 21.57 0.53% 1.33%
10 15.22 0.38% 0.94%
11 100.26 2.48% 6.21%
12 27.79 0.69% 1.72%
13 6.28 0.16% 0.39%
14 9.50 0.24% 0.59%
15 9.58 0.24% 0.59%
16 26.51 0.66% 1.64%
17 296.62 7.34% 18.36%
18 23.27 0.58% 1.44%
19 18.92 0.47% 1.17%
20 9.59 0.24% 0.59%
21 13.95 0.35% 0.86%
22 26.49 0.66% 1.64%
23 31.21 0.77% 1.93%
24 151.90 3.76% 9.40%
25 74.78 1.85% 4.63%
26 19.10 0.47% 1.18%
27 9.23 0.23% 0.57%
28 4.90 0.12% 0.30%
29 3.82 0.09% 0.24%
30 10.06 0.25% 0.62%
31 15.96 0.40% 0.99%
32 12.04 0.30% 0.75%
33 12.83 0.32% 0.79%
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Fig. 3.5 Relative welfare effects scenario A and B
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Fig. 3.6 Decomposition welfare loss, bottom 10 percent











Fig. 3.7 Average relative welfare losses per federal state
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For Scenario A, relative welfare losses rise until the 60th percentile, stay constant until
the 80th percentile and decline afterwards (figure 3.4). The absolute effect rises along the
expenditure distribution as already indicated in the description of the expenditures and the
carbon footprint. A more ambitious climate policy with higher tax rates of 20-50 USD/t
CO2 would come with the same relative distributional pattern, although progressivity is more
visible. With a larger tax rate of 50 USD/t CO2, welfare losses are at 1.5 percent for the
bottom part of the expenditure distribution. Poverty indices are hardly affected from the
lower rates, whereas a 50 USD tax would increase the national minimum wellbeing and
wellbeing poverty rates by 0.6 and 0.9 percentage points respectively (table 3.7), mainly
driven by gasoline and electricity prices. For both poverty lines, rural poverty increases more
than urban poverty.
Table 3.7 FGT poverty indices (in %), changes from baseline (Scenario A)
Minimum Wellbeing Wellbeing
Scenario FGT National Rural Urban National Rural Urban
I (USD 3.5) 0 0.064 0.000 0.082 0.081 0.024 0.097
1 0.016 0.024 0.013 0.036 0.042 0.034
2 0.008 0.015 0.006 0.023 0.030 0.021
II (USD 20) 0 0.307 0.379 0.287 0.369 0.298 0.389
1 0.090 0.140 0.076 0.205 0.243 0.194
2 0.047 0.086 0.036 0.133 0.171 0.122
II (USD 20) 0 -0.336 -0.465 -0.300 -0.228 -0.480 -0.157
Lump-Sum 1 -0.138 -0.333 -0.084 -0.214 -0.450 -0.147
2 -0.081 -0.216 -0.044 -0.165 -0.356 -0.111
II (USD 20) 0 -0.732 -1.975 -0.383 -0.355 -1.960 0.096
PROSPERA 1 -0.387 -1.236 -0.148 -0.476 -1.655 -0.145
2 -0.233 -0.790 -0.076 -0.408 -1.321 -0.152
III (USD 50) 0 0.616 0.818 0.559 0.918 0.978 0.902
1 0.231 0.358 0.195 0.519 0.616 0.492
2 0.123 0.224 0.095 0.338 0.434 0.311
III (USD 50) 0 -0.703 -1.279 -0.542 -0.580 -1.276 -0.385
Lump-Sum 1 -0.334 -0.809 -0.200 -0.526 -1.104 -0.364
2 -0.193 -0.511 -0.104 -0.402 -0.866 -0.272
III (USD 50) 0 -1.706 -4.942 -0.798 -0.820 -4.583 0.237
PROSPERA 1 -0.806 -2.616 -0.299 -1.082 -3.748 -0.333
2 -0.439 -1.522 -0.135 -0.876 -2.844 -0.324
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Table 3.8 FGT poverty indices (in %), changes from baseline (Scenario B)
Minimum Wellbeing Wellbeing
Scenario FGT National Rural Urban National Rural Urban
I (USD 3.5) 0 0.085 0.000 0.109 0.148 0.075 0.168
1 0.021 0.032 0.018 0.048 0.056 0.046
2 0.011 0.020 0.008 0.031 0.039 0.029
II (USD 20) 0 0.372 0.495 0.338 0.499 0.448 0.513
1 0.122 0.187 0.104 0.276 0.322 0.263
2 0.064 0.115 0.050 0.179 0.227 0.166
II (USD 20) 0 -0.404 -0.683 -0.325 -0.285 -0.729 -0.161
Lump-Sum 1 -0.175 -0.429 -0.104 -0.270 -0.579 -0.183
2 -0.103 -0.276 -0.054 -0.208 -0.458 -0.138
II (USD 20) 0 -0.912 -2.621 -0.432 -0.410 -2.497 0.176
PROSPERA 1 -0.482 -1.555 -0.182 -0.599 -2.106 -0.176
2 -0.285 -0.975 -0.091 -0.510 -1.666 -0.186
III (USD 50) 0 0.833 1.049 0.773 1.237 1.203 1.246
1 0.315 0.479 0.269 0.701 0.820 0.668
2 0.169 0.303 0.132 0.459 0.580 0.425
III (USD 50) 0 -0.961 -1.700 -0.753 -0.767 -1.693 -0.508
Lump-Sum 1 -0.419 -1.031 -0.248 -0.661 -1.416 -0.450
2 -0.241 -0.644 -0.127 -0.504 -1.106 -0.335
III (USD 50) 0 -2.190 -6.230 -1.056 -1.088 -5.785 0.230
PROSPERA 1 -0.941 -3.101 -0.335 -1.319 -4.638 -0.388
2 -0.492 -1.743 -0.141 -1.043 -3.439 -0.371
Including natural gas in the taxation of emissions (Scenario B), a 50 USD tax rate
increases welfare losses up to 2.1 and 2.6 percent for low and high income households
respectively (Figure 3.5). The currently implied tax rate of 3.5 USD would still create small
welfare losses below 0.2 percent of total expenditures for all households. The maximum
wellbeing poverty rate increase is 1.2 percentage points with a 50 USD tax (table 3.8). In
this scenario, extremely poor rural households are hit worse than their urban counterparts.
At the wellbeing poverty line, differences between urban and rural poverty impacts are less
pronounced.
The story changes essentially with the inclusion of CH4 and N2O in the taxation of
emissions (Scenario C). The price increase for agricultural and processed food products
not just leads to higher welfare losses it also increases regressivity since poorer households
spend relatively more on food products (figure 3.5). This is reflected in an increase in the
minimum wellbeing poverty rate on the national level of 1.5 percentage points for a 50 USD
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Table 3.9 FGT poverty indices (in %), changes from baseline (Scenario C)
Minimum Wellbeing Wellbeing
Scenario FGT National Rural Urban National Rural Urban
I (USD 3.5) 0 0.131 0.178 0.118 0.169 0.080 0.194
1 0.037 0.065 0.030 0.078 0.103 0.071
2 0.020 0.042 0.014 0.052 0.076 0.046
II (USD 20) 0 0.557 0.880 0.466 0.770 0.795 0.763
1 0.219 0.382 0.173 0.452 0.596 0.411
2 0.120 0.246 0.084 0.305 0.441 0.266
II (USD 20) 0 -0.523 -0.773 -0.452 -0.444 -1.035 -0.278
Lump-Sum 1 -0.229 -0.546 -0.140 -0.369 -0.759 -0.260
2 -0.132 -0.344 -0.073 -0.279 -0.590 -0.191
II (USD 20) 0 -1.333 -3.684 -0.673 -0.567 -3.494 0.255
PROSPERA 1 -0.644 -2.098 -0.236 -0.834 -2.940 -0.243
2 -0.364 -1.262 -0.112 -0.690 -2.270 -0.247
III (USD 50) 0 1.489 2.111 1.315 1.750 1.652 1.778
1 0.573 0.996 0.454 1.154 1.520 1.052
2 0.322 0.658 0.228 0.786 1.140 0.687
III (USD 50) 0 -1.319 -2.388 -1.019 -1.072 -2.037 -0.800
Lump-Sum 1 -0.535 -1.281 -0.326 -0.898 -1.839 -0.634
2 -0.302 -0.783 -0.167 -0.666 -1.403 -0.460
III (USD 50) 0 -2.723 -8.246 -1.172 -1.547 -8.292 0.346
PROSPERA 1 -1.083 -3.723 -0.342 -1.701 -6.078 -0.472
2 -0.518 -1.943 -0.119 -1.273 -4.302 -0.424
tax (table 3.9). More pronounced than in scenarios where only energy related emissions are
taxed, is also the increase of poverty intensity and severity. With large food price changes,
households above the poverty line will fall below the poverty line but also households below
the poverty line face increasing difficulties to escape poverty. This holds particularly for rural
households, which are already severely affected by price increases for energy items.
Reflecting the large rural urban income gap and despite the smaller poverty impacts,
urban households face slightly higher welfare losses than rural households in scenario A and
B when only energy emissions are taxed. Urban households spend relatively more on direct
energy goods such as electricity. In Scenario C, rural low income households face higher
welfare losses than their urban counterparts. For most socioeconomic groups, welfare effects
lie within a 95 percent confidence interval of the average percentile consumption and are thus
mostly statistically insignificant over the income distribution for all scenarios. We do not find
any significant difference in welfare effects between female and male headed households
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and small differences due to family sizes. Age plays some role for consumption decisions,
households with older household heads suffer slightly higher welfare losses. This finding
can be explained by relatively higher expenditures for emission intensive utilities compared
to households with younger household heads.
To understand the role of the single sectors in shaping welfare effects, we provide
a graphical overview of sector specific carbon intensities, welfare effects and household
expenditure shares for a USD 20 tax rate on CO2 emissions from energy use (Scenario B).
For the bottom 10 percent of the expenditure distribution, agricultural products, processed
food, refined petroleum and utilities make up the largest part of the welfare loss (figure 3.6).
Agricultural products are not very energy intensive but households spend a large share of
their income on processed foods. The carbon intensity for the utilities and refined petroleum
products are the highest, which make them main contributors for the welfare loss despite a
relatively low expenditure share. Expenditure patterns are different for the top 10 percent of
the expenditure distribution, who spend relatively more on rent and service oriented goods
such as hotels and restaurants (figure 3.6, appendix) but also on refined petroleum products
such as gasoline. The latter becomes the consumption item causing the largest welfare loss
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Fig. 3.8 Welfare effects lump-sum vs. PROSPERA redistribution Scenario B
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Additionally to finding differences in welfare effects across the expenditure distribution
with different tax scenarios, we find spatial heterogeneity within the country. In line with
our findings over the expenditure distribution, northern states, which generally exhibit above
average expenditures per capita have higher average welfare losses in scenarios covering
energy emissions only (Figure 3.7).
The reason can be found in higher budget shares for electricity and fuels in northern states.
With CH4 and N2O emissions included, this spatial heterogeneity mostly vanishes since
associated food price increases particularly lead to large welfare losses in southern states.
Finally, a redistribution simulation of projected tax revenues for our three scenarios is
an elementary part for the analysis of distributional effects. Transferring total tax revenues
in a lump-sum fashion per household in Scenario B with a 20 USD tax results in average
welfare gains for the bottom 85 percent of the distribution (figure 3.8). Welfare gains for
households at the lower end of the distribution are large with a magnitude of up to three times
the effect of the counterfactual welfare loss. This large redistribution effect occurs despite
the fact that low income households benefit less from the redistribution than high income
households on a per capita basis due to larger family sizes. Poverty indicators decrease
across all dimensions but more so for rural areas, where the combined tax and lump-sum
redistribution scheme would lead to poverty rate declines of about half a percentage point
at both poverty lines. Redistribution of full tax revenues via PROSPERA has the potential
to generate huge welfare gains for PROSPERA recipients more than 10 percent of total
household expenditures. Surprisingly, a nonsignificant share of households above the median
income benefit from PROSPERA although they are not classified as poor. Poverty reductions
are much stronger in this case, particularly at the minimum wellbeing poverty line and for
rural households (table 3.8.
In all other simulated scenarios with redistribution, distributional patterns become even
more progressive with higher tax revenues, particularly for PROSPERA scenarios. The urban
poverty rate on the other hand remains either constant or increases slightly in all PROSPERA
scenarios, which leads to moderate national poverty reductions despite massive improvements
for rural households. Two reasons are behind this finding. First, PROSPERA is mainly
targeted at very poor, particularly rural households. Urban households close to the wellbeing
poverty line are less likely to be recipients of PROSPERA. Second, the urban wellbeing
poverty line is significantly larger than the rural poverty line. Generally all redistribution
simulations clearly reverse the regressive into a progressive overall effect.
Inequality indices such as the Gini Index hardly react to the magnitude of welfare effects
caused by the different tax rates in our analysis (table B.1). The distributional effects of
carbon taxes are not severe enough to create significant changes in the income distribution on
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the national level, not even with high tax rates and a broad tax base. However, redistribution
of tax revenues via targeted cash transfer programs can decrease income inequality within
rural areas or keep it constant when smaller shares of tax revenues are used for redistribution.
If the tax is accompanied with border tax adjustments makes no significant difference, welfare
effects remain largely unaffected. Although 9.5 percent of consumption goods get imported,
these are mainly goods from less carbon intensive sectors such as the processed food and
transport equipment sectors.
3.5 Conclusion
Our analysis offers a detailed view on potential welfare effects of different carbon tax
scenarios for Mexico. The current rate of the carbon tax is small enough not to create much
impact for household welfare. Although we are not able to calculate resulting emission
reductions, the current effect can expected to be negligible with the currently implemented
tax regime. Adding to it, natural gas remains tax exempt and makes up 25 percent of energy
related CO2 emissions which renders the policy partly inefficient. As we show, including
natural gas increases the welfare losses due to higher electricity prices. Although the
inclusion of aviation fuels in the carbon tax would naturally increase efficiency, these effects
are negligible since jet fuel emissions are only 2 percent of total energy related emissions.
To have a measurable effect on national CO2 emissions, the necessary higher tax rates are
projected to have negative effects on household welfare and related poverty outcomes. The
exact magnitude and distributional outcome indeed depends on the tax rate but also on the
share of taxed emissions. In the case of the highest simulated tax rate of 50 USD/tCO2e
and including CH4 and N2O in the taxation, we find overall effects to be regressive with
relative welfare losses at 4.2 and 3.4 percent of total expenditures for the poorest and richest
households respectively. For carbon tax rates of 20 USD/tCO2 exclusively taxing CO2 from
energy use, which might be more realistically expected in climate policies, welfare losses
are progressive and around 1 percent of total expenditures for all households. Naturally, the
reason for this progressivity is a rising carbon intensity of consumption over the expenditure
distribution up to a certain income level, driven by transport fuels such as gasoline. In
contrast, the top decile demands more service oriented, low carbon intensive goods which
lessens the progressivity of carbon taxes to some extent. Nevertheless, absolute tax payments
strictly rise with income. Although welfare effects are generally moderate for low tax rates,
total tax revenues allow for relatively high transfers to low income households which render
the policy clearly progressive. National poverty incidence is more sensitive at the wellbeing
poverty line in scenarios covering only energy related CO2 emissions. Additionally, low
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income rural households are also at higher risk than their urban counterparts. In the case of
food price increases through taxation of CH4 and N2O, poverty is much stronger affected
which demonstrates the importantance of a well thought through redistribution mechanism.
Nevertheless, since distributional results are calculated on average per expenditure percentile,
they hide an important fact. In scenarios with redistribution not every poor household
benefits through the PROSPERA system. The share of PROSPERA recipients in the lowest
percentile is about 70 percent and declines to 13 percent at the 50th percentile, resulting in a
substantial number of households below the minimum wellbeing and other households close
to the bienestar poverty line not covered, particularly in urban areas. Despite the on average
promising redistribution outcome, targeting must be improved to achieve poverty reductions
for the entire population.

Chapter 4
Household Welfare and CO2 Emission
Impacts of Energy and Carbon Taxes in
Mexico
4.1 Introduction
Mexico has become a major emitter of greenhouse gas emissions over the last decades
with both economic and population growth as driving forces. In response, the Mexican
government committed itself to carbon dioxide emission reductions relative to a baseline
scenario and passed a climate change law in 2012 with legally binding emission reduction
goals (Vance, 2012). Additionally, substantial reform efforts in the energy sector have
been made recently that may affect energy prices. The oil and gas industry was opened to
competition in the up-, middle- and downstream sectors and Mexican households will be
subjected to international gasoline prices by 2018. The Federal Electricity Commission (CFE)
is planned to be reformed with the objective to form and regulate a competitive electricity
market with incentives for private investment (The Atlantic Council, 2014). In the residential
electricity market, large seasonal subsidies in warmer regions of Mexico continue to exist
to cover for higher demand of air conditioning (Davis et al., 2014; Komives et al., 2009).
While the effects of these (potential) reforms on energy consumer prices are uncertain in
some cases (oil sector) or modest in others (gasoline price subsidies), ambitious climate
policy implies increasing energy prices in a country with a fossil-fuel reliant energy system.
Higher energy prices are thus likely to lead to welfare losses in the short-run that may not be
equally distributed. In developed countries, poorer households tend to be more vulnerable to
energy price increases, as energy goods usually represent a larger proportion of their total
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expenditure with some exceptions for transport fuels (Flues and Thomas, 2015; Speck, 1999).
For developing countries, although there is less evidence on the distributional effects, it has
been pointed out early by Shah and Whalley (1991) as well as Shah and Larsen (1992) that
emerging distributional patterns are supposedly different. The recently growing literature
on welfare effects of energy price changes or subsidy reform mainly focuses on fuel prices
with some emphasis on gasoline. Various countries are covered in the volume of Sterner
(2011) and in Arze del Granado et al. (2012). A general result is that high-income households
capture significantly higher amounts of subsidies for fuels than low income households. A
similar result is found by Datta (2010), who investigates the distributional welfare effects of a
fuel tax in India. Gillingham et al. (2006) show that the direct (consumption losses via higher
prices) and indirect (income effects) welfare impacts of fuel price increases (both domestic
and transport fuels) are either regressive or distributional neutral in relative terms for a range
of developing countries. Potentially large welfare losses due to higher energy prices are
particularly critical for middle income countries with relatively high CO2 emissions and the
need for further economic development, growth, and poverty reduction. Mexico is such a
case where nearly half of the population still lives below the official poverty line (Consejo
Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL, 2014)). Against
this background, the present study adds to the literature in two ways. First, we provide
some evidence on the short-run poverty and distributional effects of energy price changes
for Mexico. We calculate the welfare impacts of hypothetical price increases of electricity,
motor fuels, gas and public transportation. Since these price changes can be interpreted as
environmental taxes, we can also assess how tax revenues can be redistributed, for example
by employing cash-transfers to households. Additional to price changes for energy items,
we simulate the welfare impacts of scaling up the carbon tax that was initially introduced in
2014. By drawing on the demand estimates, we examine whether second-order effects need
to be calculated for the welfare analysis in our context. By estimating a censored consumer
demand system, we incorporate the discrete choice to use certain energy types and the exact
pattern of substitution between them and other goods. Second, we calculate the short-run
CO2 emission savings potential of consumer responses due to energy and carbon taxes. The
rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we present the database on which the analysis
is based upon with some descriptive statistics in section 4.2. In section 4.3 we describe the
theory and the closely connected empirical strategy to measure welfare effects and household
induced CO2 emissions. We present the results in section 4.4, conclude in section 4.5 and
provide some policy recommendations.
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4.2 Household energy use
We use household expenditure data from ENIGH surveys conducted by INEGI, the national
institute for geography and statistics in Mexico. The data are representative at both the
national level as well as rural and urban areas. They contain information on item-wise
expenditure for every household, as well as an extensive list of variables capturing household
and sociodemographic characteristics. The expenditure categories used in the analysis are
(1) electricity, (2) motor fuels (including low-/ and high-octane gasoline as well as diesel
and gas), (3) gas (aggregate of natural gas and LPG), (4) public transportation, (5) food
(excluding alcohol and tobacco) and (6) other goods. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution
of energy expenditures over expenditure percentiles for 2014.1 Expenditures on the four
energy goods relative to total expenditures range between 6 and 13 percent of total household
expenditures. A clear reverse U-shaped curve can be observed for total energy budget shares
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Fig. 4.1 Energy expenditures
Figure 4.2 plots the distributional incidence for the energy goods separately and also
distinguishes between users and non-users. This distinction may matter for welfare analyses,
as users of some energy good may not find it so easy to switch away from using it. Households
1Nonparametric distributional curves are calculated with kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing using
an epanechnikov kernel function with degree 0 and bandwith 1.15.
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may own vehicles and other energy-processing durables that they do not want to (or cannot)
put out of use. When considering all observations, the electricity consumption share is
continuously decreasing over the expenditure distribution, but is exhibiting little variation
across percentiles and lies at around 2.4 percent for the poorest households. The slightly
declining budget shares over the income distribution pattern are not universally found in other
countries, e.g. in Sri Lanka, Mali and Indonesia, richer households exhibit larger electricity
budget shares (Gillingham et al., 2006) which is partly a result of the design of electricity
tariffs.2 For motor fuels, the share is rising over the expenditure distribution, ranging from
about 1.6 percent to 4.3 percent. Both gas and public transport exhibit an inverse U-shaped
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Fig. 4.2 Energy budget shares and usage rates
When only considering households with positive expenditures for the respective energy
goods, budget shares continuously decrease with income for all energy types. The difference
between user and non-users is most pronounced for motor fuel expenditures for the first
decile, for which the mean share is just above 10 percent. Note that only around 16 percent of
the households in the poorest decile own a vehicle compared to 73 percent in the richest decile.
Poor households that use gas also have a larger expenditure share than rich ones. Public
transport expenditure shares for users reach nearly 10 percent for the first deciles and decline
2Results for Indonesia can be found in chapter 5.
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over the expenditure distribution. Only minor differences in electricity expenditure shares
are detected. These findings indicate that the distributional incidence of relative expenditures
depend heavily on the usage rate in the respective income groups. Poor households that
depend on one of these energy goods might be disproportionately vulnerable when subjected
to energy price increases. Our data indicate that motor fuel usage, i.e. the percentage of
households consuming some motor fuel, increased from 4.5 percent in the poorest decile to
16 percent between 2002 and 2014. Poor households have thus become more vulnerable to
motor fuel price increases. We find that rural households spend slightly less of their current
income on electricity than urban households. For the other energy goods, the data shows no




We model the demand for electricity, motor fuels, gas, public transport, food and other
non-durables based on household survey data with a microeconomic, partial equilibrium
demand framework. For our analysis we use the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System
(QUAIDS) framework (Banks et al., 1997) since observed Engel curves appear to be well
approximated by a quadratic relationship between budget shares and logarithmic transformed
expenditures.3 The estimation of a QUAIDS has been applied to the energy context by
Brännlund and Nordström (2004) and Labandeira et al. (2006) for Sweden and Spain, but
according to our knowledge, no demand system specification of this form has been applied
to the energy context in low and middle income countries before.4
The QUAIDS as a rank three quadratic logarithmic budget share system has an indirect









The price indexes lna(p) and b(p) are defined as:
3For higher observed nonlinearity, other systems such as the EASI from Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) would
be more appropriate
4The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) has been used in related contexts (Symons et al., 1994; West
and Williams III, 2004)
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The term λ (p) in the indirect utility function is a differentiable, homogeneous function





λi ln pi (4.4)
with ∑i λi = 0 the derived expenditure share system is:



















where wi is the share of commodity (group) i of total expenditures x. To be consistent with






















γi j = 0 (4.7)
Symmetry
γi j = γ ji (4.8)















































and δi j is the Kronecker delta. Compensated price elasticities are derived by the slutsky
equation
eci j = e
u
i j + eiw j (4.13)
Demographic demand shifters including sex, age, education of the household head,
household size and a rural area dummy influence preferences through αi in equation 4.5. To
account for zero expenditures, we follow Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) and obtain elasticity
estimates in a censored system setting. In first step, a household specific probit model is
estimated with the outcome of 1 if the household consumes good i and 0 otherwise. For each
household in the sample, the standard normal probability density function (pdf) ϕ(zih,wi)
and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) Φ(zih,wi) are calculated by regressing wi on a
set of independent variables zih. In a second step, the pdf and the cdf are integrated into the
system of equations:
w∗i = Φwi +ϕiφ (4.14)
Opposed to Heckman (1979), this approach is based on the full sample in both steps of














Since we use prices as dependent variables in the first stage estimation, τi j is the coeffi-
cient of price j from equation i from the probit model. The respective expenditure and price
elasticities, ei and ei j are derived under the modified system (4.14). Explanatory variables
used in the probit estimation are listed in table 4.2. This two-step methodology has been
extensively applied in agricultural demand contexts (see for example Ecker and Qaim (2011);
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Shonkwiler and Yen (1999); Yen et al. (2002)) but not yet for energy demand. The censored
system is estimated for the full system and therefore loses the adding-up restriction, which is
why we calculate approximate second-order welfare effects based on equation (20). We use
a two-step feasible generalized nonlinear least squares (FGNLS) estimator for the estimation
of equation (17). Identification of price elasticities is enabled through cross-sectional (spatial)
and time variation. We select eight years for the demand system estimation: 2002, 2004,
2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. Additional to this considerable variation in time,
spatial variation comes from CPI data on the city level. The price data consist of indices
that are available from INEGI for 46 cities throughout Mexico and every state is represented
by at least one city. Households not residing in one of the 46 cities are assigned to the
city that is located in their state. When more than one city lies in the respective state, an
unweighted average of the price indices is calculated. The price indices are disaggregated
for the categories food, gasoline, electricity, gas (aggregated index for both LPG and natural
gas) and public transport (inter alia). For other goods, we use the general price index. For
motor fuels, we use the aggregated index of low- and high-octane gasoline. To correct for
city specific effects, we incorporate city fixed effects in the αi term in equation 4.5.
4.3.2 Simulation and welfare effects
















lna(p) and b(p) (equation 4.14) get adjusted accordingly with new price levels and we

























The “hats” are estimated coefficients from equation 4.14 and the superscripts denote
the periods of reference. Household characteristics in the α term remain unchanged in all
scenarios. Since the demand system does not predict household expenditures perfectly, the
redidual term εi containing household specific unexplained effects is included.5
The literature on the welfare impacts of energy price increases and subsidy reforms
focuses to a large extent on first-order effects as in Sterner (2011). These first-order effects,
based on work of Feldstein (1972) and Stern (1987) only require the observed demand and
no additional information on substitution behavior due to price changes. First order welfare











With estimated coefficients at hand, we calculate a second-order approximation to the
Compensating Variation (CV), which is the amount of money the household needs to be





























The CV is compared to the first-order effect to clarify the necessity of estimating a
demand system in our context. The price change in equation (4.17) can also be interpreted as
















which are multiplied with household weights and summed over all households to obtain the
total tax revenue. With household substitution already incorporated, simulated expenditures
based on equation 4.19 are used for the tax calculation and deflated to the base period. When
tax revenues are redistributed to households in the form of direct cash transfers, we assume
5Additionally, with the missing adding up restriction, budget shares do not sum perfectly to 1. We find this
error to be very small in the range of 0.03 – 0.3 percentage point deviation from 1 in our simulations
6The approximation is based on a second-order Taylor series expansion of the expenditure function (Banks
et al., 1996; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b; Friedman and Levinsohn, 2002)
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In our analytical framework, CO2 emissions (C) are calculated from a demand side perspec-
tive. The carbon content of the goods in our analysis may come from three different sources.
First, fuels have a direct CO2 content per physical unit (Cdir).7 Second, goods are produced
with energy which leads to the emission of CO2, the direct production emissions. Third, other
goods used in the production process are responsible for the indirect production emissions.
We term production emissions from direct and indirect energy use as indirect emissions Cind .
Total emissions C are simply the sum of direct and indirect emissions:
C =Cdir +Cind (4.24)
Where applicable, as in the case of fuels, Cdir can be calculated based on the expenditure
data. The indirect emissions Cind are calculated with an environmentally extended input-
output model based on data from the World Input-Output Database (Timmer et al., 2015)
as:
Cind =CI′x =CI′(I −A)−1y (4.25)
where CI is the direct carbon intensity of production, (I −A)−1 the Leontief inverse and
CI′(I −A)−1 the indirect carbon intensities containing all direct and indirect production
emissions.8 These CO2 emissions embedded in household consumption, the carbon footprints,
7For motor fuels we assume the CO2 content of gasoline: 2.31 kg CO2/. Gas/LPG: 1.5 kg CO2/kg. These
physical units are transformed to CO2 intensities per monetary unit by assuming prices of MXN 13 per l motor
fuel and MXN 13 per kg of gas. Although this procedure is not precise due to different prices for households
over space and fuel choice, it corrects for the otherwise missing direct carbon content on consumption in the
absence of quantity information
8For details on the calculation of carbon intensities and matching with household expenditures for Mexico,
see chapter 3. How we matched the 34 sector production classification to our 6 good demand classification is
described in table C.1
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In each scenario, new expenditure levels exp1i per good i and each household are derived










For the calculation of tax revenue, the simulated expenditures are real expenditures at
base prices. They isolate the unobserved quantity effect from the nominal expenditure change.
Aggregating over households by using household weights, we obtain total carbon emissions
resulting from domestic household demand. The difference to the baseline value is then
exclusively explained by consumer substitution. Substitution effects are also taken into
account in redistribution scenarios when total expenditures increase through cash transfers.
New expenditure levels exp1,tri based on equation 4.23 are expected to be higher with normal
goods and reduce the emission saving potential determined by the size of β and λ through
the budget elasticity.
4.4 Poverty, welfare and CO2 emissions
In order to understand the implications of energy price changes for household welfare and
carbon footprints, we simulate stylized scenarios with price changes for each fuel separately
and one scenario with price changes for all energy types simultaneously. In a second
step, we take a closer look at potential future policy interventions in the form of different
carbon tax rates. Along the way, we check upon the importance of calculating second-order
effects for welfare analysis in this context. For the effects on poverty, we calculate absolute
welfare effects and subtract them from household income, since domestic poverty lines are
constructed with household income per capita (CONEVAL, 2014). We calculate FGT poverty
indices on the basis of poverty lines for Mexico provided by the National Council for the
Evaluation of Social Development Policy CONEVAL (Consejo Nacional de Evaluacion de
la Politica de Desarrollo Social). CONEVAL indicates two different poverty lines. One
refers to extreme poverty illustrated by the minimum wellbeing standard of an individual
which corresponds to the value of the food basket per person per month (Bienestar minimo -
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Canasta alimentaria). The population below this poverty line cannot aquire enough food to
ensure adequate nutrition. The second poverty line is equivalent to the total value of the food
plus non-food basket per person per month and hence refers to a general wellbeing standard
(Bienestar - Canasta alimentaria y no alimentaria). We provide results for both poverty lines
to distinguish between effects on extreme and moderate poverty.
4.4.1 Energy price changes
Since the direct interpretation of the coefficients is difficult, we report elasticities in table
4.1. Following Banks et al. (1997), we calculate elasticities for each household individually
and construct a weighted average, with the weights generated as the household’s share of
total sample expenditure for the relevant good. The estimated budget elasticities suggest
that on average, households perceive motor fuels as a luxury good and electricity, gas and
public transport as necessities. For the latter three energy items, income elasticities are fairly
close to 1 which indicates quickly rising energy demand with income growth. Income plays
a more nuanced role for the discrete energy use decision. With a very high electrification
rate, income is no important determinant for using electricity at all. In the case of motor
fuel, income plays a major role for the determination of private transport vehicle ownership.
The probability of public transport use on the other hand is only slightly affected by rising
incomes but more so by the necessity and convenience of this transportation mode, reflected
in a large effect of the rural dummy.
Uncompensated own-price elasticities all show the expected negative signs and reflect
inelastic household responses to price changes with the exception of electricity and motor
fuels. Cross-price elasticities between energy items show the expected pattern, e.g. the do-
mestically used electricity and gas and transport expenditures motor fuel and public transport
are substitutes although fairly inelastic. Compensated price elasticities for energy items, used
in the calculation of welfare effects, do not differ significantly since expenditure elasticities
are all close to 1. For food and other goods, the elasticities become indistinguishable from 0.
Based on the observance of energy price elasticities, we would not expect large differences
between the first- and second-order welfare effects except for electricity price changes.
The descriptive analysis of budget shares has already revealed the potential distributional
patterns of price changes for the respective energy types. Reflecting these expenditure
patterns, the magnitude of a stylized price change of 20 percent per energy good separately
is displayed in figure 4.3. We find almost no difference between first- and second-order
welfare losses. Overall, the calculated own-price elasticities imply a smaller second- relative
to the first-order effect on average. However, the use of 95 percent confidence intervals
in the calculation of average welfare effects per percentile reveals no statistically signifi-
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Table 4.1 Demand elasticities
Uncompensated Price Elasticities
Price
Electricity Motor fuels Gas Publ Trans Food Other
Demand
Electricity -1.49 -0.16 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.28
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Motor fuels -0.09 -1.03 0.02 0.10 0.26 -0.45
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Gas 0.18 0.04 -0.69 -0.16 -0.29 0.11
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Publ Trans 0.01 0.10 -0.06 -0.65 -0.74 0.63
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Food 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.15 -0.10 -0.50
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Other 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.43 -0.73
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Compensated Price Elasticities
Price
Electricity Motor fuels Gas Publ Trans Food Other
Demand
Electricity -1.43 -0.12 0.16 0.06 0.30 0.82
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Motor fuels -0.06 -0.92 0.03 0.12 0.56 0.28
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gas 0.20 0.07 -0.66 -0.13 -0.04 0.58
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Publ Trans 0.03 0.11 -0.05 -0.53 -0.44 1.00
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Food 0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.12 0.16 -0.24
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Other 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.09 -0.12 0.04
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Expenditure Elasticities
0.96 1.22 0.84 0.85 0.60 1.20
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000)
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 4.2 Probit energy demand (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES electricity motor fuels gas public transp
lnp1 -0.00634*** -0.134*** 0.241*** 0.160***
(0.00127) (0.00596) (0.00664) (0.00684)
lnp2 0.0485*** -0.369*** 0.0204 0.415***
(0.00614) (0.0237) (0.0269) (0.0275)
lnp3 -0.0108*** 0.150*** 0.0558*** -0.106***
(0.00226) (0.0117) (0.0133) (0.0135)
lnp4 0.00653* -0.322*** 0.242*** 0.332***
(0.00347) (0.0171) (0.0193) (0.0197)
lnp5 -0.0281*** 0.794*** 0.117** -1.051***
(0.0103) (0.0508) (0.0570) (0.0582)
lnp6 -0.00596 -0.335*** -0.998*** 0.418***
(0.0151) (0.0739) (0.0825) (0.0846)
ln(x) 0.00627*** 0.317*** 0.177*** 0.0305***
(0.000456) (0.00178) (0.00216) (0.00224)
male -0.00233*** 0.156*** -0.000476 -0.0829***
(0.000647) (0.00286) (0.00327) (0.00336)
age 0.000299*** 0.000955*** 0.00189*** -0.00212***
(1.94e-05) (8.32e-05) (9.24e-05) (9.37e-05)
education 0.00103** 0.0758*** -0.0159*** -0.0707***
(0.000482) (0.00211) (0.00246) (0.00247)
household size 0.000599*** -0.00687*** 0.00843*** 0.0289***
(0.000142) (0.000654) (0.000754) (0.000770)
rural -0.00331*** 0.0754*** -0.136*** -0.143***
(0.000553) (0.00307) (0.00336) (0.00343)
Observations 117,656 117,656 117,656 117,656
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
cant difference with the exception of electricity. Electricity price changes have a slightly
regressive effect as opposed to motor fuel price changes, which are clearly progressive.
Welfare losses for gas and public transport price increases rise with expenditures until the
20th percentile and start falling from the 50th percentile. As expected from the descriptive
analysis in section II, price changes for public transport have the potential to create the largest
welfare losses for low and middle income households. Absolute welfare losses are strictly
rising with expenditures for all energy goods. Simultaneous price increases for all energy
related expenditures lead to an inverse U-shaped distributional impacts curve (figure 4.4).
The magnitude of welfare losses is more distributional neutral and smaller in magnitude than
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welfare losses from food price increases, which are strongly regressive. With multiple price
changes, the necessity of calculating second-order welfare effects is visible between the 20th
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Fig. 4.3 Welfare effects first- and second-order (CV), energy items
As expected from the descriptive analysis of users vs non-users of energy types, distribu-
tional results differ significantly for the average user with strictly positive demand for the
respective energy good (figure 4.5). While we see almost no difference for electricity, price
increases for all other energy items are clearly regressive for the user part of the population.
Taking motor fuel as an example, the population average progressive effects can be explained
by low car ownership rates of the lower part of the expenditure distribution. For public
transport, a major share of rural low income households appears not as dependent on public
transport and therefore we find smaller welfare losses than for the rest of the population. Al-
though these differences between users and non-users shed light on heterogeneity in welfare
effects within the same income group, the share of the population affected around the poverty
lines is more relevant for poverty incidence. Price increases for each energy type separately
have quite modest impacts on the wellbeing poverty rate, with differences for each energy
good (figure 4.6). We calculate welfare losses for first- and second order effects to assess
the importance of taking into account substitution behavior for poverty incidence. Price
increases of up to 50 percent for the single energy items produce nearly identical poverty rate
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Fig. 4.4 Welfare effects first- and second-order (CV), energy and food
outcomes for first- and second-order effects. Only beyond this range, differences become
significant. For joint price increases for all energy goods, the difference between first- and
second-order effects starts earlier and is more pronounced. The domestically used energy
electricity and gas both show little sensitivity towards price increases with respect to the
poverty rate. An electricity price rise of 50 percent would increase the wellbeing poverty rate
by 0.5 percentage points maximum. Domestic energy prices for consumers in Mexico are
relatively low in international comparison.
Energy price increases in general have less impact on poverty than food price increases,
reflected in a steeper gradient in figure 4.6. Nevertheless, at the wellbeing poverty line, a 20
percent price increase on energy has substantial effects on poverty with an increase of 1.4
percentage points in the poverty rate (table 4.4). The on average higher budget shares and
associated welfare effects for middle income households also lead to higher increases of the
wellbeing poverty rate for all energy goods and for food compared to the minimum wellbeing
poverty rate (table 4.3). Additionally to changes in poverty, middle income households close
to the poverty line would be disproportionally affected by higher energy prices although
technically not defined as poor after the price change.
For each price increase we calculate resulting changes in the household carbon footprint
(energy related CO2 emissions and CO2 equivalent emissions including CH4 and N2O),
displayed in table 4.5. Although motor fuel does not have the highest carbon intensity,
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price change 0 0.143 0.099 0.169 0.373 0.785 3.077
1 0.041 0.043 0.043 0.124 0.259 1.299
2 0.019 0.022 0.019 0.057 0.122 0.692
+ lum-sum 0 -0.091 -0.481 -0.081 -0.215 -0.775 -1.307
1 -0.030 -0.159 -0.046 -0.096 -0.323 -0.540
2 -0.018 -0.084 -0.027 -0.058 -0.180 -0.293
+ PROSPERA 0 -0.213 -0.821 -0.308 -0.601 -1.820 -2.581
1 -0.115 -0.377 -0.151 -0.330 -0.745 -0.622
2 -0.067 -0.200 -0.088 -0.183 -0.357 -0.193






price change 0 0.192 0.316 0.184 0.710 1.440 4.414
1 0.097 0.127 0.123 0.356 0.720 2.687
2 0.061 0.074 0.075 0.216 0.438 1.808
+ lum-sum 0 -0.015 -0.311 0.003 -0.043 -0.598 -0.925
1 -0.043 -0.285 -0.056 -0.088 -0.475 -0.934
2 -0.035 -0.205 -0.047 -0.086 -0.371 -0.688
+ PROSPERA 0 -0.046 -0.440 -0.117 -0.046 -0.647 -1.647
1 -0.135 -0.531 -0.170 -0.352 -1.043 -1.571
2 -0.118 -0.423 -0.151 -0.318 -0.816 -0.972
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Fig. 4.5 Welfare effects first- and second-order (CV), users vs. average
a motor fuel price increase/tax would create the largest emission reductions, driven by
relatively large budget shares. Emission reductions through electricity price changes would
also be large, determined by high price elasticities despite relatively small budget shares.
Remarkably, taxing gas alone has no observable effect on CO2 emissions. This seemingly
counter intuitive result can be explained by positive cross-price elasticities with electricity.
As a clear substitute and with higher carbon intensity, increased electricity demand turns the
emission saving from reduced gas use into a small net emission increase. A similar finding
can be observed for a tax on public transport, which results in zero emission savings due to
substitution with motorized private transport. These findings demonstrate the importance
of obtaining a full range of own- and cross-price effects to simulate integrated welfare-
environmental models. Multiple price changes for all energy related goods may lead to
very strong emission reductions from household demand. Food price increases have, as
discussed above, large effects on poverty, and also a significant impact on energy related
CO2 emissions. As households are estimated to have close to zero own-price elasticities for
food, the complementary character of gas, public transport and other goods accounts for the
energy related emission reduction.
Redistribution of tax revenues leads to moderate progressive welfare effects when lump-
sum transfers are used (figure 4.7). Mostly, net taxes are paid by the rich households with the
exception of public transport where the middle class pays the bill. When redistributing all
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Fig. 4.6 Poverty rate (FGT0, wellbeing poverty line) and price increases
tax revenues solely to PROSPERA recipients, progressivity becomes very strong with large
welfare gains around 11 percent of expenditures for the poorest households in the case of
motor fuel or public transport taxes. Compared to the pure lump-sum scheme, households are
less well compensated starting at the 50th percentile which is also above the moderate poverty
line. As a result, the poverty rate decreases by 0.65 percentage points at the wellbeing poverty
line in the case of a simultaneous tax of 20 percent on all four energy goods and redistribution
via PROSPERA. On the other hand, poverty measured at the minimum wellbeing poverty line
reacts more sensitively to redistribution trough the relatively large compensation amounts. In
this case and redistribution via PROSPERA, we find a reduction in the poverty rate of 1.8
percent. CO2 reductions are slightly larger when redistribution takes place via PROSPERA
than via universal lump-sum transfers, but differences are small. When taxing all energy
related goods with a 20 percent tax rate and tax revenue is fully redistributed via PROSPERA,
household CO2 emissions are calculated to be 9.5 percent smaller than in the baseline and 1.5
percent less than without redistribution. On the other hand, a tax on food with a simultaneous
redistribution of tax revenues has positive effects on household CO2 emissions. Driven by
increased demand for direct energy and other goods, the positive income effect from the
relatively large redistribution amount has a strong effect on direct energy demand despite the
negative cross-price effects with energy goods such as electricity.
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price change CO2 -4.7% -5.9% 0.0% 0.0% -10.8% -2.1%
CO2e -2.8% -3.1% -0.1% -1.2% -7.3% -3.1%
+ lum-sum CO2 -4.5% -5.3% 0.3% 0.7% -9.1% 3.5%
CO2e -2.6% -2.5% 0.2% -0.5% -5.5% 2.4%
+ PROSPERA CO2 -4.5% -5.4% 0.3% 0.6% -9.3% 2.5%
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Fig. 4.7 Welfare effects redistribution scenarios
4.4.2 Carbon tax
The first-order welfare and poverty effects of a carbon tax in Mexico have been analyzed in
chapter 3. We take calculated sector specific price changes from chapter 3 and apply it to
our product categorization to check upon the validity to use first-order effects and calculate
the short run CO2 emissions reduction potential when price increases are fully shifted to
consumers.9 Approximate price increases for a 25 USD/tCO2 tax and for two different tax
9See table C.1 for the aggregation scheme.
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bases are displayed in table 4.6. Considering that the tax rate in 2014 was at 3.5 USD/tCO2,
we focus on 25 USD/tCO2 scenario as an upper bound of potential tax increases in the short
term. Price changes for households are most severe for electricity, followed by motor fuel and
gas. Public transport and food items are less affected by taxing energy related CO2 emissions.
Food prices are clearly more sensitive to taxing N2O and CH4 while direct energy items are
hardly affected. Generally, carbon tax induced price changes are smaller than discussed in
the previous section on energy and food price changes, although the simulated tax rate can
be considered non-marginal.
Table 4.6 CO2 intensities and price changes carbon tax
CI (kg/MXN) Price Change (t =
25 USD)
item CO2 CO2e CO2 CO2e
1 Electricity 0.290 0.297 9.0% 9.2%
2 Motor Fuel 0.217 0.222 6.7% 6.9%
3 Gas 0.140 0.140 4.3% 4.3%
4 Public Transport 0.029 0.031 0.9% 1.0%
5 Food 0.020 0.070 0.6% 2.2%
6 Other 0.013 0.022 0.4% 0.7%
The first- and second order effects are plotted in figure 4.8 and we observe that their
95 percent confidence intervals in the calculation of average welfare effects per percentile
clearly overlap. This result holds despite the fact that electricity prices are a major channel
of carbon tax induced welfare losses and the finding of a large estimated own-price elasticity.
The magnitude of electricity price changes in the range of 9 percent does not necessarily
require the estimation of demand elasticities. In Scenario I, taxing only energy related CO2
emissions, welfare effects are slightly progressive in the range of 0.9 and 1.1 percent for
lower and higher income households respectively.
When incorporating CH4 and N2O in the tax scheme, welfare effects are overall regressive
and particularly severe for low income households at 2 percent of total expenditures. The
much higher welfare effects are mostly caused by food price increases. Considering the
inability of households to substitute away from food expenditures, this scenario has larger
welfare and poverty effects. These are generally rising with the tax base with a 1.1 percentage
points increase in the wellbeing poverty rate (table 4.7). As in the case of energy price
increases, the moderate wellbeing poverty rate is more affected than the minimum wellbeing
poverty rate. Redistribution via lump-sum transfers or PROSPERA can turn the welfare
effects clearly progressive, poverty indicators even improve over all dimensions.
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The short-run emission reduction potential through consumer substitution is at 5.6/3.5
(CO2/CO2e) percent of total household induced CO2/CO2e emissions and rises up to 6/4
(CO2/CO2e) percent in Scenario II. The taxation of CH4 and N2O does not only lead to
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Fig. 4.8 Welfare effects of carbon taxes
It is important to consider however, that these simulated emission reductions are relative
to a baseline with zero income growth and tax revenues are completely reinvested carbon free.
Additional to expected income growth, redistribution of tax revenues to households in the
form of cash transfers, tax rebates or the increased use of public goods inevitably leads to the
use of goods produced with fossil fuels if the energy system remains untransformed. In the
case of direct cash transfers to households, the CO2 emission saving potential can shrink to
83 percent of the reductions achieved in scenarios without redistribution. Taking into account
CH4 and N2O, the wider tax base generates large tax revenues and lump-sum transfers which
in turn lead to large income effects and smaller CO2 and CO2e savings which are reduced to
75 and 62 percent respectively. Redistribution via PROSPERA leads to slightly larger CO2
emission reductions as already observed in the case of energy price changes. Considering
the problematic link of taxing CH4 and N2O with food prices, taxing CO2 alone provides an
option for an ambitious short-run climate policy with moderate welfare effects that could be
turned into welfare gains with proper redistribution schemes.
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Table 4.7 FGT changes carbon tax
Minimum wellbeing wellbeing
Tax Scenario
FGT I (CO2) II(CO2, CH4,
N2O)
I (CO2) II(CO2, CH4,
N2O)
Carbon Tax 0 0.399 0.755 0.723 1.186
1 0.140 0.264 0.392 0.651
2 0.066 0.130 0.233 0.406
+ Lump-sum 0 -0.407 -0.607 -0.061 -0.301
1 -0.147 -0.228 -0.189 -0.347
2 -0.083 -0.126 -0.161 -0.272
+ PROSPERA 0 -0.407 -1.505 -0.292 -0.493
1 -0.147 -0.633 -0.518 -0.854
2 -0.083 -0.311 -0.446 -0.686
Table 4.8 CO2(e) emission impacts (USD 25/t CO2(e))
Tax Scenario
I (CO2) II (CO2,
CH4, N2O)
Carbon Tax CO2 -5.6% -6.0%
CO2e -3.5% -4.0%
+ Lump-sum CO2 -4.7% -4.5%
CO2e -2.6% -2.5%
+ PROSPERA CO2 -4.9% -4.7%
CO2e -2.6% -2.4%
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4.5 Discussion and conclusion
We simulate the short-run poverty and distributional effects of energy price changes and
carbon taxes in a partial equilibrium framework. We estimate a full matrix of substitution
elasticities, test first- versus second-order welfare effects and find the latter are only slightly
different than the former as in the case of electricity but differ with multiple price changes.
Despite this finding, two practical reasons speak against the abandonment of demand es-
timation in our context. First of all, checking on the validity of using first-order effects is
preferable over assuming it. Secondly, without estimated substitution elasticities we are un-
able to calculate the CO2 emission saving potential that comes from household consumption.
The latter is usually lacking in prior literature.
By simulating stylized price increase scenarios, we find only motor fuels to unfold pro-
gressive effects. Taxing electricity, gas and public transport is regressive, although in the
latter case the middle class is most affected. Important to consider is also the heterogeneity
within income percentiles. For actual users with positive demand for energy items, price
increases are regressive. To put energy price changes into perspective, we find that food
price increases have significantly larger welfare effects. Households spend a larger fraction
on food products than on energy and show small sensitivity to prices reflected in a close to
zero own-price elasticity. Middle income households close to the wellbeing poverty line
would be more affected by higher energy prices than low income households. Although
the smaller effects on extreme poverty are welcome from a development perspective, the
political economy behind this pattern could be problematic. The progressive distribution
pattern of welfare effects resulting from a carbon tax is largely driven by private motorized
transport. Though the absolute monetary losses are small for households, the public opinion
on environmental policy reforms appears to be quite sensible to gasoline price changes.
We also simulate a carbon tax at USD 25 per t CO2 and find slightly progressive wel-
fare effects and substantial emissions reductions. The additional taxation of CH4 and N2O
has the potential to create large price changes in the agricultural sector which makes their
incorporation into a carbon tax regime an unsuitable candidate for creating poverty and
environmental synergies in short-run climate policies. Considering the problematic link of
taxing CH4 and N2O with food prices, taxing CO2 alone provides an option for an ambitious
short-run climate policy with moderate welfare effects that could be turned into welfare gains
with proper redistribution schemes. The calculated emission reductions through energy and
carbon taxes must be understood as household consumption induced emission reductions
relative to a baseline with no income growth. Emission reductions through substitution
by households can be quite substantial even in the case of small price changes. Income
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and related consumption growth on the other hand reduce the emission saving potential.
Taking into account the latter through redistribution via cash transfers, the initially large
numbers become significantly smaller but remain substantial. Unsurprisingly, redistribution
of simulated tax revenue can turn any regressive outcome progressive and reduce poverty. A
targeted transfer through a social welfare program (PROSPERA) proofs to be preferable in
terms of poverty and emission outcomes. Since compensation amounts are relatively large
for lower income households, poverty reduction through redistribution is clearly more visible




The effects of energy price changes:
Heterogeneous welfare impacts, energy
poverty and CO2 emissions in Indonesia
5.1 Introduction
Fuel and energy prices are typically subject to heavy government intervention in many
countries. Energy is subsidized to make it affordable and to shield domestic prices from
international price fluctuations. In addition, transport fuels are heavily taxed in a number
of countries because of negative externalities they create. These subsidies and taxes can
constitute a heavy burden on government budgets or alternatively a reliable source of tax
revenue. In recent years, climate change mitigation policies have been adding to the reasons
to regulate energy prices. With regard to energy pricing, one particular policy option,
abolishing fuel subsidies in developing countries, is often seen as a win-win policy, as
it reduces distortions, internalizes negative climate externalities, and, on top of that, is
progressive as it hurts richer, fuel-consuming households more than poorer households
(Arze del Granado et al., 2012; Clements et al., 2013; Sterner, 2011). This paper adds to the
literature that examines the latter assertion. The direct welfare effects of energy price changes
for households depend on the magnitude of the price change, the relative importance of energy
items in the basket of commodities and finally on the ability and willingness to substitute the
more expensive good to deal with price shocks. In addition, indirect (general equilibrium)
effects are triggered by changing production costs and hence the prices of other goods (and
intermediate inputs). These changes will eventually affect labor demand and wages. Such
effects are taken into account by general equilibrium modelling exercises. In this paper, we
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analyze the welfare impacts of energy price changes using a partial equilibrium approach
based on a detailed empirical model of household energy demand in Indonesia. Since the
majority of energy subsidies are in the form of fixed prices for consumers, indirect effects
through wages and employment are unlikely to be of major importance. Additionally, the
use of a CGE would come with a high demand for empirically unavailable parameter values
and a higher energy item aggregation than needed in our case. Previous partial equilibrium
studies on the impact of fuel subsidies in low and middle income countries have typically
come to the conclusion that fuel subsidy (tax) cuts (increases) tend to be progressive.
We improve on and add to existing work in three ways: First, we model behavioral
responses to price changes, i.e. we capture second order effects that are typically not
accounted for in previous work. Second, we explore in detail the heterogeneity of impacts
caused by the ownership of energy-processing durables, such as private transport vehicles,
electric appliances or cooking stoves. These durables are acquired by households according
to the amount of services the household needs and some of them are not easily substituted,
particularly transport vessels. While it is true that low income households have lower
ownership rates of many energy processing durables, a considerable share among the poor has
high service needs due to occupational or geographical circumstances. It is these households
that may be strongly affected by certain fuel price changes. Third, we also examine the
quality and quantity effects of price changes on energy services, which may have a significant
impact on individual wellbeing. Thereby, we extend the welfare analysis beyond the money
metric utility effects and look at energy poverty understood as a condition of missing or
imperfect access to reliable and clean modern energy services. Without affordable alternative
technological solutions to the use of fossil fuels, rising energy prices may seriously affect the
amount of energy services that households continue to use for basic living requirements.
In Indonesia, consumer energy prices have been regulated by the government for a long
time with a recent change in subsidy policies, facilitated by dramatically falling oil prices.
This makes the country an ideal place to study the welfare implications of energy price
changes. In addition, our work is likely to remain highly relevant to the country’s policy-
makers: When oil prices rise again in the future and current government policies continue
to phase out subsidies with flexible pricing mechanisms close to market levels, the price of
energy will rise for households. We analyze this scenario of rising energy prices for a set of
commercial energy items used by households and estimate the impact on household welfare,
energy poverty and demand related carbon emissions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first describe the current situation of
consumer energy prices and the energy subsidy scheme for consumers in Indonesia (section
5.2). We then provide an overview of the literature related to energy price changes with a
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focus on low and middle income countries (section 5.3). Section 5.4 presents the price and
survey data as well as some descriptive statistics. In section 5.5 we describe the theoretical
and empirical models underpinning our welfare analysis. The results are presented in section
5.6 and we conclude in section 5.7 with some policy recommendations.
5.2 Consumer energy prices and subsidies in Indonesia
Energy prices for households in Indonesia have traditionally been set by the government
below international market price levels. These subsidies are argued to make access to
energy affordable to the poor. In fossil fuel rich countries, like Indonesia, this policy is also
motivated by the idea of sharing natural resource wealth with its citizens. Subsidies have
been the dominating domestic energy policy instrument for decades but the high costs have
put considerable pressure on public finances in recent years, and much more so since 2009
when the country became a net oil importer and left the OPEC. Today, the country is more
oil-dependent than ever before, as from 2000 to 2013, total final energy consumption and the
per capita final energy consumption increased by over 80 percent and 55 percent respectively
(MEMR, 2014).1 Very likely, this increased oil-dependence can be partly ascribed to fuel
subsidies. As a reaction to the fiscal pressure, the government implemented significant
subsidy reductions in 2005, 2008 and 2013, i.e. during a time when rising oil prices pushed
up fuel subsidy expenditures that could no longer be sustained. Figure 5.1 shows nominal
energy prices for electricity, gasoline, kerosene, and LPG, respectively, from 2008 onwards.2
All three subsidy reforms were accompanied by compensation programs, which helped to
gain public acceptance. At the end of 2012, Indonesia had the lowest fuel prices of any net-oil
consuming nation worldwide and fuel subsidy expenditures increased up to 21.2 percent
of total central government spending (World Bank, 2013). In June 2013, the government
decided to increase prices on gasoline and diesel up by 44 and 22 percent, respectively. Public
protests did not spread too far and subsidy cuts were accompanied with two compensation
packages, including short-term unconditional cash transfers, increased food distribution and
additional spending in infrastructure programs. In late 2014, the newly elected government
announced a complete phase-out of fuel subsidies in the coming years. As a result of this
policy and low world oil prices, the price for automotive fuels decreased with subsequent
rises in March 2015. The government’s concern about the social implications of fuel subsidy
reform led it to treat several fuel items differently. Subsidies on kerosene, today a less used
fuel for lighting and cooking source for the rural poor, have not been trimmed down as much
1Population growth in the same period has been around 17 percent.
2Data on general energy prices are from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources.
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as those on gasoline and diesel.3 Recent subsidy reform has also made a distinction on
the purchasing side, when subsidies on both kerosene and gasoline have been completely
abolished for industrial consumers. When international oil prices are low, gasoline subsidies
may be completely phased out for the time being. However, when oil prices start to rise again
and subsidies are abolished as politically communicated, households will face non-marginal
price increases that, depending on the scenario for international markets could raise prices
by 100 percent and more. We focus explicitly on the main energy items that households
use, including electricity and fuels such as gasoline, kerosene and LPG. Traditional fuels,
i.e. firewood and biomass, are widely used as well, particularly in rural areas. However, we
have no information on prices for these fuels, neither in the survey data nor from external
sources. For electricity demand, price discrimination between different users is established
through a progressive block tariff schedule that results in higher prices per kwh with higher
installed power capacity and demand. Households pay the lowest price on average compared
to industry and business (figure 5.1) and also face the smallest price increases over the last
years. With an estimated production price of 1200 IDR per kwh ( about 0.07 Euro at 2015
exchange rates), only few customers pay an unsubsidized price and tariffs for households
as low as 150 IDR reveal the dimension of subsidies paid in this sector. For transport fuels,
different products with varying octane qualities exist but low quality gasoil, mainly used
for motorcycles, dominates the market. While the higher quality gasoline fuels (92 and 95
octane) have been closer to international market prices, the price of lower quality gasoline
and diesel has been fixed by the government at comparatively low levels with recent price
fluctuations towards international price levels. There are differences between the official
retail price and measured prices at the consumer level, particularly in rural areas where
transport costs and additional trading margins in informal market add to the official price.
Kerosene, a multi-purpose fuel for cooking and lighting, has not seen a change in retail prices
since 2008 but rural consumer nevertheless pay an increasingly higher price over the last
years. The increasingly used fuel for cooking, LPG, comes in different bottle sizes and the
prices are regulated accordingly. The smallest size is 3kg with the lowest price and no change
over the last years. Prices for 12kg bottles increased recently while the 50kg bottles move
with market prices. Like transport fuels, LPG is more expensive in rural than in urban areas
on average.
3In 2007 the government launched a kerosene–to–LPG transition program that included the disbursement of
more than 48 million free LPG start–up packages and subsidized the price for small LPG tanks (3kg).














































Fig. 5.1 Nominal energy prices over time
5.3 Literature review
Shah and Whalley (1991) and Shah and Larsen (1992) were among the first to warn of
applying conventional wisdom in assessing the incidence of environmental taxes for devel-
oping countries. They hinted at the fact that, with lower shares of energy expenditures in
the consumption basket of the poor, distributional effects of energy related taxes in devel-
oping countries can generally be expected to be progressive. Earlier work on Indonesia by
Pitt (1985) finds that kerosene subsidies benefited the urban and wealthy households the
most. In addition, they cannot support the notion that kerosene subsidies would help to
address deforestation externalities. Olivia and Gibson (2008) estimate a five good house-
hold energy demand system for Indonesia with a correction procedure for quality effects
suggested by Deaton (1988). Based on a marginal tax reform approach by Ahmad and Stern
(1984), increasing taxes on energy is found to be desirable from both an efficiency and
equity perspective. Other work on energy prices and subsidies for Indonesia predominantly
use Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. Clements et al. (2013), for example,
simulate the effects of a price increase for petroleum products and find a decline in aggregate
household consumption with high income urban households suffering the highest losses.
Another CGE analysis with a highly disaggregated household sector by Yusuf and Resosu-
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darmo (2008) – in a similar scenario with rising fuel prices –, also find progressive effects for
transport fuels, but regressive effects of higher Kerosene prices. Dartanto (2013) uses a CGE
model with a disaggregated household sector to explicitly look at the effects of fuel subsidy
reductions on the poverty rate. He finds a slight increase in the poverty headcount with no
recycling of revenues. Yet, a complete removal of fuel subsidies and a partial reallocation to
other government spending items and transfers has the potential to slightly reduce poverty.
Durand-Lasserve et al. (2015) also use a CGE to assess the distributional impacts of energy
subsidy reforms and find subsidy removals to be generally regressive. They simulate different
redistribution schemes and find lump-sum transfers to change the distributional impacts
towards progressivity. For other low and middle income countries, there is some evidence
for a progressive (regressive) impact of fuel taxes (subsidies). Sterner (2011) presents a
collection of mostly first-order, partial equilibrium studies on the impact of transport fuel
taxes on the poor in Mexico, Costa Rica, China, India, Ethopia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania
and the impact of reducing transport fuel subsidies in Iran. The general result is that poor
households face a lower tax burden relative to their income as richer households, leading to a
progressive income distribution effect in all cases. The main reason is that poorer households
tend to spend relatively little on transport fuels. Recently there is also an increasing interest
in energy subsidy reforms as reflected by a growing literature for low and middle income
countries. Arze del Granado et al. (2012) provide a review of fuel subsidies for 20 countries
and find that the top income quintile receives as much as six times more in subsidy payments
than the bottom quintile. In general, there appears to be no disagreement that – in developing
countries – transport fuel subsidies benefit the rich more than the poor. Yet, there is no work
on energy subsidies in general, i.e. subsidies on electricity and cooking fuels are typically
ignored. While the heterogeneity of impacts of price changes across the income distribution
has been scrutinized in most empirical work, other possible sources of impact heterogeneity
have received less attention. The presence of certain energy-related household needs, for
example the need for transport in remote areas, may have important implications for welfare
impacts of price changes. Specifically, some households, and more so poorer ones, do spend
a higher than average share of their budgets on energy and this may introduce substantial
impact heterogeneity. Additionally, the issue of energy poverty is virtually absent from the
discussion on fuel taxes and subsidies.
5.4 Household energy use and energy poverty
We use household expenditure data from the Indonesian Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional
(SUSENAS), a cross-section survey collected annually by Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) In-
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donesia.4 Drawing on the survey data, the poverty rate in Indonesia was at 12 percent in 2013
using the national poverty lines provided by BPS Indonesia with the majority of the poor
living in rural areas (see also table 5.1).5 The SUSENAS survey has a detailed expenditure
module with reported expenditures and quantities on electricity (in kwh), gasoline (in l),
kerosene (in l) and liquefied petroleum gas LPG (in kg). In addition, other expenditures for
transport are reported, including spending on public transport, airfares, and marine trans-
port. Based on these data, Figure 5.2 shows the patterns for all energy (electricity, gasoline,
kerosene, LPG, other transport and firewood), modern energy (electricity, gasoline, kerosene
and LPG; used in the later analysis), transport energy (gasoline and other transport) and
domestic energy (electricity, kerosene, LPG and firewood) expenditures over the income
distribution, divided into percentiles of total household per capita expenditure.6 Due to the
discrete decision to obtain major energy-consuming durables, we distinguish between the
average user in the sample including zero demand (demand >= 0) and the average user with
strictly positive demand (demand > 0). This is a simple approximation to the abovementioned
heterogeneity in energy spending patterns between households that, in contrast, may be simi-
lar in terms of household per capita income. In the case of aggregated energy expenditures,
this hardly makes a difference but it is very relevant in the analysis of single energy items. In
general, energy expenditures rise over the expenditure distribution which appears to be driven
by transport expenditures. Modern domestic energy use is only absent for some households
below the 20th percentile, and the share of households relying solely on traditional energy
sources for cooking and lighting is below 10 percent among this group. A more detailed
look into the expenditure patterns of single energy items for rural (figure 5.3) and urban
(figure 5.4) households provides some interesting insights here. For gasoline demand, the
following pattern emerges: the budget shares for gasoline of the richest households is about
twice as high as the average poor household’s budget share. Yet, those households in the
lower part of the income distribution who actually use gasoline have a similar budget share
as the rich. This shows that the sole look at averages even within income groups is not
sufficient, in particular if policy makers are interested in identifying potential losers. 30
percent of the poorest households use gasoline, most of them as an input to motorcycle
transport. This differentiation is not necessary for electricity demand, as, according to the
4For descriptive purposes and the welfare analysis we use the March 2013 data. For the estimation we
use a pooled dataset for the years 2009-2013. Data provision by Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) is gratefully
acknowledged.
5The national poverty line is relatively low. In 2010, a year for which poverty rates for both international
and national poverty rates are reported by the World Bank, the poverty rate was 11.3 using the national and
15.9 using the Int.$ 1.9 poverty line.
6Nonparametric distributional curves are calculated with kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing using
an epanechnikov kernel function with degree 0 and bandwith 1.15.
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survey data, about 90 percent of the population have non-zero electricity demand. This
reflects relatively high grid access in Indonesia, reported to be around 76 percent in 2012
(IEA, 2014). The difference can be explained by electricity coming from local power supply
and diesel generators. Electricity budget shares are generally rising with income and differ
between rural and urban areas. The average urban household spends 1 percentage point
more of his income on electricity than the average rural household. While Kerosene is a
multi-purpose fuel, LPG and firewood are mostly used for cooking. Over time, kerosene has
become the least popular fuel in Indonesia with only 30 percent of households exhibiting
positive demand. It is still more used in rural areas and, somewhat surprisingly, not just by
low income households but with slightly higher budget shares by middle and higher income
households. LPG and firewood might be close substitutes in general, but, as expected, low
income rural households still depend heavily on firewood and LPG is becoming the dominant
cooking fuel for urban households – now used by 51 percent of the population.
In contrast to regular consumption goods, energy use is typically a two-step decision
process with the first step being a discrete decision to own a durable which converts energy
into some usable form to enjoy the desired energy service. A case in point is of course private
transport. Not surprisingly, demand for gasoline can be well explained by the ownership of
private transport vehicles, dominated by motorbikes in Indonesia. Once households own a
motorbike, they tend to spend a similar share of their income on gasoline – irrespective of
their income levels. This is illustrated in Table 5.1 that combines poverty status, ownership
of private transport means, and gasoline expenditure shares. The national ownership rate
of private transport means stands at 65 percent in our dataset. The rate in urban areas is 74
percent and significantly lower but still considerable with 58.2 percent in rural areas. Among
the poor, still 37.1 percent own a vehicle, typically a motorbike. For these income poor
motorbike owners, the average budget share for gasoline is 5.2 percent, only 0.1 percentage
points less than the share of the non-poor. Note also that urban poor vehicle owners spend an
even higher budget share on gasoline than the urban non-poor. Maybe somewhat contrary to
expectations, we do not find major differences in transport-related energy demand between
rural and urban households. Note that the residual category includes diverse transport modes
such as local public transport as well as air travel. The latter is likely to be the main reason
why budget shares increase with higher incomes and rich rural households with positive de-
mand have higher budget shares than their urban counterparts. For lower income households,
the share of public transport might be higher in this category, but we are unable to further
distinguish between transport modes. Other minor transport energy items are motor oils
and diesel, with the latter likely to be relevant to prices of public transport. The direct use
of diesel by households is negligible in Indonesia. Opposed to transport, expenditures for
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firewood (also includes other undefined fuels) decline with rising incomes and the usage
rate declines steeply (figure 5.5). Rural households clearly use more firewood than urban
households, reflected in higher usage rates and budget shares.
Our analysis of energy demand patterns reveals interesting insights into an often over-
looked dimension in the distributional analysis of energy price changes: energy poverty. The
International Energy Association defines energy poverty as “the lack of access to modern
energy services. These services are defined as household access to electricity and clean
cooking facilities [e.g. fuels and stoves that do not cause air pollution in houses]” (IEA,
2014).7 We therefore focus on the domestically used energy items electricity, kerosene and
LPG, for which expenditure information is available in the household survey. The used
quantities are transformed to physical, normalized units (kilograms oil equivalent, kgoe) and
summed up to household energy use per capita. Two different energy poverty approaches
are subsequently defined and will help us to understand the sensitivity of the chosen poverty
lines. First, we define poverty cut-offs at 50 kgoe (kilogram of oil equivalent) of final energy
per capita and year in the form of modern fuels used for cooking and a minimum amount of
electricity resulting in the energy poverty Line (EPL) 1, similar as in Modi, Vijay et al. (2005).
Since quantity information for firewood is missing, we calculate household energy use per
capita exclusively based on modern fuels. Therefore, energy poverty is strictly defined as a
lack of use of modern energy and not as total energy use which would include biomass.
Table 5.1 Gasoline demand, vehicle ownership and poverty
pop % w (d>=0)a w (d>0)b priv trc Motod
All 1 0.035 0.053 0.65 0.636
Urban 0.426 0.038 0.051 0.74 0.727
Rural 0.574 0.032 0.055 0.582 0.568
Poor 0.117 0.019 0.052 0.371 0.365
Nonpoor 0.883 0.037 0.053 0.686 0.672
Urban poor 0.039 0.025 0.053 0.462 0.459
Urban nonpoor 0.387 0.039 0.051 0.768 0.754
Rural poor 0.078 0.017 0.051 0.326 0.318
Rural nonpoor 0.497 0.035 0.056 0.623 0.607
a Average budget share over population including zero demand
b Average budget share over population excluding zero demand
c Ownership rate for private transport vehicle(s)
d Ownership rate for motorcycle(s
7A wider definition of energy poverty could also include transport related energy or the quality and
performance of the energy use as discussed in Angelou et al. (2013) but this is beyond the scope of our study.
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Fig. 5.3 Rural energy expenditure shares and usage rates
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Fig. 5.5 Urban and rural energy expenditure shares and usage rates
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Secondly, we define an alternative energy poverty line (EPL 2) at the expenditure poverty
line inspired by Foster et al. (2000). We do this by transforming demanded quantities of
all “modern” energy items into kgoe and perform a nonparametric kernel-weighted local
polynomial regression of the quantity used per energy item on total household expenditures
per capita for the reference year 2013.8 The calculated value at the per capita expenditure
poverty line can then be directly interpreted as our energy poverty line at which we calculate
FGT energy poverty indices. We refrain from calculating a “transport poverty line” because
of conceptual and empirical issues, such as the difficult comparability between urban and
rural energy needs and the missing public transport data. Table 5.2 displays the calculated
FGT energy indices and the per capita energy poverty line EPL 2 which is considerably
smaller than EPL 1 at around 22 kgoe. Although this poverty line is at a relatively low level,
the national energy poverty rate is close to 30 percent, dominated by the rural energy poverty
rate of 43 percent. To be clear, there are many households not defined as income poor but
do not use more modern energy than the average household at the poverty line. Based on
EPL 1, the national energy poverty rate is above 60 percent. Since many, particularly rural
households use firewood for cooking and we excluded it from the analysis, the magnitude is
not particularly surprising.
Table 5.2 Energy poverty
FGT
National Rural Urban
0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
EPL 1 0.61 0.32 0.22 0.75 0.44 0.31 0.43 0.16 0.09
EPL 2 0.29 0.14 0.09 0.43 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.02
EPL 2 poverty line: 21.82 kgoe
5.5 Welfare measurement, demand estimation and CO2 Emis-
sions
5.5.1 Demand system
There is an extensive literature on the estimation of demand functions based on economic
theory. Since the seminal work of Stone (1954), a significant amount of research has been
produced, with Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980b) Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)
8See Fan and Gijbels (1996) for further information on kernel-weighted local polynomial regression.
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(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a) and the quadratic extension of the AIDS, the QUAIDS by
Banks et al. (1997) among the more prominent ones. The estimation of QUAIDS has been
applied to the energy context by West and Williams III (2004), Labandeira et al. (2006),
Nikodinoska and Schröder (2016) and Tiezzi and Verde (2016). According to our knowledge,
no demand system specification of this form has been applied to the energy context in low and
middle income countries before. For India, Gundimeda and Köhlin (2008) estimate an LA-
AIDS differentiated by income for rural and urban households separately. They report a full
range of substitution elasticities for a four good energy demand system but no welfare effects.
More recent developments in the field are towards even higher nonlinearity in parametric
systems (Lewbel and Pendakur, 2009). For our analysis we use the well-established QUAIDS
framework since observed Engel curves appear to be well approximated by a quadratic
relationship between budget shares and logarithmic transformed expenditures. Rank three










The price indexes log[a(p)] and b(p) are defined as:



















The term λ (p) in the indirect utility function is a differentiable, homogeneous function of





λi ln pi (5.4)
With ∑i λi = 0. The derived expenditure share system is:



















Where wi is the share of commodity (group) i of total non-durable expenditures x. To be
consistent with utility maximization, the following restrictions need to hold:






















γi j = 0 (5.7)
Symmetry
γi j = γ ji (5.8)














































and δi j is the Kronecker delta. Compensated price elasticities are derived by the slutsky
equation:
eci j = e
u
i j + eiw j (5.13)
In household expenditure data, recorded zero expenditures are a common problem.
The possible reasons, infrequency of purchase or corner solutions are hard to distinguish
empirically however. The literature usually identifies this data issue as ”censored”, although
censoring may only be a special case of the underlying data generating process. We stick to
this discussion and use ”censored” as a synonym for zero observations in budget share data.
Apart from the recent use of Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation (Chen
and Yen, 2005), the suggested solutions in the literature are based on Heckman’s two step
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approach (Heckman, 1979). Heien and Wessells (1990) applied the two step approach to the
demand context, but attracted criticism for being inconsistent in later work. Shonkwiler and
Yen (1999) prove this inconsistency, showing the statistical correct way to obtain elasticity
estimates in censored system settings. First, a household specific probit model is estimated
with the outcome of 1 if the household consumes good i and 0 otherwise. For each household,
the standard normal probability density function (pdf) φ and the cumulative distribution
function (cdf) Φ are calculated by regressing wi on a set of independent variables zi. Secondly,
the pdf and the cdf are integrated into the system of equations as follows:
w∗i = Φwi +ϕiφ (5.14)
In contrast to Heckman (1979), this approach makes use of the full sample in both steps of
the estimation process. According to Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) the estimation of a censored
system requires a procedure that uses the whole sample since each dependent variable may















The respective expenditure and price elasticities, ei and ei j are derived under the modified
system (13). This two-step methodology has been applied in food demand contexts by Yen
et al. (2002) and Ecker and Qaim (2011) amongst others but not yet for energy demand.
5.5.2 Welfare effects
Since the literature on the welfare impacts of subsidy reforms focuses on first-order effects as
in Sterner (2011), we are interested in the necessity of calculating second-order effects taking
into account demand substitution. The first-order effects (FO) only require the observed
demand and no additional information on substitution behavior due to price changes (Deaton
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More exact welfare measures, incorporating substitution effects, have been proposed
early by Hicks (1939) with the compensating and equivalent variation measures. The
difference between first-order welfare measures, approximated by the budget share and more
exact second-order approximations incorporating household demand responses are well
documented in Banks et al. (1996). As they demonstrate, the difference between first and
second-order or “exact” welfare measures can be quite substantial when price changes are
non-marginal. They point to another main difference which is created by the distribution of
substitution elasticities, which may change the welfare effects considerably if elasticities
differ over the income distribution. To account for heterogeneous preferences, we obtain own-
and cross price elasticities (ei j) on the household level following Banks et al. (1997) which
are used in a cost of living experiment with the second order welfare loss approximated by a




























5.5.3 Household CO2 emissions
CO2 emissions embodied in household consumption (carbon footprints) could easily be
calculated with direct carbon intensities measured in available physical energy units (e.g.
2.4 kg CO2 per liter gasoline). However, the direct carbon content is not accounting for
emissions in the production process (e.g. refining gasoline) and for electricity and the residual
other goods category we would not be able to provide carbon contents. Therefore, in our
analytical framework, carbon emissions are calculated from a demand side perspective by
employing an input-output (IO) model. These carbon footprints are derived by calculating
carbon intensities of the Indonesian production sectors and a subsequent matching with
household consumption. The underlying database is the national IO table and CO2 emissions
per industrial sector from the World Input Output Database (Timmer et al., 2015).9 Total
production emissions Cind are simply a product of the matrix of sector specific direct carbon
intensities CI and total production vector x:
CI′x =Cind (5.19)
9The matching between WIOD sectors and the SUSENAS cinsumption classfication is documented in table
D.1, Appendix.
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Since our analysis has a focus on final demand y, direct carbon intensities are not of
interest and we transform equation (5.19) with the Leontief inverse (I−A)−1. Recalling total
production
x = (I −A)−1y (5.20)
and substituting (5.20) for x in (5.19) gives us total production emissions from a demand side
perspective:
CI′(I −A)−1y =Cind (5.21)
The multiplication of the direct carbon intensities e′C by the Leontief inverse (I −A)−1 then
generates the indirect carbon intensities CIind:
CIind =CI′(I −A)−1 (5.22)
which we use in the further analysis. For the fuels gasoline, kerosene and LPG we have to
additionally add these production based emissions to the direct carbon content emitted in the
combustion process.10 These direct carbon contents are transformed to household specific
expenditure based carbon intensities by calculating direct carbon emissions (quantities
multiplied with carbon contents) and dividing through the respective fuel expenditures.
Household specific carbon footprints are then calculated by multiplying expenditures per






After price changes take place, new expenditure levels exp1i per household are derived

































10Gasoline: 2.31 kg CO2/l, Kerosene: 2.55 kg CO2/l, LPG: 1.5 kg CO2/kg
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where the simulated expenditures are deflated to the baseline level in period 0 to avoid
upward biased projected emission levels. Additionally, to account for consumption growth
effects through redistribution via social programs, we simulate new expenditures and resulting
carbon emissions after income changes occur.
5.6 Energy price changes, poverty, welfare effects and CO2
emissions
We simulate the welfare and energy poverty impact for two stylized scenarios (20 and 50
percent price increase) and obtain results for single and multiple simultaneous price changes.
Based on the current low international oil prices, scenarios with even higher price increases
up to 100 percent and above are indeed possible for the coming years considering past trends.
Yet, price changes of this magnitude imply that we would have to forecast completely out of
sample. As mentioned before, the survey data offers price information for electricity, gasoline,
kerosene and LPG. Unfortunately we neither have price information for other transport nor
firewood expenditures and have to exclude them from further analysis. In addition to these
scenarios with energy price increases, we also simulate a scenario that interprets the price
change as an ad valorem tax rate and redistributes collected tax revenues via lump-sum cash
transfers to households. We assume similarity between consumers’ responses of price changes
through market mechanisms and taxes, although there is increasing evidence questioning this
assumption (Rivers and Schaufele, 2015; Tiezzi and Verde, 2016). Since this difference is
most likely to play out in the long-run, our analysis still offers valid results in the short-run.
5.6.1 Estimation results
The first stage estimation generates results from the probit model specification. Marginal
effects, evaluated at the sample means are displayed in table 5.3. All energy-price coefficients
have close to zero magnitude which implies that energy prices appear not to be a major
determinant of energy use decisions. Income on the other hand is an important factor,
particularly for private motorized transport. In the next step, the full demand system is
estimated. Due to the difficult economic interpreation of model coefficients, we report
expenditure elasticities in table 5.4 and price elasticities in table 5.5. Following Banks et al.
(1997), we calculate elasticities for each household individually and construct a weighted
average, with the weights generated as the household’s share of total sample expenditure for
the relevant good.
With rising income, the willingness to spend more on electricity increases, turning from a
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necessity to a luxury good at the 90th percentile. We observe high income responses towards
gasoline use, with slightly rising budget elasticities over the expenditure distribution all
above one. Gasoline is clearly a luxury good for households of all incomes. Kerosene also
exhibits budget elasticities close to 1, particularly for lower income households. LPG is
also estimated to be a necessity for all households, although as in the case of kerosene, the
tendency to demand more quantity declines with rising income.
Table 5.3 First stage probit model (marginal effects at means)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Electricity Gasoline Kerosene LPG
VARIABLES y1 y1 y1 y1
p1 1.23e-05*** -8.05e-06*** 2.39e-05*** -4.53e-06***
(7.67e-07) (1.25e-06) (1.25e-06) (1.31e-06)
p2 -2.79e-05*** -3.23e-05*** 6.73e-05*** -6.21e-05***
(5.44e-07) (9.96e-07) (9.90e-07) (1.15e-06)
p3 -2.72e-05*** -6.28e-06*** -5.01e-05*** 3.20e-05***
(2.40e-07) (3.89e-07) (3.88e-07) (3.79e-07)
p4 -1.13e-05*** -4.12e-06*** 2.46e-06*** -5.05e-06***
(6.69e-08) (7.27e-08) (7.94e-08) (9.61e-08)
p5 0.000723*** 0.00583*** -0.0177*** 0.00184***
(6.88e-05) (0.000113) (0.000122) (0.000115)
ln(x) 0.0851*** 0.486*** -0.0436*** 0.286***
(0.000777) (0.00146) (0.00131) (0.00131)
male -0.0115*** 0.147*** -0.0316*** -0.0158***
(0.00120) (0.00209) (0.00216) (0.00203)
age 0.000638*** -0.00385*** 0.000719*** -0.000950***
(3.05e-05) (5.05e-05) (5.22e-05) (4.86e-05)
hhsize = 2 0.00387** 0.109*** 0.0550*** 0.107***
(0.00178) (0.00360) (0.00318) (0.00284)
hhsize = 3 0.000562 0.175*** 0.0617*** 0.118***
(0.00176) (0.00343) (0.00312) (0.00273)
hhsize = 4 -0.00580*** 0.169*** 0.0566*** 0.118***
(0.00180) (0.00346) (0.00316) (0.00277)
hhsize = 5 -0.0144*** 0.143*** 0.0663*** 0.0834***
(0.00193) (0.00363) (0.00335) (0.00294)
hhsize = 6 -0.0332*** 0.0824*** 0.0945*** 0.0211***
(0.00204) (0.00375) (0.00346) (0.00295)
Observations 761,624 761,624 761,624 761,624
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Households with different income respond quite similarly to price changes for all energy
items, which is why we show only one price elasticity matrices for the first, fifth and tenth
expenditure per capita decile. In general, households react strongly to price changes for all
energy items. Most own-price elasticities are close to -1 with the strongest response observed
for gasoline. Based on the estimations, we expect to find differences between first and second
order welfare effects particularly for electricity and gasoline price changes when high usage
rates meet relatively large own-price elasticities.
Table 5.4 Budget elasticities
Deciles Electricity Gasoline Kerosene LPG Other
1 0.877 1.341 0.933 0.824 0.984
(0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000)
2 0.890 1.391 0.905 0.810 0.984
(0.890) (1.391) (0.905) (0.810) (0.984)
3 0.905 1.407 0.895 0.804 0.984
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
4 0.916 1.435 0.893 0.784 0.985
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
5 0.935 1.448 0.890 0.771 0.985
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
6 0.950 1.446 0.886 0.754 0.985
(0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
7 0.966 1.437 0.880 0.737 0.985
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
8 0.986 1.435 0.870 0.721 0.986
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
9 1.014 1.429 0.856 0.701 0.986
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
10 1.083 1.361 0.780 0.623 0.988
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.000)
Standard errors in parentheses
The evaluation of cross-price elasticities reveals that not all modern domestic energy
items are complements. Electricity and kerosene are weak substitutes while electricity and
LPG are weak complements, more so for households with higher income. The cross-price
elasticities between LPG and kerosene are zero, which clearly shows an unimportant role of
energy prices for the politically supported conversion from kerosene to LPG. Substitution
between private transport in the form of gasoline demand and domestic energy has no general
pattern either. Kerosene and LPG are weak substitutes and complements with gasoline
respectively while gasoline and electricity-gasoline cross-price elasticities are close to zero.
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Table 5.5 Price elasticities
decile item price
Electricity Gasoline Kerosene LPG Other
1 Electricity -0.83 0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.85
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Gasoline 0.03 -1.01 0.02 -0.03 0.96
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Kerosene 0.03 0.05 -0.95 0.00 0.78
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004)
LPG -0.10 -0.08 0.00 -0.99 1.20
(0.004) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008)
Other 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
5 Electricity -0.82 0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.83
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Gasoline 0.03 -1.03 0.03 -0.08 0.97
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Kerosene 0.04 0.14 -0.95 0.00 0.77
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004)
LPG -0.16 -0.20 0.00 -1.01 1.33
(0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006)
Other 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
10 Electricity -0.80 0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.83
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Gasoline 0.01 -0.97 0.04 -0.17 0.96
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Kerosene 0.04 0.21 -0.94 0.00 0.76
(0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004)
LPG -0.45 -0.75 0.00 -1.05 2.09
(0.005) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.013)
Other 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard errors in parentheses
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For other countries, the substitutability of energy items appears to be very context
specific as finding in the empirical literature demonstrate. Tiezzi and Verde (2016) find
complementarity between electricity and gasoline for the US while Nikodinoska and Schröder
(2016)) find the opposite for Germany.
Since this is a critical step in the further analysis, we test for the potential bias of different
prices through the geographical location of the household by including province fixed effects
and find no significant difference.11
5.6.2 Welfare and poverty effects
A relatively moderate 20 percent price increase for all four energy items under consideration
and averaging over all households per expenditure percentile is displayed in figure 5.6. As
expected, electricity and gasoline make up the biggest part of the welfare losses with a
progressive pattern in both cases. The relative welfare losses for a uniform 20 percent
electricity price increase are between 0.4 and 0.6 percent of total expenditures for the poorest
and richest households respectively. For gasoline, these relative welfare losses are larger
in particular for richer households, between 0.4 and 0.7 percent. Smaller welfare effects
for Kerosene and LPG reflect their relatively low usage rates and budget shares. For the
domestically used LPG, a price increase would be slightly regressive, but the magnitude
is small due to still low usage rates. This however could change when more and more
households use LPG instead of firewood also in rural areas. The difference between the
upper bound first order and the lower bound second order effects is relatively small at this
magnitude of price effects. First order estimates of welfare losses in the first scenario are
on average 10 percent higher. It becomes more pronounced in the second scenario of a
50 percent price increase, where the difference increases to over 20 percent for electricity
and gasoline with again small observed differences for kerosene and LPG (figure 5.7). In
particular for gasoline, second order effects are slightly less progressive. Responsible for
this effect is not a variation of demand responses with rising expenditures but the increase in
the usage rate. A larger fraction of households with actual gasoline demand also implies a
larger substitution potential. Low income households which are close to the poverty line and
dependent on the use of modern energy are less well represented in these average effects.
11Households in more remote locations face higher prices for all modern energy items and also have smaller
demand.
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In this regard, the poverty indicators in table 5.6 do not show a large increase, but absolute
numbers are important to consider.12 The moderate electricity price increases in Scenario I
raise the national poverty rate by 0.23 percent, which appears to be very small but absolutely
about half a million people will be additionally classified as poor, most of them in rural
areas. For gasoline price increases, we observe a similar magnitude. Although the poverty
effects are relatively small due to low usage rates and budget shares of modern energy,
there is a significant and growing number of households which are negatively affected by
price increases. Most of these households are living in urban areas but with more rural
households using modern energy items and private transport vehicles this finding is unlikely
to be stable over time. Non-negligible effects can also be found for LPG price increases,
which demonstrates its importance as the new major cooking fuel for Indonesian households.
In the multiple price change scenario, changing prices for all four energy items simulta-
neously, we observe a general progressive pattern, dominated by electricity and in particular
gasoline (Figure 5.8). Nevertheless, multiple price changes for the energy items under
consideration would result in serious welfare losses for poor households of close to 1.5 and 3
percent of total expenditures for scenario I and II respectively. In particular for Scenario II,
higher usage rates and associated substitution options for higher income households turn the
distributional effect less progressive. On the other hand, it also means there is less need to
redistribute tax revenue to higher income households since they are capable of dealing with
price increases. In Scenario II, poverty effects are quite strong with increases of 0.6 and 1.2
percentage points in the poverty rate for Scenario I and II respectively.
To shed some light on potential effects through redistribution if energy taxes of 20 percent
are the drivers behind the price increases, we simulate a full redistribution of tax revenues
via lump-sum transfers to households. For all four energy items, redistribution of tax revenue
leads to welfare gains for low income households (figure 5.9). Electricity and gasoline taxes
raise substantial revenue that could lead to quite large welfare gains for the majority of the
population if proper redistribution schemes can be identified. Welfare gains are also reflected
in poverty indicators, which improve for all scenarios (table 5.7). As much as urban house-
holds are disproportionately hit by energy price hikes, there are also more urban households
which benefit from transfer payments. Since universal lump-sum transfers are unlikely to be
implemented, more realistic redistribution schemes would rely on social welfare programs,
which directly target the poor.13
12Second-order welfare effects are used in the computation of post-reform poverty indices.
13The survey data does offer information on social welfare programs but unfortunately their coverage is low
and therefore unsuitable for a large scale redistribution scheme.
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Fig. 5.7 Welfare effects Scenario II
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Fig. 5.9 Welfare effects with lump-sum transfers Scenario I
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5.6.3 Energy poverty
Based on the estimated price elasticity matrices, we calculate the quantities households
reduce per capita in response to price increases for the respective scenarios. Based on these
behavioral responses, we calculate the FGT class of indices for both scenarios and energy
poverty lines and find significant effects on energy poverty resulting from lower energy use.
Table 5.8 displays the change in FGT indicators for the two simulated scenarios. We find
considerable effects of price increases on the poverty rate with particularly tremendous effects
of electricity and LPG price increases. LPG price increases result in higher energy poverty
levels than kerosene price increases, the latter with the expected smallest effects. For all
modern fuels, the increase in energy poverty is larger in rural areas despite the higher urban
usage rates. As discussed in the interpretation of estimated price elasticities, complementarity
between LPG and gasoline implies reduced domestic energy use also in the case of gasoline
price increases. Energy poverty increases due to gasoline price changes are about 25 percent
of LPG price increase induced energy poverty, a value close to the estimated cross-price
elasticity. Redistribution of tax revenues does not change energy poverty significantly since
households are projected to spend most of the extra income on other goods than energy.14
These findings reflect the downside of consumer responses and associated smaller calcu-
lated welfare effects through substitution. While the microeconomic welfare metric tells us
only about utility based monetary effects, other welfare dimensions such as energy poverty
are not directly addressed in a standard welfare assessment. Although one could argue that
households take energy requirements into account in consumption decisions, they are also
likely to substitute modern for traditional fuels when prices rise. Additionally, they may
not internalize all associated external costs such as health issues caused by air pollution.
Unfortunately, our data does not permit us to quantify the exact nature of substitution between
modern and traditional fuels when prices change. However, a simple estimation of firewood
demand in a Working-Leser form (Leser, 1963; Working, 1943), depending on prices of
modern energy, household total expenditures x and household characteristics H sheds some
light on this issue:




γi j ln p j + ln(x)+H (5.26)
Due to a significant share of zero firewood budget shares, equation (5.26) is estimated as a
heckman selection model with additional variables reflecting lighting and cooking fuel choice
14Results are almost identical to the scenario without redistribution and therefore not reported.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.6 Energy price changes, poverty, welfare effects and CO2 emissions 121
in the identifying equation.15 The estimated firewood cross-price elasticities (table 5.10)
exhibit an expected substitutability between other domestically used energy items electricity,
kerosene, LPG and firewood. This serves as some evidence, although not integrated into the
rest of the analysis due to data constraints, that households are very likely to increase the use
of traditional fuels when prices of modern, domestically used energy items rise. Households
may not reduce domestically used energy as strong as energy poverty indices suggest, but
instead move towards traditional fuels.
Table 5.10 Firewood cross-price elasticities
prices
Electricity Gasoline Kerosene LPG
firewood 0.11 -2.29 0.41 0.28
5.6.4 CO2 emission effects
Since households respond to price changes, the effect on household related carbon emissions
are expected to be negative with the estimated price elasticities. How large this effect is
for the single energy items can be seen in table 5.11. The elasticity of household carbon
emissions relative to price changes is the highest for electricity and gasoline due to the high
carbon intensity of electricity and high budget shares for gasoline. Moderate price changes of
20 percent for electricity and gasoline lead to already substantial emission reductions at the
order of 4.7 and 5.4 percent of household carbon emissions. Redistribution of tax revenues
does not change this picture tremendously with on average 10 percent lower reductions,
although absolute reductions will decline with the size of the price change and redistributive
transfers.
Although these emission reductions appear to be rather large, they have to be put into
perspective. They cannot be readily compared to domestic production based emissions,
which are about 25 percent larger as demand side emissions.16 Household emissions are in
turn only 65 percent of demand side emissions, which includes imported emissions under the
domestic technology assumption.17 Relative to total production CO2 emissions, households
15As in the case of demand system coefficients we do not report results due to the difficult economic
interpretation and report elasticities instead.
16Domestic demand emissions (including imports) are only 80 percent of domestic production emissions, the
rest gets exported.
17Demand side emissions include expenditures from households, government, gross fixed capital formation
and changes in inventories and valuables.
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are responsible for about 50 percent. Additionally, the household survey covers only about
50 percent of demand emissions calculated with the IO data. How to finally interpret the
emission reductions is a question of how to deal with the large disparity between survey and
IO data. If the survey data is scaled up to match the total aggregate consumption in the IO
tables, the calculated relative reductions of household emissions remain identical. Relative to
total domestic, production based CO2 emissions, the estimated reductions need to be adjusted
downwards by 50 percent if the survey data is scaled or 75 percent when it remains unscaled.
Table 5.11 Household CO2-price elasticities
Scenario electricity gasoline kerosene LPG energy
price increase -0.238 -0.272 0.022 -0.141 -0.612
price increase + lump-sum -0.214 -0.243 0.024 -0.133 -0.555
5.7 Conclusion
Consumer energy price increases affect richer households more in relative and consequentially
also in absolute terms. On the one hand, our findings confirm prior studies, which are based on
observed demand and the assumption of zero substitution between goods, on the progressive
direction of this effect for electricity and gasoline. On the other hand, we find neutral
effects for Kerosene and LPG and smaller welfare losses for electricity and gasoline by
employing second-order welfare estimates. The calculated first-order effects for electricity
and gasoline are on average 10 and 20 percent larger in Scenario I and II, which may seem
small in relative terms but are substantial differences in absolute terms. First-order effects
particularly overestimate welfare losses for the upper part of the income distribution where
small percentage changes in relative terms translate into large absolute monetary amounts.
For redistribution this has important consequences, since richer households are estimated to
be capable of dealing with increasing energy prices and therefore need less compensation.
This holds particularly for gasoline, which is at the center of the subsidy debate and a
major fuel used by households. Due to lower usage rates for low income households, also
the poverty impacts are moderate when prices change by small amounts. Despite these
supposedly small relative changes, a non-marginal number of low income households are
actually highly affected by energy price changes. Additionally, there is a large and growing
number of households who are vulnerable to large energy price increases, which appear to be
quite possible when energy subsidies are completely abolished.
Eventually, redistribution of taxes or saved subsidies is crucial of turning this story around
into welfare gains and poverty reduction. Although the simulated lump-sum transfers are
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already quite effective in absorbing large welfare shocks, more targeted transfers are certainly
desirable from an equity and fiscal perspective. Although the estimation of a demand system
proves to be already useful for calculating welfare effects, the consideration of energy poverty
and household related carbon emissions makes it additionally valuable. Without changes in
quantities demanded, energy poverty would not change in our expenditure based definition
of energy poverty. Additionally to welfare losses from energy price increases, households
also suffer from a lack of modern energy items which could trigger additional negative
impacts such as adverse health effects through the shift to traditional sources of energy. By
simulating energy item quantities, we find substantial effects of price increases for energy
used domestically on energy poverty. Somewhat surprisingly, this also holds for gasoline
since the estimation reveals a complementary relationship to LPG. Particularly problematic
for energy poverty is this complementarity for low income households, for which these
energy goods have much more of a necessity character than for high income households.
The resulting divergence of relatively small estimated second order welfare effects and
large impacts on energy poverty reflects a weakness of standard welfare metrics which
assumes complete information and the absence of negative externalities. Also redistribution
of tax revenue is only partially able to deal with rising energy poverty in our model since
households spend most of the transfer income on other goods than modern energy. The
resulting increased use of traditional biomass fuels such as firewood is certainly critical
from both a health perspective through indoor air pollution and a CO2 emission perspective
through deforestation.
The reduction of carbon emissions embodied in household consumption is the flip side of
the coin to energy poverty increases and welfare losses. The pricing of direct energy use by
households leads to substantial emissions reductions at the order of 0.28 percent for each
percent increase in prices for gasoline or electricity. Analog to the results for energy poverty,
where households only partially increase their energy use due to redistributive transfers, the
adverse emission effect of redistribution is very limited with 10 percent smaller reductions.
These emission reductions are, as is the nature of our data and model, exclusively embodied
in household consumption. When comparing to production based CO2 emissions, which
are usually referred to in other studies, the effects are about half of what is estimated. For
all simulated effects, we have to keep in mind that households can only reduce energy use
to a certain minimum level. This and the nature of our modeling framework restricts the
interpretation of results to the very short run perspective.
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Fig. A.1 Emission Intensities of Expenditure Sub-Groups (2004/05)
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Table A.1 NSS-CSO Matching 2011/12
NSS code NSS description IO code Exp group code
101 rice – PDS 1 1
102 rice – other sources 1 1
103 chira 1 1
104 khoi, lawa 1 1
105 muri 1 1
106 other rice products 1 1
107 wheat/ atta – PDS 2 1
108 wheat/ atta – other sources 2 1
110 maida 2 1
111 suji, rawa 2 1
112 sewai, noodles 1 1
113 bread (bakery) 2 1
114 other wheat products 2 1
115 jowar & its products 3 1
116 bajra & its products 4 1
117 maize & products 5 1
118 barley & its products 2 1
120 small millets & their products 4 1
121 ragi & its products 7 1
122 other cereals 20 1
129 cereal: sub-total (101-122)
139 cereal substitutes: tapioca, etc. 20 1
140 arhar, tur 6 1
141 gram: split 6 1
142 gram: whole 6 1
143 moong 6 1
144 masur 6 1
145 urd 6 1
146 peas 6 1
147 khesari 7 1
148 other pulses 7 1
150 gram products 6 1
151 besan 6 1
152 other pulse products 7 1
159 pulses & pulse products: s.t. (140-152)
160 milk: liquid (litre) 21 2
161 baby food 21 2
162 milk: condensed/ powder 21 2
163 curd 21 2
164 ghee 21 2
139
NSS code NSS description IO code Exp group code
165 butter 21 2
166 ice-cream 21 2
167 other milk products 21 2
169 milk & milk products: s.t.(160-167)
170 salt 37 1
171 sugar - PDS 38 1
172 sugar - other sources 38 1
173 gur 8 1
174 candy, misri 39 1
175 honey 38 1
179 sugar & salt: s.t. (170-175)
180 vanaspati, margarine 40 1
181 mustard oil 11 1
182 groundnut oil 9 1
183 coconut oil 10 1
184 refined oil 10 1
185 soyabean, saffola, etc.] 41 1
189 edible oil: s.t. (180-185)
190 eggs (no.) 23 2
191 fish, prawn 26 2
192 goat meat/mutton 22 2
193 beef/ buffalo meat 22 2
194 pork 22 2
195 chicken 23 2
196 others: birds, crab, oyster, tortoise, etc. 23 2
199 egg, fish & meat: s.t. (190-199)
200 potato 19 1
201 onion 19 1
202 tomato 19 1
203 brinjal 19 1
204 radish 19 1
205 carrot 19 1
206 palak/other leafy vegetables 19 1
207 chillis: green 19 1
208 lady’s finger 19 1
210 parwal, patal 19 1
211 cauliflower 19 1
212 cabbage 19 1
213 pumpkin 19 1
214 peas 19 1
215 french beans, barbati 19 1
216 lemon (no.) 18 1
140
NSS code NSS description IO code Exp group code
217 other vegetables 19 1
219 vegetables: s.t. (200-217)
220 banana (no.) 18 1
221 jackfruit 18 1
222 watermelon 18 1
223 pineapple (no.) 18 1
224 coconut (no.) 18 1
225 coconut green (no.) 18 1
226 guava 18 1
227 singara 18 1
228 orange, mausami (no.) 18 1
230 papaya 18 1
231 mango 18 1
232 kharbooza 18 1
233 pears/naspati 18 1
234 berries 18 1
235 leechi 18 1
236 apple 18 1
237 grapes 18 1
238 other fresh fruits 18 1
239 fruits (fresh): s.t.(250-268)
240 coconut: copra 10 1
241 groundnut 9 1
242 dates 18 1
243 cashewnut 9 1
244 walnut 9 1
245 other nuts 9 1
246 raisin, kishmish, monacca, etc. 18 1
247 other dry fruits 18 1
249 fruits (dry): s.t. (270-277)
250 ginger (gm) 20 1
251 garlic (gm) 20 1
252 jeera(gm) 20 1
253 dhania (gm) 20 1
254 turmeric (gm) 20 1
255 black pepper (gm) 20 1
256 dry chillies (gm) 20 1
257 tamarind (gm) 20 1
258 curry powder (gm) 20 1
260 oilseeds (gm) 20 1
261 other spices (gm) 20 1
269 spices: s.t. (250-269)
141
NSS code NSS description IO code Exp group code
270 tea : cups (no.) 42 3
271 tea : leaf (gm) 14 3
272 coffee : cups (no.) 42 3
273 coffee: powder (gm) 15 3
274 mineral water (litre) 44 3
275 cold beverages: bottled/canned (litre) 44 3
276 fruit juice and shake (litre) 44 3
277 other beverages: cocoa, chocolate, etc. 44 3
279 beverages: sub-total (270-279)
280 cooked meals purchased (no.) 43 3
281 cooked meals received free in workplace** (no.) 43 3
282 cooked meals received as assistance ** (no.) 43 3
283 cooked snacks purchased 43 3
284 other served processed food 43 3
289 served processed food.: sub-total (280-284)
290 prepared sweets 43 3
291 biscuits 43 3
292 papad, bhujia, namkeen, mixture, 43 3
293 chips (gm) 43 3
294 pickles (gm) 43 3
295 sauce, jam, jelly (gm) 43 3
296 other packaged processed food
299 packaged processed food: sub-total (290-296)
300 pan: leaf (no.) 17 4
301 pan: finished (no.) 45 4
302 ingredients for pan (gm) 45 4
309 pan: s.t. (300-302)
310 bidi (no.) 45 4
311 cigarettes (no.) 45 4
312 leaf tobacco (gm) 17 4
313 snuff (gm) 45 4
314 hookah tobacco (gm) 45 4
315 cheroot (no.) 45 4
316 zarda, kimam, surti (gm) 45 4
317 other tobacco products 45 4
319 tobacco: s.t. (310-317)
320 ganja (gm) 44 4
321 toddy (litre) 44 4
322 country liquor (litre) 44 4
323 beer (litre) 44 4
324 foreign/refined liquor or wine (litre) 44 4
325 other intoxicants 44 4
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329 intoxicants: s.t. (320-325)
330 coke 64 9
331 firewood and chips 56 6
332 electricity (std. unit) 107 5
333 dung cake 24 6
334 kerosene – PDS (litre) 63 8
335 kerosene – other sources (litre) 63 8
336 matches (box) 56 9
337 coal 64 9
338 LPG [excl. conveyance] 63 7
340 charcoal 64 9
341 candle (no.) 73 9
342 gobar gas 28 6
343 petrol (litre) [excl. conveyance] 63 9
344 diesel (litre) [excl. conveyance] 63 9
345 other fuel 63 9
349 fuel and light: s.t. (330-345)
350 dhoti (no.) 54 10
351 sari (no.) 54 10
352 cloth for shirt, pyjama, salwar, etc. (metre) 54 10
353 cloth for coat, trousers, overcoat, etc. (metre) 54 10
354 chaddar, dupatta, shawl, etc. (no.) 54 10
355 lungi (no.) 54 10
356 school/college uniform: boys 54 10
357 school/college uniform: girls 54 10
358 kurta-pajama suits: males (no.) 54 10
360 kurta-pajama suits: females (no.) 54 10
361 kurta, kameez (no.) 54 10
362 pajamas, salwar (no.) 54 10
363 shirts, T-shirts (no.) 54 10
364 shorts, trousers, bermudas (no.) 54 10
365 frocks, skirts, etc. (no.) 54 10
366 blouse, dupatta, scarf, muffler (no.) 54 10
367 lungi (no.) 54 10
368 other casual wear* 54 10
370 baniyan, socks, other hosiery and undergarments, etc.
(no.)
54 10
371 gamchha, towel, handkerchief (no.) 54 10
372 infant clothing 54 10
373 headwear, belts, ties (no.) 54 10
374 knitting wool (gm) 54 10
375 clothing (first-hand): other 54 10
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376 clothing: second-hand 54 10
379 clothing: sub-total (350-376)
380 bed sheet, bed cover (no.) 54 16
381 rug, blanket (no.) 52 16
382 pillow, quilt, mattress (no.) 54 16
383 cloth for upholstery, curtains, tablecloth, etc. (metre) 54 16
384 mosquito net (no.) 54 16
385 bedding: others 54 16
389 bedding, etc.: s.t. (380-385)
390 leather boots, shoes 59 10
391 leather sandals, chappals, etc. 59 10
392 other leather footwear 59 10
393 rubber / PVC footwear 61 10
394 other footwear 59 10
395 footwear: second-hand 59 10
399 footwear: sub-total (390-395)
400 books, journals: first hand 58 11
401 books, journals, etc.: second hand 58 11
402 newspapers, periodicals 57 11
403 library charges 121 11
404 stationery, photocopying charges 123 11
405 tuition and other fees (school, college, etc.) 121 11
406 private tutor/ coaching centre 121 11
407 educational CD 121 11
408 other educational expenses 121 11
409 education: s.t. (400-408)
410 medicine 70 13
411 X-ray, ECG, pathological test, etc. 122 13
412 doctor’s/surgeon’s fee 122 13
413 hospital & nursing home charges 122 13
414 other medical expenses 122 13
419 medical - institutional: s.t. (410-414)
420 medicine 70 13
421 X-ray, ECG, pathological test, etc. 122 13
422 doctor’s/ surgeon’s fee 122 13
423 family planning appliances 122 13
424 other medical expenses 122 13
429 medical – non-institutional: sub-total (420-424)
430 cinema, theatre 129 12
431 mela, fair, picnic 129 12
432 sports goods, toys, etc. 105 12
433 club fees 129 12
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434 goods for recreation and hobbies 105 12
435 photography 94 12
436 VCD/ DVD hire (incl. instrument) 94 12
437 cable TV 94 12
438 other entertainment 129 12
439 entertainment: sub-total (430-438)
440 spectacles 105 19
441 torch 105 19
442 lock 105 19
443 umbrella, raincoat 105 19
444 lighter (bidi/ cigarette/ gas stove) 105 19
445 other minor durable-type goods 105 19
449 minor durable-type goods: sub-total (440-445)
450 toilet soap 71 14
451 toothpaste, toothbrush, comb, etc. 62 14
452 powder, snow, cream, lotion and perfume 71 14
453 hair oil, shampoo, hair cream 71 14
454 shaving blades, shaving stick, razor 82 14
455 shaving cream, aftershave lotion 71 14
456 sanitary napkins 57 14
457 other toilet articles 71 14
459 toilet articles: sub-total (450-457)
460 electric bulb, tubelight 91 16
461 electric batteries 90 16
462 other non-durable electric goods 91 16
463 earthenware 76 16
464 glassware 76 16
465 bucket, water bottle/ feeding bottle & other plastic goods 62 16
466 coir, rope, etc. 53 16
467 washing soap/soda/powder 71 16
468 other washing requisites 71 16
470 incense (agarbatti), room freshener 71 16
471 flower (fresh): all purposes 20 16
472 mosquito repellent, insecticide, acid etc. 68 16
473 other petty articles 76 16
479 other household consumables: sub-total (460-473)
480 domestic servant/cook 123 15
481 attendant 123 15
482 sweeper 123 15
483 barber, beautician, etc. 123 15
484 washerman, laundry, ironing 123 15
485 tailor 123 15
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486 grinding charges 128 15
487 telephone charges: landline* 128 15
488 telephone charges: mobile 128 15
490 postage & telegram 128 15
491 miscellaneous expenses 129 15
492 priest 128 15
493 legal expenses 125 15
494 repair charges for non-durables 129 15
495 pet animals (incl. birds, fish) 129 15
496 internet expenses 128 15
497 other consumer services excluding conveyance 129 15
499 consumer services excluding conveyance: sub-total
(480-496)
500 air fare 112 18
501 railway fare 109 17
502 bus/tram fare 97 17
503 taxi, auto-rickshaw fare 97 17
504 steamer, boat fare 111 17
505 rickshaw (hand drawn & cycle) fare 99 17
506 horse cart fare 22 17
507 porter charges 128 17
508 petrol for vehicle 29 18
510 diesel for vehicle 29 18
511 lubricants & other fuels for vehicle 29 18
512 school bus, van, etc. 97 17
513 other conveyance expenses 98 17
519 conveyance: sub-total (500-513)
520 house rent, garage rent (actual) 120 16
521 hotel lodging charges 117 16
522 residential land rent 120 16
523 other consumer rent 120 16
529 rent: sub-total (520-523)
539 house rent, garage rent (imputed- urban only) 120 16
540 water charges 108 16
541 other consumer taxes & cesses 130 15
549 consumer taxes and cesses: sub-total (540-541)
550 bedstead 54 16
551 almirah, dressing table 54 16
552 chair, stool, bench, table 55 16
553 suitcase, trunk, box, handbag and other travel goods 63 16
554 foam, rubber cushion 61 16
555 carpet, daree & other floor mattings 52 16
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556 paintings, drawings, engravings, etc. 69 16
557 other furniture & fixtures (couch, sofa, etc.) 55 16
559 furniture & fixtures: sub-total (550-557)
560 radio, 2-in-1 94 12
561 television 94 12
562 VCR/VCD/DVD player 94 12
563 camera & photographic equipment 94 12
564 CD, DVD, audio/video cassette, etc 94 12
565 musical instruments 105 12
566 other goods for recreation 105 12
569 goods for recreation: sub-total (560-566)
570 stainless steel utensils 82 16
571 other metal utensils 82 16
572 casseroles, thermos, thermoware 82 16
573 other crockery & utensils 82 16
579 crockery & utensils: sub-total (570-573)
580 electric fan 91 16
581 air conditioner, air cooler 91 16
582 inverter 91 16
583 lantern, lamp, electric lampshade 91 16
584 sewing machine 91 16
585 washing machine 91 16
586 stove 91 16
587 pressure cooker/ pressure pan 91 16
588 refrigerator 91 16
590 water purifier 91 16
591 electric iron, heater, toaster, oven & other electric heating
appliances
91 16
592 other cooking/ household appliances 91 16
599 cooking & other household appliances: sub-total
(580-592)
600 bicycle 99 18
601 motor cycle, scooter 98 18
602 motor car, jeep 97 18
603 tyres & tubes 61 18
604 other transport equipment 100 18
609 personal transport equipment: sub-total (600-604)
610 contact lenses, hearing aids & orthopaedic equipment 102 13
611 other medical equipment 102 13
619 therapeutic appliances: sub-total (610-611)
620 clock, watch 101 19
621 other machines for household work 91 19
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622 PC/ Laptop/ other peripherals incl. software 92 19
623 mobile handset 92 19
624 telephone instrument (landline) 92 19
625 any other personal goods 93 19
629 other personal goods: sub-total (620-625)
630 bathroom and sanitary equipment 87 16
631 plugs, switches & other electrical fittings 89 16
632 residential building & land (cost of repairs only) 129 16
633 other durables (specify) 105 16
639 residential building, land and other durables:
sub-total (630-633)
640 gold ornaments 103 19
641 silver ornaments 103 19
642 jewels, pearls 103 19
643 other ornaments 103 19
649 jewellery & ornaments: sub-total (640-643)
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Fig. B.1 Decomposition welfare loss, top 10 percent
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Table B.1 Inequality effects (Gini Index)
Scenario National Rural Urban
Baseline 0.518 0.452 0.505
A
I (USD 3.5) 0.518 0.452 0.505
II (USD 20) 0.519 0.452 0.505
II (USD 20) + lump-sum 0.516 0.449 0.503
II (USD 20) + PROSPERA 0.514 0.440 0.503
III (USD 50) 0.519 0.453 0.506
III (USD 50) + lump-sum 0.514 0.444 0.501
III (USD 50) + PROSPERA 0.509 0.425 0.501
B
I (USD 3.5) 0.518 0.452 0.505
II (USD 20) 0.519 0.452 0.505
II (USD 20) + lump-sum 0.516 0.448 0.503
II (USD 20) + PROSPERA 0.513 0.436 0.503
III (USD 50) 0.520 0.453 0.507
III (USD 50) + lump-sum 0.513 0.442 0.500
III (USD 50) + PROSPERA 0.507 0.419 0.500
C
I (USD 3.5) 0.518 0.452 0.505
II (USD 20) 0.519 0.454 0.506
II (USD 20) + lump-sum 0.515 0.447 0.502
II (USD 20) + PROSPERA 0.511 0.431 0.502
III (USD 50) 0.521 0.457 0.508
III (USD 50) + lump-sum 0.510 0.440 0.498
III (USD 50) + PROSPERA 0.502 0.410 0.498
Table B.2 ENIGH-WIOD Matching 2014
ENIGH code ENIGH description WIOD sector
A001 Maíz en grano 1
A002 Harina de maíz 3
A003 Masa de maíz 3
A004 Tortilla de maíz 3
A005 Tostadas 3
A006 Otros productos de maíz 3
A007 Harina de trigo 3
A008 Tortilla de harina 3
A009 Pasta para sopa 3
A010 Galletas dulces 3
A011 Galletas saladas 3
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A012 Pan blanco: bolillo, telera, baguete, etcétera 3
A013 Pan dulce en piezas 3
A014 Pan dulce empaquetado 3
A015 Pan para sándwich, hamburguesa, hot-dog y tostado 3
A016 Pasteles y pastelillos en piezas o a granel 3
A017 Pasteles y pastelillos empaquetados 3
A018 Otros productos de trigo 3
A019 Arroz en grano 1
A020 Otros productos de arroz 3
A021 Cereal de maíz, de trigo, de arroz, de avena, de granola, etcétera 1
A022 Botanas: frituras, palomitas, cheetos, doritos etcétera (excepto papas) 3
A023 Sopas instantáneas 3
A024 Otros cereales 1
A025 Bistec de res (de cualquier parte que se saque) 3
A026 Arrachera, filete 3
A027 Milanesa de res 3
A028 Chamorro de res 3
A029 Chuleta de costilla de res 3
A030 Agujas, aldilla, chambarete, diezmillo, espinazo, fajilla de res para asar,
retazo, tampiqueña
3
A031 Cocido de res 3
A032 Cortes especiales de res 3
A033 Hamburguesas de res para asar 3
A034 Molida de res 3
A035 Pulpa de res en trozo 3
A036 Carne de otras partes de la res 3
A037 Vísceras de res 3
A038 Bistec de puerco (de cualquier parte que se saque) 3
A039 Pierna de puerco en trozo 3
A040 Pulpa de puerco en trozo 3
A041 Molida de puerco 3
A042 Costilla y chuleta de puerco 3
A043 Espaldilla de puerco 3
A044 Codillo de puerco 3
A045 Carne de otras partes del puerco 3
A046 Vísceras de puerco 3
A047 Carne enchilada 3
A048 Chicharrón de puerco 3
A049 Chorizo con cualquier condimento y color y longaniza 3
A050 Chuleta ahumada de puerco 3
A051 Machaca y carne seca 3
A052 Jamón de puerco 3
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A053 Mortadela, queso de puerco y salami, bolonia de carnes surtidas 3
A054 Lardo procesado (tocino) 3
A055 Salchichas y salchichón 3
A056 Otras carnes procesadas 3
A057 Pierna, muslo o pechuga de pollo con hueso 3
A058 Pierna, muslo o pechuga de pollo sin hueso 3
A059 Pollo entero o en piezas excepto, pierna, muslo y pechuga 3
A060 Vísceras y otras partes del pollo 3
A061 Otras aves 3
A062 Chorizo de pollo, jamón y nugget, salchicha, mortadela, etcétera 3
A063 Borrego: carnero y borrego 3
A064 Chivo y cabrito 3
A065 Otras carnes: caballo, conejo, iguana, jabalí, rana, tortuga, venado 3
A066 Pescado entero limpio y sin limpiar 3
A067 Filete de pescado 3
A068 Atún enlatado 3
A069 Salmón y bacalao procesado 3
A070 Pescado ahumado, seco, nugget, sardina, etcétera 3
A071 Anguilas, angulas, hueva de pescado, mantarraya, pejelagarto, etcétera 3
A072 Camarón fresco 3
A073 Mariscos frescos 3
A074 Mariscos procesados 3
A075 Leche pasteurizada de vaca 3
A076 Leche condensada 3
A077 Leche evaporada 3
A078 Leche en polvo entera o descremada 3
A079 Leche modificada o maternizada 3
A080 Leche no pasteurizada (leche bronca) 3
A081 Otras leches: de burra, de cabra, de soya 3
A082 Queso amarillo en rebanadas o para untar 3
A083 Queso añejo y cotija 3
A084 Queso chihuahua 3
A085 Queso fresco 3
A086 Queso manchego 3
A087 Queso oaxaca o asadero 3
A088 Otros quesos 3
A089 Crema 3
A090 Mantequilla 3
A091 Bebidas fermentadas de leche 3
A092 Otros derivados de la leche 3
A093 Huevo de gallina blanco y rojo 3
A094 Otros huevos: codorniz, pata, pava etcétera 3
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A095 Aceite vegetal: canola, cártamo, girasol, maíz, etcétera 3
A096 Aceite de coco, oliva, soya 3
A097 Margarina 3
A098 Manteca de puerco 3
A099 Manteca vegetal 3
A100 Otros aceites: de bacalao, de tiburón, de tortuga, enjundia 3
A101 Betabel y camote 1
A102 Papa 1
A103 Rábano 1
A104 Otros tubérculos 1
A105 Harina para puré de papa 3
A106 Papas fritas en bolsa o a granel 3








A115 Chile jalapeño 1
A116 Chile poblano 1
A117 Chile serrano 1
A118 Otros chiles 1
A119 Cilantro 1








A128 Perejil y yerbabuena 1
A129 Tomate verde 1
A130 Zanahoria 1
A131 Otras verduras 1
A132 Germinados de maíz, de soya, de trigo 1
A133 Chiles envasados 3
A134 Chile secos o en polvo 3
A135 Verduras y legumbres envasadas 3
A136 Verduras y legumbres congeladas 3
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A137 Frijol en grano 1
A138 Garbanzo en grano 1
A139 Haba amarilla o verde en grano 1
A140 Lenteja en grano 1
A141 Otras leguminosas en grano 1
A142 Frijol procesado 3
A143 Otras leguminosas procesadas 3
A144 Semillas a granel 1
A145 Semillas envasadas 1
A146 Semillas procesadas 1
A147 Anona, chirimoya, guanábana 1
A148 Cereza, frambuesa, fresa, zarzamora 1
A149 Chabacano, durazno, melocotón 1
A150 Chicozapote y mamey 1




A155 Mandarina, nectarina, tangerina 1
A156 Toronja 1
A157 Mango 1






A164 Pitahaya y tuna 1
A165 Plátano macho y de castilla 1
A166 Plátano verde y tabasco 1





A170 Otras frutas: garambullo, granada, higo, jícama, kiwi, etcétera 1
A171 Frutas en almíbar y conserva 3
A172 Frutas cristalizadas, enchiladas y secas 3
A173 Azúcar blanca y morena 3
A174 Miel de abeja 1
A175 Otras azúcares y mieles 3
A176 Café tostado en grano molido 3
A177 Café tostado soluble 3
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A178 Flor y hojas para té 1
A179 Té soluble (cualquier sabor) 3
A180 Chocolate en tableta 3
A181 Chocolate en polvo 3
A182 Otros chocolates 3
A183 Canela 1
A184 Clavo 1
A185 Yerbas de olor 1
A186 Concentrados de pollo y tomate 1
A187 Mayonesa 1




A192 Salsas dulces y picantes 1
A193 Vinagre 1
A194 Otros aderezos, especies y salsas 1
A195 Cereal de arroz, avena, plátano, manzana, mixto para bebé 3
A196 Papillas para bebé 3
A197 Jugos de frutas y verduras de cualquier combinación para bebé 3
A198 Pizzas preparadas 22
A199 Carnitas 22
A200 Pollo rostizado 22
A201 Barbacoa y birria 22
A202 Otros alimentos preparados: atole, flautas, guisados, hot-dog,
emparedados, sopas, tacos, tamales, tortas, sopes,
22
A203 Hongos frescos: champiñones, huitlacoche y setas 1
A204 Insectos: chapulines, chinicuiles, escamoles, gusanos de maguey,
hormigas (chicatana), jumiles
1
A205 Flanes, gelatinas y pudines en polvo 3
A206 Cajetas, dulces de leche, jamoncillos y natillas 3
A207 Ates, crema de cacahuate, jaleas, mermelada 3
A208 Helados, nieves y paletas de hielo 3
A209 Otras golosinas 3
A210 Molienda de nixtamal 3
A211 Otros gastos relacionados con la preparación de alimentos 3
A212 Alimentos y/o bebidas en paquete 3
A213 Alimento para animales domésticos 3
A214 Alimento para animales para uso del hogar 3
A215 Agua natural embotellada 3
A216 Agua mineral, quina, desmineralizada con o sin sabor 3
A217 Agua preparada y jugos naturales 3
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A218 Jugos y néctares envasados 3
A219 Concentrados y polvos para preparar bebidas 3
A220 Refrescos de cola y de sabores 3
A221 Bebida energética 3
A222 Bebidas fermentadas de maíz, hielo, jarabe natural, lechuguilla, sangrita,
tascalate, tepache y tuba
3
A223 Coñac y brandy 3
A224 Cerveza 3
A225 Anís (licor) 3
A226 Jerez 3
A227 Licor o cremas de frutas 3
A228 Aguamiel, pulque, tlachique 3
A229 Aguardiente, alcohol de caña, charanda, mezcal 3
A230 Ron añejo, blanco, con limón 3
A231 Rompope 3
A232 Sidra blanca y rosada
A233 Tequila añejo, azul y blanco 3
A234 Vino de mesa blanco, rosado, tinto 3
A235 Vodka 3
A236 Whisky 3
A237 Bebida alcohólica preparada 3
A238 Otras bebidas alcohólicas: champaña 3
A239 Cigarros 3
A240 Puros 3
A241 Tabaco en hoja y picado 3







A247 Otros eventos fuera de casa 22
B001 Metro o tren ligero 23
B002 Autobús 23
B003 Trolebús o metrobús 23
B004 Colectivo, combi o microbús 23
B005 Taxi, radio-taxi (sitio) 23
B006 Autobús foráneo 23
B007 Otros transportes: lancha, panga o peaje 24
C001 Detergentes (polvo, líquido, pasta, gel) 9
C002 Jabón de barra 9
C003 Blanqueadores 9
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C004 Suavizantes de telas 9
C005 Limpiadores (en polvo o líquido) 9
C006 Servilletas y papel absorbente 7
C007 Platos y vasos desechables, papel aluminio y encerado 7
C008 Escobas, trapeadores, recogedor 16
C009 Fibras, estropajos, escobetas, pinzas para ropa, lazos 16




C014 Cera y limpia muebles 9
C015 Insecticidas líquido, en polvo, pastilla, raid eléctrico 9
C016 Desodorante ambiental y sanitario 9
C017 Recipientes de lámina (cubetas, tinas, etcétera) 12
C018 Recipientes de plástico (cubetas, tinas, mangueras, etcétera) 10
C019 Otros artículos 9




C024 Otros servicios: fumigación, etcétera 34
D001 Jabón de tocador 9
D002 Lociones y perfumes 9
D003 Pasta dental y enjuague bucal 9
D004 Hilo y cepillo dental 16
D005 Champús, enjuagues, tratamiento para el cabello 9
D006 Tintes y líquidos para permanente 9
D007 Desodorante y talco 9
D008 Bronceadores y bloqueadores 9
D009 Crema para el cuerpo, para la cara y tratamiento facial 9
D010 Gel, spray, mousse para el cabello 9
D011 Crema para afeitar y rastrillos 9
D012 Cosméticos, polvo y maquillaje sombra, lápiz labial, delineador de ojos,
etcétera
9
D013 Esmalte para uñas 9
D014 Papel sanitario, pañuelos desechables 7
D015 Toallas sanitarias 7
D016 Pañales desechables 7
D017 Artículos de tocador para bebé 7
D018 Cepillos y peines 16
D019 Artículos eléctricos: rasuradora, secadora, etcétera 13
D020 Reparación y/o mantenimiento de los artículos anteriores 21
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D021 Otros: donas y mariposas para el cabello, limas de uñas, pasadores,
etcétera
16
D022 Corte de cabello y peinado 34
D023 Baños y masajes 34
D024 Permanentes y tintes 34
D025 Manicure 34




E004 Preparatoria o bachillerato 32
E005 Profesional 32
E006 Maestría y doctorado 32
E007 Educación Técnica 32
E008 Estancias infantiles (excepto preprimaria) 32
E009 Enseñanza adicional 32
E010 Educación especial para discapacitados 32
E011 Internados 32
E012 Cuidado de niños (persona particular) 33
E013 Transporte escolar 23
E014 Libros para la escuela 7
E015 Gastos recurrentes en educación, como: credenciales, seguro médico,
seguro de vida, cuotas a padres de familia
32
E016 Pago de imprevistos como: derecho a examen, examen extraordinario,
cursos de regularización, etcétera
32
E017 Equipo escolar: máquinas de escribir, calculadora, etcétera 32
E018 Gastos recurrentes en educación técnica: credenciales, seguro médico,
seguro de vida, cuotas a padres de familia
32
E019 Pago de imprevistos para educación técnica, como: derecho a examen,
cursos de regularización, etcétera
32
E020 Material para la educación adicional 32
E021 Reparación y/o mantenimiento de equipo escolar 32
E022 Enciclopedia y libros (excluya los de la escuela) 7
E023 Periódicos 7
E024 Revistas 7
E025 Audiocasetes, discos y discos compactos 7
E026 Otros 16
E027 Cines 34
E028 Teatros y conciertos 34
E029 Centros nocturnos (incluye alimentos, bebidas, tabaco, entrada,
propinas, etcétera)
34
E030 Espectáculos deportivos 34
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E031 Lotería y juegos de azar 34
E032 Cuotas a centros sociales, asociaciones, clubes, etcétera 34
E033 Renta de casetes para videojuegos, discos compactos y videocasetes 30
E034 Otros gastos de recreación: museo, ferias, juegos mecánicos, balnearios,
etcétera
34
F001 Instalación de la línea de teléfono particular 27
F002 Teléfonos celulares, pago inicial y equipo 27
F003 Compra de tarjeta para servicio de teléfono celular 27
F004 Teléfono público 27
F005 Estampillas para correo, paquetería, telégrafo 27
F006 Otros servicios: Internet público, fax público, etcétera 27
F007 Gasolina Magna 8
F008 Gasolina Premium 8
F009 Diesel y gas 8
F010 Aceites y lubricantes 8
F011 Reparación de llantas 19
F012 Pensión y estacionamiento 19
F013 Lavado y engrasado 19
F014 Otros servicios: encerado, inflado de llantas, etcétera 19
G001 Cuota por la vivienda recibida como prestación en el trabajo 28
G002 Cuota de la vivienda en otra situación 28
G003 Cuota o pago a otro hogar 28
G004 Alquiler de terrenos 30
G005 Recolección de basura 34
G006 Cuotas de vigilancia 31
G007 Cuotas de administración 31
G008 Otros servicios 31





G014 Combustible para calentar 8
G015 Velas y veladoras 16
G016 Otros combustibles: cartón, papel, etcétera 7
G101 Renta o alquiler de la vivienda 29
G102 Estimación del alquiler de la vivienda que es prestada 29
G103 Estimación del alquiler de vivienda propia y se está pagando 29
G104 Estimación del alquiler de la vivienda que es propia 29
G105 Estimación del alquiler de vivienda intestada o en litigio 29
G106 Estimación del alquiler de la vivienda en otra situación 29
H001 Pantalones para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
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H002 Trajes, sacos, conjuntos, abrigos, gabardinas e impermeables para niño
de 0 a 4 años
4
H003 Camisas para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H004 Playeras para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H005 Camisetas para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H006 Suéteres, sudaderas y chambritas para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H007 Pants para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H008 Trusas y bóxer para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H009 Calcetines, calcetas y tines para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H010 Calzones de hule para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H011 Pañales de tela para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H012 Telas, confecciones y reparaciones para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H013 Otras prendas de vestir: baberos, delantales, fajillas, batas, pijamas,
etcétera para niño de 0 a 4 años
4
H014 Pantalones para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H015 Trajes, sacos, conjuntos, abrigos, gabardinas e impermeables para niña
de 0 a 4 años
4
H016 Vestidos y faldas para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H017 Playeras para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H018 Camisetas para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H019 Suéteres, sudaderas y chambritas para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H020 Blusas para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H021 Pants para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H022 Pantaletas para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H023 Calcetas, tobilleras y tines para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H024 Calzones de hule para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H025 Pañales de tela para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H026 Telas, confecciones y reparaciones para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H027 Otras prendas de vestir: baberos, delantales, fajillas, batas, pijamas,
etcétera ( para niña de 0 a 4 años
4
H028 Pantalones para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H029 Camisas para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H030 Playeras para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H031 Trajes, sacos, abrigos, gabardinas e impermeables para niño de 5 a 17
años
4
H032 Chamarras para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H033 Suéteres y sudaderas para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H034 Trusas y bóxer para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H035 Camisetas para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H036 Calcetines, calcetas y tines para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H037 Pants para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H038 Telas, confecciones y reparaciones para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
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H039 Otras prendas de vestir para hombre: corbatas, batas, pijamas, etcétera
para niño de 5 a 17 años
4
H040 Pantalones para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H041 Blusas para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H042 Playeras para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H043 Trajes, sacos, conjuntos, abrigos, gabardinas e impermeables para niña
de 5 a 17 años
4
H044 Vestidos para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H045 Faldas para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H046 Suéteres y sudaderas para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H047 Chamarras para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H048 Calcetas, tobilleras, tines y mallas para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H049 Pantaletas y fajas para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H050 Brassieres para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H051 Fondos y corpiños para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H052 Medias, pantimedias y tobimedias para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H053 Pants para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H054 Telas, confecciones y reparaciones para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H055 Otras prendas de vestir para mujer: rebozo, pijamas, camisones, batas,
etcétera para niña de 5 a 17 años
4
H056 Pantalones para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H057 Camisas para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H058 Playeras para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H059 Trajes, sacos, conjuntos, abrigos, gabardinas e impermeables para
hombre de 18 o más años
4
H060 Suéteres y sudaderas para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H061 Chamarras para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H062 Trusas y bóxer para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H063 Camisetas para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H064 Calcetines, calcetas y tines para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H065 Pants para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H066 Telas, confecciones y reparaciones para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H067 Otras prendas de vestir para hombre: corbatas, batas, pijamas, etcétera
para hombre de 18 o más años
4
H068 Pantalones para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H069 Blusas para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H070 Playeras para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H071 Trajes, sacos, conjuntos, abrigos, gabardinas e impermeables para mujer
de 18 o más años
4
H072 Vestidos para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H073 Faldas para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H074 Suéteres y sudaderas para mujer de 18 o más años 4
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H075 Chamarras para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H076 Calcetas, tobilleras, tines y mallas para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H077 Pantaletas y fajas para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H078 Brassieres para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H079 Fondos y corpiños para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H080 Medias, pantimedias y tobimedias para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H081 Pants para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H082 Telas, confecciones y reparaciones para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H083 Otras prendas de vestir para mujer: rebozos, pijamas, camisones, batas,
etcétera para mujer de 18 o más años
4
H084 Zapatos para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H085 Botas para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H086 Tenis para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H087 Huaraches para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H088 Sandalias para baño o descanso para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H089 Pantuflas para niño de 0 a 4 años 4
H090 Zapatos y sandalias para vestir para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H091 Botas para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H092 Tenis para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H093 Huaraches para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H094 Sandalias para baño o descanso para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H095 Pantuflas para niña de 0 a 4 años 4
H096 Zapatos para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H097 Botas para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H098 Tenis para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H099 Huaraches para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H100 Sandalias para baño o descanso para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H101 Pantuflas para niño de 5 a 17 años 4
H102 Zapatos y sandalias para vestir para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H103 Botas para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H104 Tenis para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H105 Huaraches para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H106 Sandalias para baño o descanso para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H107 Pantuflas para niña de 5 a 17 años 4
H108 Zapatos para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H109 Botas para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H110 Tenis para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H111 Huaraches para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H112 Sandalias para baño o descanso para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H113 Pantuflas para hombre de 18 o más años 4
H114 Zapatos y sandalias para vestir para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H115 Botas para mujer de 18 o más años 4
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H116 Tenis para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H117 Huaraches para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H118 Sandalias para baño o descanso para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H119 Pantuflas para mujer de 18 o más años 4
H120 Servicio de limpieza y reparación de calzado 21
H121 Crema para calzado 9
H122 Otros: agujetas, cepillos, etcétera 16
H123 Bolsas 5
H124 Cinturones, carteras y monederos 5
H125 Diademas 16
H126 Encendedores, cigarreras y polveras 16
H127 Joyería de fantasía 16
H128 Portafolios 16
H129 Relojes de pulso 14
H130 Sombreros, gorros y cachuchas 4
H131 Otros accesorios: lentes oscuros, etcétera 14
H132 Artículos y accesorios para el cuidado del bebé 16
H133 Reparación y/o mantenimiento de los artículos anteriores 21
H134 Uniformes y prendas de vestir para actividades educativas, artísticas y
deportivas
4
H135 Prendas de vestir para eventos especiales derivados de la educación 4
H136 Telas, confecciones y reparaciones 4
I001 Vajilla completa de cristal, barro, plástico, etcétera 16
I002 Piezas sueltas de vajilla de cristal, barro, plástico, etcétera 16
I003 Recipientes o cajas de plástico para la cocina 16
I004 Vasos, copas y jarras de cristal, plástico, cerámica, etcétera 16
I005 Cubiertos 16
I006 Plantas y flores artificiales, objetos de cerámica, orfebrería, porcelana, y
otros artículos decorativos
16
I007 Accesorios de hule y plástico: jabonera, tapetes, espejos, etc. 16
I008 Reloj de pared o mesa 16
I009 Batería de cocina y piezas sueltas 16
I010 Olla express 16
I011 Otros utensilios: tijeras, abrelatas, pinzas para hielo, etc. 16
I012 Herramientas: martillo, pinzas, taladro, etcétera 16
I013 Reparación y/o mantenimiento de los artículos anteriores 16
I014 Colchones 4
I015 Colchonetas 4
I016 Cobertores y cobijas 4
I017 Sábanas 4
I018 Fundas 4
I019 Colchas, edredones 4
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I020 Manteles y servilletas 4
I021 Toallas 4
I022 Cortinas 4
I023 Telas, confecciones y reparaciones de artículos anteriores 4
I024 Hilos, hilazas y estambres 4
I025 Agujas, cierres, botones y broches 4
I026 Otros artículos: hamacas, almo-hadas, cojines, etc. 4
J001 Honorarios por servicios profesionales: cirugía, anestesia, etcétera,
durante el parto
33
J002 Hospitalización, durante el parto 33
J003 Análisis clínicos y estudios médicos: Rayos X, ultrasonido, etcétera,
durante el parto
33
J004 Medicamentos recetados y material de curación, durante el parto 9
J005 Servicios de partera, durante el parto 33
J006 Otros: servicio de ambulancia, etcétera, durante el parto 33
J007 Consultas médicas, durante el embarazo 33
J008 Consultas, placas, puentes dentales y otros, durante el embarazo 33
J009 Medicamentos recetados, durante el embarazo 9
J010 Vitaminas y complementos alimenticios, durante el embarazo 3
J011 Análisis clínicos y estudios médicos: rayos X, ultrasonidos, durante el
embarazo
33
J012 Hospitalización durante el embarazo (no parto) 33
J013 Servicios de partera, durante el embarazo 33
J014 Hierbas medicinales, remedios caseros, etcétera, durante el embarazo 9
J015 Otros servicios: ambulancia, aplicación de inyecciones, vacunas,
etcétera, durante el embarazo
33
J016 Consultas médico general 33
J017 Consultas médico especialista (pediatría y ginecología, etc.) 33
J018 Consultas dentales (placas dentales o prótesis dentales, etc.) 33
J019 Análisis clínicos y estudios médicos: rayos X 33
J020 Medicamentos recetados para: diarrea, infecciones y malestar estomacal 9
J021 Medicamentos recetados para: gripe 9
J022 Medicamentos recetados para: piel 9
J023 Medicamentos recetados para: alergias 9
J024 Medicamentos recetados para: tos 9
J025 Medicamentos recetados para: infecciones de la garganta 9
J026 Medicamentos recetados para: fiebre 9
J027 Medicamentos recetados para: inflamación 9
J028 Medicamentos recetados para: otras infecciones (antibióticos) 9
J029 Medicamentos recetados para: dolor de cabeza y migraña 9
J030 Medicamentos recetados para: otro tipo de dolores 9
J031 Medicamentos recetados para: presión arterial 9
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J032 Medicamentos recetados para: diabetes 9
J033 Medicamentos recetados para: vitaminas 9
J034 Medicamentos recetados para: anticonceptivos 9
J035 Otros medicamentos recetados 9
J036 Consultas médicas para el control de peso 33
J037 Medicamentos y productos para el control de peso 9
J038 Tratamiento para el control de peso 33
J039 Honorarios por servicios profesionales: cirujano, anestesista, etc. 33
J040 Hospitalización 33
J041 Análisis clínicos y estudios médicos (rayos X, electros, etc.) 33
J042 Medicamentos recetados y material de curación 9
J043 Otros: servicios de ambulancia, oxígeno, suero, sondas, bolsas de
diálisis y de orina, cómodos, etc.
33
J044 Medicamentos sin receta para: diarrea, infecciones y malestar estomacal 9
J045 Medicamentos sin receta para: gripe 9
J046 Medicamentos sin receta para: piel 9
J047 Medicamentos sin receta para: alergias 9
J048 Medicamentos sin receta para: tos 9
J049 Medicamentos sin receta para: infecciones de la garganta 9
J050 Medicamentos sin receta para: fiebre 9
J051 Medicamentos sin receta para: inflamación 9
J052 Medicamentos sin receta para: otras infecciones (antibióticos) 9
J053 Medicamentos sin receta para: dolor de cabeza y migraña 9
J054 Medicamentos sin receta para: otro tipo de dolores 9
J055 Medicamentos sin receta para: vitaminas 9
J056 Medicamentos sin receta para: presión arterial 9
J057 Medicamentos sin receta para: diabetes 9
J058 Medicamentos sin receta para: anticonceptivos 9
J059 Otros medicamentos sin receta 9
J060 Algodón, gasas, vendas, etc. 33
J061 Alcohol, merthiolate, solución antiséptica, etcétera 33
J062 Consultas con el curandero, huesero, quiropráctico, etcétera 33
J063 Medicamento naturista, hierbas medicinales, remedios caseros 9
J064 Medicamento homeopático 9
J065 Anteojos y lentes de contacto 14
J066 Aparatos para sordera 14
J067 Aparatos ortopédicos y para terapia, silla de ruedas, andadera, muletas,
etcétera
14
J068 Reparación y mantenimiento de aparatos ortopédicos 14
J069 Otros: pago de enfermeras y personal al cuidado de enfermos, terapias,
etcétera
33
J070 Cuotas a hospitales o clínicas 33
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J071 Cuotas a compañías de seguros 28
J072 Cuotas de seguro popular 28
K001 Ventilador 13
K002 Aparatos telefónicos 13
K003 Identificador de llamadas, fax, etc. 13
K004 Aparatos de aire acondicionado para casa (incluye refrigeración o clima) 13
K005 Máquina de coser y accesorios 13
K006 Cocina integral 13
K007 Estufa de gas 13





K013 Extractor de jugos 13
K014 Horno de microondas 13
K015 Lavadora 13
K016 Aspiradora 13
K017 Calentador de gas 13
K018 Calentador de otro combustible 13
K019 Lámparas eléctricas (incluye candiles) 13
K020 Lámparas de otro combustible 13
K021 Tanque de gas e instalación 13
K022 Lavadero, tinaco y bomba de agua 13
K023 Compra e instalación de paneles solares y planta de luz propia 13
K024 Otros aparatos: tostador, calefactor, horno eléctrico, etcétera 13
K025 Reparación, y/o mantenimiento de los artículos anteriores 13
K026 Juego de recámara 16
K027 Piezas sueltas de recámara: camas, tocadores, literas, etcétera 16
K028 Juego de comedor o antecomedor 16
K029 Piezas sueltas para comedor o antecomedor (mesas, sillas) 16
K030 Juego de sala 16
K031 Piezas sueltas para sala (mesa de centro) Muebles 16
K032 Muebles para cocina (gabinete, mesa, etcétera) 16
K033 Muebles para baño (taza, tina, tina de hidromasaje, etcétera) 16
K034 Muebles para jardín 16
K035 Alfombras y tapetes 16
K036 Otros muebles: libreros, escritorio, mesa para televisión, etcétera 16
K037 Reparación y/o mantenimiento de los artículos anteriores 16
K038 Materiales para reparación y mantenimiento 16
K039 Servicios de reparación y mantenimiento 18
K040 Materiales para ampliación y remodelación 18
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K041 Servicios para ampliación y remodelación 18
K042 Materiales para reparación y mantenimiento 18
K043 Servicios de reparación y mantenimiento 18
K044 Materiales para ampliación, construcción y remodelación 18
K045 Servicios para ampliación, construcción y remodelación 18
L001 Radio y radio despertador 13
L002 Estéreo y modular 13
L003 Grabadora 13
L004 Televisión blanco y negro (incluye portátil) 13
L005 Televisión color (incluye portátil), LCD y plasma 13
L006 Lector de DVD y Blu-Ray (incluye portátil) 13
L007 Computadora 13
L008 Accesorios para computadora (mouse, memorias usb, etc) 13
L009 Decodificador de T.V., control remoto, etcétera 13
L010 Accesorios: bocinas, audífonos, antena aérea, control remoto, etc. 13
L011 Videocasetes, cartuchos y discos para videojuegos 13
L012 Reproductor de discos compactos, MP3 y IPod (MP4) 13
L013 Reproductor de discos compactos, DVD para vehículos y autoestéreo 13
L014 Alquiler de televisión, videocaseteras, computadoras, etcétera 30
L015 Otros aparatos: Walkman, etc. 13
L016 Reparación y/o mantenimiento de los artículos anteriores 13
L017 Proyectores 14
L018 Cámaras fotográficas y de video 14
L019 Material fotográfico, películas 9
L020 Servicio fotográfico, revelado e impresión 30
L021 Otros artículos y servicios: tripié, alquiler de equipo, proyectores, etc. 14
L022 Reparación y mantenimiento de los artículos anteriores 21
L023 Juguetes, juegos de mesa 16
L024 Juegos electrónicos, videojuegos 16
L025 Instrumentos musicales 16
L026 Artículos de deporte y cacería (aparatos para ejercicio, etcétera) 16
L027 Artículos de jardinería: plantas, flores, macetas, tierra, abonos 1
L028 Reparación y/o mantenimiento de los artículos anteriores. 21
L029 Compra y cuidado de animales domésticos: patos, perros, etcétera 1
M001 Transporte foráneo 23
M002 Transporte ferroviario 23
M003 Transporte aéreo 25
M004 Servicio de carga y mudanza 23
M005 Cuotas de autopista 26
M006 Otros: lancha, barco, carreta, alquiler de vehículos, etcétera 24
M007 Automóvil y/o guayín 19
M008 Camioneta (pick up) 19
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M009 Motoneta, motocicleta 19
M010 Bicicleta 15
M011 Otros: remolque, lancha, triciclo, etcétera 15
M012 Llantas 19
M013 Acumulador 19
M014 Refacciones: bujías, bandas, filtros, etcétera 19
M015 Partes de vehículos: vidrios, salpicaderas, etcétera 19
M016 Accesorios: espejos, manijas, antenas, etcétera 19
M017 Servicios de afinación, alineación y balanceo 19
M018 Otros servicios: ajuste de motor, de frenos, hojalatería, pintura, etcétera 19
N001 Servicios profesionales de abogados, notarios, arquitectos, etcétera (no
médicos)
31
N002 Funerales y cementerios 34
N003 Paquetes para fiesta (salón, comida, orquesta) 22
N004 Gastos turísticos: paquetes, hospedajes, alimentos, tours, etcétera 26
N005 Hospedaje o alojamiento sin fines turísticos (con o sin alimentos) 22
N006 Gastos en cargos comunales para festividades locales 34
N007 Contribuciones para obras del servicio público local 31
N008 Seguro de automóvil 28
N009 Seguros contra incendio, daños y riesgos para la vivienda, educación y
seguro de vida (no capitalizable)
28
N010 Otros gastos diversos no comprendidos en las categorías anteriores 21
N011 Indemnizaciones pagadas a terceros 34
N012 Pérdidas y robos en dinero (excluya negocios) 34
N013 Ayuda a parientes y personas ajenas al hogar (en dinero) 34
N014 Contribuciones a instituciones benéficas en dinero, iglesias, cruz roja,
incluye servicios eclesiásticos
34
N015 Servicios del sector público: expedición de pasaporte, actas, títulos,
etcétera
31
N016 Trámites para vehículos: licencias, placas, verificación vehicular,
etcétera
31
R001 Energía eléctrica 17
R002 Agua 17
R003 Gas natural 17
R004 Impuesto predial 31
R005 Largas distancias de línea particular 27
R006 Llamadas locales de línea particular 27
R007 Teléfonos celulares (plan mensual) 27
R008 Internet 27
R009 Televisión de paga 27
R010 Paquete de Internet y teléfono 27
R011 Paquete de Internet, teléfono y televisión de paga 27
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R012 Tenencia vehicular 19
R013 Alarmas para la casa 18
T901 Alimentos, bebidas y tabaco 3
T902 Transporte (pasajes) 23
T903 Artículos o servicios destinados a la limpieza y cuidados de la casa 9
T904 Artículos o servicios destinados a cuidados personales 9
T905 Artículos o servicios destinados a educación, cultura y recreación 34
T906 Artículos o servicios destinados a la comunicación y servicios para
vehículos
27
T907 Artículos o servicios destinados a vivienda y servicios de conservación 21
T908 Último recibo pagado 21
T909 Prendas de vestir, calzado y accesorios 21
T910 Cristalería, blancos y utensilios domésticos 16
T911 Artículos o servicios destinados a cuidados de la salud 33
T912 Enseres domésticos y mantenimiento de la vivienda 21
T913 Artículos de esparcimiento 21
T914 Artículos o servicios destinados al transporte 23
T915 Gastos diversos 16
T916 Erogaciones financieras y de capital 28

Appendix C
Table C.1 ENIGH-WIOD reduced matching and carbon intensities
CI (kg/MXN)
Item WIOD code WIOD description CO2 CO2e
Electricity 17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 0.290 0.297
Motor Fuels 8 Coke, Refined Petroleum 0.217 0.222
Gas 8 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 0.140 0.140
Public Transport 23 Inland Transport 0.029 0.031
Food 1 Agriculture 0.032 0.173
3 Food processing 0.016 0.044
Other 4 Textiles 0.017 0.024
5 Leather, Footwear 0.013 0.019
6 Wood and Wood Products 0.018 0.047
7 Pulp, Paper 0.019 0.020
8 Chemicals and Products 0.014 0.022
9 Rubber and Plastics 0.013 0.015
10 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 0.056 0.100
11 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 0.021 0.028
12 Machinery 0.005 0.006
13 Electrical and Optical Equipment 0.008 0.009
14 Transport Equipment 0.008 0.010
15 Manufacturing; Recycling 0.022 0.027
16 Construction 0.018 0.023
17 Sale Motor Vehicles and Fuel 0.017 0.019
18 Wholesale and Commission Trade 0.008 0.010
19 Retail Trade 0.012 0.014
20 Hotels and Restaurants 0.025 0.026
21 Water Transport 0.147 0.152
22 Air Transport 0.013 0.075
23 Other Transport 0.018 0.019
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24 Post and Telecommunications 0.008 0.009
25 Financial Intermediation 0.004 0.005
26 Real Estate Activities 0.004 0.004
27 Renting of M&Eq and Other 0.009 0.010
28 Public Admin and Defence 0.015 0.016
29 Education 0.012 0.012
30 Health and Social Work 0.011 0.013
31 Other Services 0.013 0.101
Appendix D
Table D.1 SUSENAS-WIOD Matching 2014
SUSENAS code SUSENAS description WIOD sector
1 CEREALS [R.2-R.9]
2 Rice 3
3 Glutinous rice 3
4 Fresh corn with husk 3
5 Dryshelled corn/corn rice 3
6 Rice meal 3
7 Corn meal 3




12 Sweet potatoes 1
13 Sago flour 1
14 Taro 1
15 Potatoes 1
16 Dried cassava 1
17 Flour dried cassava 1
18 Cassava flour 1
19 Others 1
20 FISH/SHRIMP/SQUID/SHELL [R.21-R.52]
21 Yellow tail/fusiliers 1
22 Eastern tuna/skipjack tuna 1
23 Mackerel 1
24 Trevallies 1
25 Indian mackerel 1
26 Anchovies 1
27 Milk fish 1
28 Snake head 1
29 Mozambique tilapia 1
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36 Common squid/cuttle fish 1
37 Mud crab/swim crab 1
38 Cockle/snail 1
39 Others 1
40 Indian mackerel 1
41 Mackerel 1
42 Eastern tuna/skipjack tuna 1
43 Anchovies 1
44 Trevallies 1
45 Snakeskin gourame 1
46 Milk fishes 1
47 Snake head 1
48 Canned fish 1
49 Others 1
50 Shrimps 1




55 Buffalo meat 3
56 Lamb meat 3
57 Pork 3
58 Broiler meat 3
59 Local chicken meat 3
60 Other poultry meat 3
61 Other meat 3
62 Dried beef 3
63 Shredded fried meat 3
64 Canned meat 3
65 Others 3
66 Liver 3
67 Innards excluding liver 3
68 Trimming 3
69 Bone (untrimmed) 3
70 Others 3
71 EGGS AND MILK [R.72-R.84]
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72 Broiler egg 3
73 Local chicken egg 3
74 Duck egg 3
75 Quail egg 3
76 Other egg 3
77 Salted egg 3
78 Fresh milk 3
79 Preserved milk 3
80 Sweet canned liquid milk 3
81 Canned powder milk 3
82 Baby powder milk 3
83 Cheese 3
84 Milk product 3
85 VEGETABLES [R.86-R.114]
86 Spinach 3
87 Swamp cabbage 3
88 Cabbage 3
89 Chinese cabbage 3
90 Mustard greens 3
91 Beans 3




96 Cassava leaf 3
97 Aubergine 3
98 Bean sprout 3
99 Squash 3
100 Unripe corn 3
101 Soup/stir-fried vegetables 3
102 Sour vegetable soup 3
103 Young jackfruit 3
104 Unripe papaya 3
105 Mushroom 3
106 Petai beans 3




111 Green chili 3
112 Cayenne pepper 3
113 Canned vegetable 3
176
SUSENAS code SUSENAS description WIOD sector
114 Others 3
115 LEGUMES [R.116-R.126]
116 Peanuts without shell 3
117 Peanuts with shell 3
118 Soybean 3
119 Mungbean 3
120 Red kidney bean 3
121 Other bean 3
122 Tofu, soybean curd 3
123 Fermented soybean cake 3
124 Fermented soybean paste 3












137 "Ambon" banana 1
138 "Raja" banana 1





144 Spanish plum 1
145 Watermelon 1
146 Melon 1
147 Jack fruit 1
148 Tomato 1
149 Canned fruit 1
150 Others 1
151 OILS AND FATS [R.152-R.157]
152 Coconut oil 3
153 Corn oil 3
154 Other frying oil 3
155 Coconut 3
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159 Cane sugar 3
160 Brown sugar 3
161 T e a 3
162 Powdered/bean coffee 3
163 Instant cocoa 3











175 Fish paste 3
176 Soya sauce 3
177 Monosodium glutamate 3
178 Chili sauce/tomato sauce 3
179 Spice 3
180 Other spice 3
181 MISCELLANEOUS FOOD ITEM [R.182-R.190]
182 Instant noodle 3
183 Wheat noodle 3
184 Rice noodle 3
185 Macaroni 3
186 Crisps 3
187 Fried chips 3
188 Seaweed 3
189 Porridge in package 3
190 Others 3
191 PREPARED FOOD AND BEVERAGES [
R.192-R.222]
192 Ordinary bread 3
193 Other bread 3
194 Cookies 3
195 Boil or steam cake 3
196 Fried food 3
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197 Porridge of mung bean 3
198 Kind of salad with peanuts sauce 3
199 A plate of rice accompanied by a mixture of dishes 3
200 Fried rice 3
201 Rice 3
202 Rice steamed in a banana leaf or coconut leaf 3
203 Soup 3
204 Roasted meat on skewer/satay 3
205 Noodle (with meatball/boiled/fried) 3
206 Instant noodle 3
207 Snack for children 3
208 Fish (fried, roasted, etc) 3
209 Chicken/meat (fried, roasted, etc) 3
210 Other prepared food 3
211 Mineral water (bottle) 3
212 Mineral water (gallon) 3
213 Packed tea 3
214 Packed juice 3
215 CO2 drink 3
216 Health drink 3
217 Other drinks (coffee, milk, etc) 3
218 Ice cream 3
219 Other ice 3
220 B e e r 3
221 Wine 3
222 Other alcoholic beverage 3
223 TOBACCO AND BETEL [R.224-R.229]
224 Clove filter cigarettes 3
225 Clove non filter cigarettes 3
226 Cigarettes 3
227 Tobacco 3
228 Betel/areca nut 3
229 Others 3
230 HOUSING AND HOUSEHOLD FACILITY
[R.231-R.260]
232 rent and house maintenance 29
233 rent and house maintenance 29
234 rent and house maintenance 29
235 rent and house maintenance 29
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242 LPG 8
244 city gas 17
246 kerosene 8
248 generator fuel 8
250 generator: Lubricant oil 8
251 generator: maintenance and repair 21
253 charcoal/coal/briket 8
254 Firewood and other fuel 6
255 Others (flashlight, storage battery, matches, mosquito
repellent, lamp, air freshener, Liquid floor cleaner, etc)
9
256 Post and Telecomunication:Phone bill (home) 27
257 Mobile phone bill 27
258 Phone card/public phone/phone shop 27
259 Post stuff (stamp, etc.) 27
260 Others (internet) 27
261 GOODS AND SERVICES [R.262-R.302]
262 Bathing soap, toothpaste, and shampoo 27
263 Cosmetic articles 27
264 Treatment of skin, face, nails, hair 27
265 Laundry soap (bars, powders, creams, and liquid) 27
266 Clothes maintenance material (softener and fragrances,
bleacing, lubricant, camphor, etc)
27
267 Newspapers, magazine, books, and stationeries (exluding
for education) including magazine rent
27
268 Other stuffs (tissue, baby diaper, satai stick, etc.) 27
269 Health Care:Public Hospital 33
270 Private Hospital 33
271 Sub ordinary Public Health Center 33




274 Traditional treatment 33
275 Traditional birth attendant 33
276 Drug costs (only drugs purchased in pharmacies, drug
stores, etc)
9
277 Self treatment/take medicine without recipe 9
278 Purchasing traditional medicine 9
279 Purchasing glasses, hand/leg artificial, & wheel chair 16
280 Health Preventive Cost Pregnancy examination cost 33
281 Children Under-fives immunization cost 33
282 Medical check-up 33
283 Contraception cost 33
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284 vitamin, medicine herbs, etc. 33
285 School fee and non/formal education cost 32
286 School fee 32
287 Other cost of school contribution 32
288 Text books 32
289 Stationery (pen, pencil, eraser, ruler, calculator, etc.) 32
290 Non-formal education cost 32
292 motor vehicle fuel: gasoline 19
294 motor vehicle fuel: diesel 19
296 motor vehicle fuel: lubricant 19
297 motor vehicle service and repair (brake fluid, battery acid,
battery, brake, clutch, etc.)
19
298 Transport expenses (bus, train, plane, etc.) 23
299 Hotel, inn, cinema, theater, sports, set-top box, cable TV
subscriptions (excluding transport and purchase of goods
for recreation)
22
300 Domestic servant, security, and driver (salary or wages) 35
301 Financial service charge (ATM services, credit card
services, transfer fees, etc.)
28
302 Other services (ID card, driver’s license, birth certificate,
copy, photo, etc.)
34
303 CLOTHING, FOOTWEAR, AND HEADGEAR
[R.304-R.311]
304 Ready-made clothes for men 4
305 Ready-made clothes for women 4
306 Ready-made clothes for children 4
307 Materials clothing for men, women, and children 4
308 Wages sewing, repairing clothes, sewing thread, and other
goods for the purposes of tailoring
4
309 Footwear (shoes, sandals, socks, etc) 5
310 Headgear for men, women, and children (hat, cap, scarf,
etc..)
4
311 Others (towel, belt, shoe polish, tie, laundry, etc.) 4
312 DURABLE GOODS [R.313-R.329]
313 Furniture 6
314 Household furnishings (sewing machines, refrigerators,
fans, washing machines, air conditioners, etc..)
14
315 Household equipments (mattresses, pillows, tablecloths,
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316 Home appliances (iron, broom, scissors, knives, machetes,
hoes, saws, vacuum cleaner, coat hanger, soldering
equipment, etc..)
16
317 Kitchen utensils (rack plate, stove, pots, pans, buckets,
kitchen knives, pans, spoons, flasks, plates, glasses,
mixers, rice cookers, blenders, microwaves, ovens, and
other dishes made of glass / ceramic / melamine / plastic,
etc..)
16
318 Decoration stuff (wall hangings, aquariums, decorative
items made of ceramic, porcelain, onyx, marble, wood,
etc..)
14
319 Furniture and utensils repairs 21
320 Hand phone and other accessories 14
321 Watch, clock, camera, glasses, and repairs 14
322 Umbrella, bag, and repairs 16
323 Jewelry and repairs 16
324 Toys and repair, imitation jewelry 16
325 Electronics (Television, radio, video, DVD, cassette,
cassette radio, guitar, piano / organ, computer) and repair
14
326 Tools and sports equipment (chess, racket, ball, net, bet,
sticks, including bathing suits, soccer shoes, wheels shoes
, goggles) and repairs
16
327 Vehicles (cars, motorcycles, bicycles, etc..) and major
repairs
19
328 Domestic animal and plant maintenance 1
329 Other durable goods (electrical installation / phone / tap,
swing, stroller, etc..) and repairs
14
330 TAXES AND INSURANCES [R.331-R.336]
331 Buildings and land taxes 28
332 Motor and non-motor vehicle taxes 28
333 Other contributions (dues RT / RW, trash, security,
cemetery, parking, etc..)
28
334 Health insurance 28
335 Live insurance and general insurance (death insurance,
accident, car, house, etc..)
28
336 Others (ticket, Income Tax, etc..) 28
337 PARTIES AND CEREMONIES [R.338-R.343]
338 Wedding 34
339 Circumcision and birthday 34
340 Religious festival (chair rental, tent rental, etc..) 34
341 Pilgrimage cost 34
182
SUSENAS code SUSENAS description WIOD sector
342 Religious/traditional ceremony (called Ustad, Reverend,
offerings, etc..)
34
343 Funeral expenses 34
